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OR at least ninety years, courts and commentators have debated
about how to deal with the special issues raised by expert witness
testimony. Judge Learned Hand, in a 1901 article, identified the
twin problems of expert witnesses: (i) venality; and (ii) authority.' In
essence, the lure of witness fees will attract a qualified expert willing to
testify to almost anything; and the special qualifications and knowledge of
the expert, as well as the trial judge's certification that the witness is an
1. Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testi-
mony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 50-52 (1901).
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expert, may perhaps lend an undue "aura of mystic infallibility"'2 to the
expert's testimony.
Because of these risks, the common law imposed a number of con-
straints on the admissibility of expert witness testimony, thus limiting the
issues and the bases on which an expert would be permitted to testify.
When it enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, Congress was
aware of the unique problems expert testimony presents, yet it chose to
enact a set of rules that rejected many of the common law's constraints on
admissibility. In doing so, Congress relied primarily on the adversarial
process to counter-balance the (supposed) tendency of juries to give un-
due weight to expert testimony of questionable validity.
While the balance that Congress struck has worked reasonably well,3
recent decisions addressing the use of expert testimony in toxic tort cases4
have questioned Congress's judgment on this issue. In toxic tort cases,
expert testimony plays a crucial role, because it would be difficult for a
plaintiff to satisfy his or her burden of proof regarding causation without
the specialized knowledge and opinion of an expert. In tension with this
necessary element of proof is the perception of both courts and commen-
tators that an expert can be found who will testify to virtually anything.
Certain courts and commentators have expressed frustration concerning
the liberal standards for admissibility of expert testimony under the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence,5 because the Rules may allow into evidence ex-
pert testimony that is on the fringe, or even expressly repudiated, by
mainstream experts in the field.
At the same time, a perception has arisen that the tort system does not
work, often leads to ridiculous results, and is in grave need of reform.
Some have attributed these problems to gullible, and perhaps irrational,
2. United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1199 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1117 (1979); Addison v. United States, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("posture of
mythic infallibility"); United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.) (aura of "reliabil-
ity"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975).
3. See, e.g., CARNEGIE COMM'N ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, & GOV'T, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY IN JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES AND MEETING
CHALLENGES 13 (1993) ("Our examination of the cases leads to the conclusion that,
although such dissatisfaction [with the manner in which the legal system deals with scien-
tific and technological issues] does exist, many of the concerns expressed are greatly
exaggerated.").
4. Toxic tort cases generally involve those in which "plaintiffs seek compensation for
harm allegedly caused by exposure to a substance that increases the risk of contracting a
serious disease, but generally involve a period of latency or incubation prior to onset of the
disease. Exposure to radiation and the use of pharmaceutical drugs or products fall within
this loose rubric. Although many kinds of injuries are involved, most toxic tort cases in-
volve cancer and the issue of carcinogenesis." Bert Black, A Unified Theory Of Scientific
Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 602 n.29 (1988). Additionally, exposure to drugs
during pregnancy that result in birth defects has also been characterized as a toxic tort.
Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 309 (5th Cir.), modified, 884
F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990).
5. Because the evidentiary rules concerning expert testimony were intended to liber-
alize the admissibility of such testimony by rejecting certain of the common law rules re-
stricting its use, the term "liberal," as used in this article, is intended to describe a plain-
meaning interpretation of the Rules, in accordance with the intentions of their drafters.
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juries. Fearful that juries will be too willing to find liability on the basis of
questionable expert testimony, certain courts have set about to resolve
the perceived problems and injustices that may arise in toxic tort cases
through two approaches, each of which is designed to keep liability ques-
tions from the jury's consideration. First, under the standard for sum-
mary judgment established in 1986 by the Celotex trilogy,6 certain courts
have ruled that expert testimony of questionable credibility will not cre-
ate a genuine issue as to whether the exposure to a defendant's product
factually caused the plaintiff's injury.7 Finding no genuine factual dispute
with respect to the issue of cause in fact, the trial judge can grant sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendant, thereby keeping the liability
issue from the jury. 8 Second, certain courts have "interpreted" the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence to permit the trial judge to exclude an expert's
opinion, if the judge is not convinced of the reliability and scientific valid-
ity of that opinion.9 In practice, courts have exercised this authority to
restrict the admission of relevant expert testimony on issues, such as cau-
sation, that are essential to a plaintiff's prima facie case. Once the trial
judge has excluded the proffered testimony of the plaintiff's expert, the
plaintiff will often have no evidence to establish causation, making sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendant again appropriate. 10 While
these two approaches work together to keep liability decisions from the
jury, this article will focus on the increasing willingness of certain courts
6. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986).
7. See, e.g., Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1350, 1353
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 84 (1992); Brock, 874 F.2d at 313, as modified, 884 F.2d at
167; Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. de-
nied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989). In a recent antitrust case, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Techni-
cal Serv., the Supreme Court seemed to take a step back from the permissive summary
judgment standards announced in the Celotex trilogy by reversing a grant of summary
judgment and remanding for trial an antitrust claim based upon a reasonably implausible
set of factual assertions. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., 112 S. Ct. 2072,
2078 (1992). It remains unclear, however, whether the Kodak decision was primarily
meant to shift the standards for summary judgment, or shift the underlying scope of anti-
trust liability. The fact that the Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798 (1993), approved the "freer" use of summary judgment in the toxic
tort context (citing with approval the Turpin and Brock decisions), suggests that this ap-
proach to keeping the liability decision in the judge's, and therefore out of the jury's, hands
is likely to continue. See Elkins v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 8 F.3d 1068, 1071 (6th Cir.
1993) (affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant in Bendectin birth de-
fect case, the court noted that "the admissibility of Merrell's affidavit under Daubert is
irrelevant; the district court properly determined that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate
the existence of a genuine factual dispute regarding causation"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1299 (1994). For a discussion of this approach, see Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and
Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and
Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 643 (1992).
8. This article will refer to the first approach intended to keep liability questions from
the jury's consideration as the "procedural" approach.
9. See infra notes 110-41 and accompanying text.
10. This article will refer to the second approach intended to keep liability questions
from the jury's consideration as the "evidentiary" approach.
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to keep the liability decision from the jury through the use of the eviden-
tiary approach.
The evidentiary approach merits particular attention given the Court's
attempt in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc." to address the
extent to which a judge may properly keep relevant evidence from the
jury under the Rules. In Daubert, the Court addressed both the specific
issue of whether relevant scientific evidence must satisfy the general ac-
ceptance standard announced in Frye v. United States12 to be admissible
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the more general issue of the
standards that trial judges should apply in determining whether to admit
expert scientific testimony. On both issues, the Court faced a choice be-
tween a more restrictive approach 13 to the admissibility of such evidence
in which the trial judge would more carefully scrutinize the proffered tes-
timony for "correctness" before admitting it, and a less restrictive ap-
proach which would rely on the jury's good sense as well as the
adversarial process to discredit unreliable scientific evidence.
Instead of facing this choice directly, however, the Daubert Court
seemed to play to both sides of the issue.14 First, in addressing whether
the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence had overruled Frye's
general acceptance test, the Court focused on the "liberal thrust" of the
Rules and the Rules' emphasis on the adversarial process to discredit un-
reliable evidence, and concluded that the enactment of the Rules had
overruled Frye.'5 Yet, in its dicta detailing the standards a trial court
should apply in determining whether to admit scientific testimony, the
Court emphasized the need for the trial court to screen scientific testi-
mony for accuracy before admitting it. The Court required a trial judge
11. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
12. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Frye, the court excluded opinion testimony based
upon a systolic blood pressure detection test (a precursor to the polygraph machine) using
the following language:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the ex-
perimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the de-
duction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general ac-
ceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id. at 1014. From this language, later courts have derived the so-called Frye requirement
that opinion testimony be based upon a technique that is "generally accepted" in the rele-
vant scientific field. See, e.g., Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Ap-
proach to Admissibility, 67 IOWA L. REV. 879, 882-85 (1982).
13. The term "restrictive," as used in this article, is intended to describe those courts
and interpretations which limit the introduction of relevant expert testimony to a greater
extent than was intended under the Federal Rules of Evidence, as reflected in the legisla-
tive history and the plain language of the Rules. Cf In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Lit.,
611 F. Supp. 1223, 1243-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (applying the phrases "restrictive" and "lib-
eral" to describe two approaches for determining the admissibility of expert testimony
under Rule 703), affd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Lombardi v. Dow
Chem. Co., 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
14. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798 (concluding its opinion by attempting to placate
both sides).
15. Id. at 2794.
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to determine, under Rule 702, that expert testimony was scientifically
valid before admitting it,16 and recognized that Frye's general acceptance
test would continue to play an important role in determining such valid-
ity.17 Thus, ironically, the Daubert Court, in the course of one opinion,
ruled that while Frye's general acceptance test did not survive enactment
of the Rules, the Rules had incorporated Frye's general acceptance analy-
sis as a consideration under Rule 702.
Unfortunately, in its attempt to give something to everyone on this
highly charged admissibility issue, the Court has only further muddied
what has recently become a fairly murky area of evidentiary law.18 This
article examines the applicable legislative history and the historical con-
text of the Rules' enactment to determine the appropriate standard for
admission of expert testimony under Rules 702 and 703. This examina-
tion demonstrates that the Daubert Court, as well as the restrictive courts
of appeals, are wrong about the proper role of the trial judge under Rules
702 and 703. By taking the language of these Rules out of their historical
context and giving them a purely literalistic interpretation, these courts
have misconstrued Congress's intent as well as the meaning of these
Rules.
In contrast, the plain meaning and historical context of the Rules' en-
actment demonstrate that Congress intended to liberalize the admissibil-
ity of expert testimony. While Congress recognized the risks that
unrestricted admissibility of expert testimony presents, it intended ques-
tions concerning the admissibility of relevant, but questionable, scientific
evidence to be governed by Rule 403. Under Rule 403's structured bal-
ancing requirements, a trial judge has discretion to exclude relevant sci-
entific evidence only if, upon consideration of the case as a whole and
with the assumption that all parties are represented by able trial counsel,
the judge finds that the probative value of the evidence is substantially
outweighed by the danger' 9 of admitting it. Because Congress's funda-
mental presumption in enacting the Rules was that competent cross-ex-
amination by able trial counsel would likely discredit questionable
scientific evidence, the admission of such evidence will seldom present a
16. Id. at 2796 n.9.
17. Id. at 2797; see also infra note 173. In addition to the possibility of excluding ques-
tionable scientific evidence under Rule 702, the Court also directed trial judges to examine
the underlying factual basis for expert testimony to ensure that the basis satisfied Rule 703.
Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797-98.
18. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2799 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("'General observa-
tions' by this Court customarily carry great weight with lower federal courts, but the ones
offered here suffer from the flaw common to most such observations-they are not applied
to deciding whether or not particular evidence was or was not admissible, and therefore
they tend to be not only general, but vague and abstract.").
19. Under Rule 403, a trial judge has the discretion to exclude relevant evidence if the
probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by one of three "dangers":
"unfair prejudice," "confusion of the issues," or "misleading the jury"; or by one of three
"considerations": "undue delay," "waste of time," or "needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403. This article will refer to all six factors as "dangers" or
"danger."
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serious likelihood of prejudice. As a result, proper use of Rule 403's bal-
ancing test should result in the admission of substantially more relevant
evidence than would be permitted under the restrictive interpretations of
Rules 702 and 703.
The restrictive courts' refusal to rely on the adversarial process to dis-
credit questionable scientific evidence implicates far more than the ques-
tion of which evidentiary rule the courts should rely upon in determining
the admissibility of such evidence. This dispute is not simply a philosoph-
ical one over the efficacy of cross-examination and the adversarial pro-
cess, or an academic one over the relative merits of an admissibility
analysis under Rules 702 and 703, rather than Rule 403. Instead, the re-
strictive courts have read Rules 702 and 703 as establishing a judge-con-
trolled bottleneck to the admission of questionable scientific evidence
that makes it essentially impossible for a wide variety of injured toxic tort
plaintiffs to be compensated through the tort system.
Thus, while the issue is framed in terms of the admissibility of question-
able scientific evidence, the real dispute is over what role, if any, the tort
system should play in compensating a plaintiff who suffers from a serious
injury that the defendant's conduct may have caused. By requiring ex-
pert testimony to reflect a substantial degree of scientific certainty before
admitting it, these courts have substantially increased the toxic tort plain-
tiff's burden of proof, and have limited recovery for the toxic tort plaintiff
to situations where the causal relationship has been scientifically verified,
a degree of certainty not generally required of tort plaintiffs. The inevita-
ble result of such a restrictive interpretation is, in practice, to alter the
substantive law of torts by limiting, and perhaps precluding, the availabil-
ity of a tort remedy for the injured toxic tort plaintiff.
I. EVIDENTIARY RULES PERTAINING TO EXPERT
TESTIMONY: HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Over the past eight to ten years, certain courts and commentators have
become convinced that there is something fundamentally wrong with the
tort system, especially in the area of toxic torts. In dealing with the inju-
ries that can result from exposure to toxic substances, a compensation
system such as the tort system presents the jury with a choice between a
certain and usually serious condition, and an uncertain and often complex
relationship between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's condi-
tion. Some courts and commentators fear that a jury in this situation will
too often make the wrong choice, favoring the party who has suffered the
certain illness or injury, even if the defendant's responsibility for that
condition is less than clear.
Expert witnesses play a central role in this drama by guiding the jury to
an understanding of the relationship, if any, between the defendant's con-
duct and the plaintiff's condition, and by providing the crucial evidentiary
link between the conduct and the condition. Some courts and commenta-
tors fear, however, that such witnesses often mislead the jury by testifying
1994]
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to the existence of a causal relationship even when such a causal link has
not been adequately established. These courts and commentators have
expressed frustration concerning the "hired gun" mentality of many ex-
perts,20 the inability of most lawyers to deal with complex science and
technology on cross-examination, 2 1 and the willingness of experts to ex-
press opinions that are contrary to the established and accepted findings
of the members in such experts' fields of expertise.22 To address these
concerns, commentators have recommended, among other things,
amending the Rules to include such requirements as a judicial analysis of
the reliability of the evidence upon which an expert bases his or her opin-
ion;23 express incorporation of the Frye test;24 incorporation of a rele-
vancy analysis under Rule 702;25 or implementation of special notice rules
for use of expert testimony. 26
Certain federal courts have expressed the specific concern that the lib-
eral admissibility of expert testimony leads to inconsistent and sometimes
inaccurate results in toxic tort cases.27 Unlike the commentators, who
generally seek to amend the applicable evidentiary rules, these courts
have simply read the Rules to include many of the suggested revisions, as
20. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Second,
the professional expert is now commonplace. That a person spends substantially all of his
time consulting with attorneys and testifying is not a disqualification. But experts whose
opinions are available to the highest bidder have no place testifying in a court of law
."); Black, supra note 4, at 598 & n.3.
21. See Black, supra note 4, at 603 n.31; cf William A. Thomas, Some Observations by
a Scientist, 115 F.R.D. 142, 144 (1986).
22. See Black, supra note 4, at 672-74 (discussing medical community's rejection of
causation finding in Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986)); E. Donald Elliot, Toward Incentive-Based Procedure: Three
Approaches for Regulating Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U. L. REV. 487, 489-93 (1989) (discuss-
ing rejection by "conventional scientists" of causation findings that "clinical ecologists"
made). See generally PETER HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURT-
ROOM (1991).
23. See, e.g., Frederic I. Lederer, Resolving the Frye Dilemma-A Reliability Ap-
proach, 115 F.R.D. 84 (1986).
24. See, e.g., James E. Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revitalized: A
Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 115 F.R.D. 173 (1986).
25. See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, A Relevancy Approach to Novel Scientific Evidence,
115 F.R.D. 89 (1986).
26. See, e.g., Paul C. Gianelli, Scientific Evidence: A Proposed Amendment to Federal
Rule 702, 115 F.R.D. 102 (1986).
27. The courts have expressed two fears concerning expert testimony: (i) that juries
will put too much faith in the word of an expert; and (ii) that juries have no real basis for
deciding between two experts espousing diametrically opposed opinions. See Starrs, supra
note 24, at 92 ("Almost as if it were a shibboleth, it has been said and resaid that trial juries
gave overweening deference to scientific evidence, regardless of its validity within the sci-
entific community."); Hand, supra note 1, at 53 ("The trouble with all this is that it is
setting the jury to decide, where doctors disagree. The whole object of the expert is to tell
the jury, not the facts, as we have seen, but general truths derived from his specialized
experience. But how can the jury judge between two statements each founded upon an
experience confessedly foreign in kind to their own? It is just because they are incompe-
tent for such a task that the expert is necessary at all."). Against these two concerns, some
courts believe that the adversarial system has been found wanting. See, e.g., Christopher-
sen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1126 (5th Cir. 1991) (Reavley, J., dissenting)
(responding to the majority's decision, the dissent laments the "neglected virtues of the
adversarial system"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
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well as others, thereby creating a restrictive climate for the admission of
expert testimony in toxic tort cases. 28
To determine whether these restrictive interpretations are warranted,
this article begins its analysis with consideration of the Rules themselves
and the common law evidentiary problems which the expert testimony
Rules were intended to remedy. Consideration of the Rules' historical
context, and the assumptions of the Rules' drafters, is essential to deter-
mining whether the restrictive courts' interpretation of the Rules fairly
implements their drafters' intentions. 29
A. PROMULGATION OF THE RULES: PROCESS OF ADOPTION
The Rules Advisory Committee of the Judicial Conference drafted the
Federal Rules of Evidence under the supervision of the United States
Supreme Court, pursuant to the authority granted to the Court in the
Rules Enabling Act. 30 Congress enacted the Rules into law on January 2,
28. The courts that have placed restrictive interpretations on the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence concerning expert testimony in toxic tort cases include the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and, most recently,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See Richardson v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (limiting Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736
F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984), to novel expert testimony that is at
the "frontier" of medical and epidemiological findings), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989);
Lynch v. Merrell-National Labs., 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987); Christophersen v. Allied-
Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1280 (1992); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1991),
vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1992). The restrictive interpretations of these cases are discussed
in more detail infra notes 110-41 and accompanying text.
29. Cf. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 518 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring) (In dis-
cussing whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorized discovery of trial prepara-
tion materials, Justice Jackson wrote: "It is true that the literal language of the district
court's order [permits the discovery of trial preparation materials] .... But all such proce-
dural measures have a background of custom and practice which was assumed by those
who wrote and should be by those who apply them."). See also Fedorenko v. United
States, 449 U.S. 490, 514 (1981) ("It is not the function of the courts to amend statutes
under the guise of 'statutory interpretation."').
30. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1966). At the time that the Supreme Court promulgated the
Federal Rules of Evidence, § 2072 provided in pertinent part:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the
forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and proce-
dure of the district courts and courts of appeals of the United States in civil
actions ....
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right ....
Not everyone believed that the Rules Enabling Act granted to the Court the authority to
promulgate the Federal Rules of Evidence, however. Justice Douglas dissented from the
Supreme Court's Order transmitting the proposed Rules to Congress, stating:
I can find no legislative history that rules of evidence were to be included in
"practice and procedure" as used in § 2072 .... The words "practice and
procedure" in the setting of the Act seem to me to exclude rules of evidence.
They seem to me to be words of art that describe pretrial procedures, plead-
ings, and procedures for preserving objections and taking appeals.
Order of the Supreme Court of the United States, 56 F.R.D. 184, 185 (November 20, 1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Section 2072 was amended in 1988 to provide expressly that the
Supreme Court shall have the power "to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure
and rules of evidence .... Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No.
1994]
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1975.31 The process of enacting the Federal Rules of Evidence took over
thirteen years, and involved a number of steps, including initial drafting,
revision, and eventual promulgation of proposed Rules by the Rules Ad-
visory Committee, consideration of the proposed Rules by the Supreme
Court, and finally congressional consideration, revision, and enactment of
the Rules in their final form.32 At virtually every step in the process, the
proposed Rules were circulated to the public and the bar, and comments
regarding the Rules were requested and carefully considered. 33
B. CENTRAL PURPOSE FOR ENACTING THE RULES: UNIFORMITY
From its enactment in 1937 until its amendment in 1972, Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 43(a) governed the admissibility of evidence and the
competency of the witnesses to testify in the federal courts. 34 During this
time, Rule 43(a) provided that evidence was admissible if it was admissi-
ble under: (i) the statutes of the United States; (ii) the rules of evidence
historically applied in equity; or (iii) the rules of evidence of the state in
which the federal court was situated.35 Moreover, Rule 43(a) required
100-702, Title IV, § 401(a), 102 Stat. 4648 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2072-74) (emphasis added). Considerations of whether Congress actually had authority
under the Constitution to delegate legislative power to the Supreme Court for the promul-
gation of the Federal Rules of Evidence are beyond the scope of this article. See generally
Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rule-Making Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Cri-
sis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 674 (1975).
31. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 3, 88 Stat. 1959.
32. The specific steps included an evaluation of the advisability and feasibility of es-
tablishing uniform rules of evidence; promulgation of proposed Rules by the Rules Advi-
sory Committee whose members were appointed by the Judicial Conference; the Judicial
Conference's submission of the proposed Rules to the Supreme Court; promulgation of the
proposed Rules by the Supreme Court; transmittal of the proposed Rules by the Supreme
Court for consideration by Congress; congressional hearings concerning the proposed
Rules; congressional revisions to certain of the proposed Rules; and congressional enact-
ment of the proposed Rules in final form. For further discussion of the events leading up
to Congress's enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see S. REP. No. 1277, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051-52.
33. See, e.g., Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1973)
[hereinafter Rules of Evidence: House Hearings 1] (testimony of Albert E. Jenner, Jr.,
Chairman, Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence, Judicial Conference of the United
States) ("Thousands, literally thousands, of the first preliminary draft were distributed to
the bench and bar throughout this nation in 1969 .... The same procedure was followed
with respect to the 1971 revised draft. Literally, 100,000 copies of the two drafts have been
at large in this country for several years.").
34. See, e.g., Faircloth v. Lamb-Grays Harbor Co., 467 F.2d 685, 693 (10th Cir. 1972).
35. Before 1972, Rule 43(a) provided:
(a) Form and Admissibility. In all trials the testimony of a witness shall be
taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by these rules. All
evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the statutes of the
United States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied in the courts
of the United States on the hearing of suits in equity, or under the rules of
evidence applied in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the
United States court is held. In any case, the statute or rule which favors the
reception of the evidence governs and the evidence shall be presented ac-
cording to the most convenient method prescribed in any of the statutes or
rules to which reference is herein made. The competency of a witness to
testify shall be determined in like manner.
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that of these three potential sources of law, the one "which favors the
reception of the evidence governs. 36
While Rule 43(a) sought to bring some conformity to the rules of evi-
dence that the federal courts applied, and to some extent did SO,37 the
Rule created a number of ambiguities, most of which were attributable to
its admittedly "makeshift" character. 38 The principal question that arose
in the admissibility context was whether the "federal equity" provision of
the Rule authorized federal courts to create their own federal common
law of evidence, or merely authorized the federal courts to continue using
the rules of evidence detailed in specific equity precedents. 39 Thus, when
a federal court confronted a state law that required exclusion of certain
evidence and an absence of federal authority on the issue, some federal
courts, under one interpretation of the "federal equity" provision, would
follow the state law and exclude the evidence, while others, under a dif-
ferent interpretation of the "federal equity" provision, would craft their
own federal common law of evidence and admit the evidence.40 Of the
federal courts that followed the latter approach, they often adopted a fed-
eral rule of evidence under the "federal equity" provision with no more
authority for the existence of the supposed rule than a citation to Profes-
sor Wigmore's treatise.41 To add to the confusion, the courts considered
certain issues, such as testimonial privileges, to be substantive rather than
procedural, which necessitated consideration of such issues under the law
of the forum state42 as required by Erie.43
36. Id.
37. Thomas F. Green, Jr., The Admissibility of Evidence Under the Federal Rules, 55
HARV. L. REV. 197, 213 (1941).
38. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Rules of Evidence: A Preliminary Report on the Advisability and Feasibil-
ity of Developing Uniform Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts 13
(1962), reprinted in 1 JAMES F. BAILEY, III, AND OSCAR M. TRELLES, II, THE FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS (1980) [here-
inafter PRELIMINARY REPORT].
39. See, e.g., Hope v. Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 294 F.2d 681, 683-89 (2d Cir.
1961); United States v. 60.14 Acres of Land, 362 F.2d 660, 665-68 (3d Cir. 1966).
40. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 38, at 21-23.
41. See, e.g., Bailey v. Kawasaki-Kisen, 455 F.2d 392, 397 (5th Cir. 1972) (adopting
Professor Wigmore's position as the definitive statement of the rule governing the admissi-
bility of subsequent repair to show defect under the "federal equity" provision of Rule
43(a)). The court's use of Professor Wigmore as authority for establishing a federal com-
mon law of evidence is particularly ironic, given that Professor Wigmore believed that the
federal equity provision of Rule 43(a) did not authorize the federal courts to invoke any
general "Federal common law of evidence." 1 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 6(c)
(James H. Chadbourn rev. 1978). One of the principal difficulties of applying the "federal
equity" provision was that "nobody really knew what rules of evidence the Federal courts
had been applying in suits in equity ....".Rules of Evidence: House Hearings I, infra note
33, at 247 (testimony of Henry J. Friendly, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit).
42. See, e.g., Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Brei, 311 F.2d 463, 465-66 & n.3 (2d
Cir. 1962).
43. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Justice Douglas, and others, believed
that the Rules were unconstitutional because they impermissibly abrogated state law evi-
dentiary privileges. See Order of the Supreme Court of the United States, 56 F.R.D. 184,
185 (November 20, 1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Rules of Evidence: House Hearings I,
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To eliminate this state by state, and circuit by circuit, variation in the
federal courts' evidentiary rules, commentators and others periodically
proposed adopting a uniform set of federal evidentiary rules.44 Eventu-
ally, the need for uniformity led to the thirteen year drafting process
which culminated with Congress's approval of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.45 In considering the Federal Rules of Evidence, the overall goal
of the codification process was to organize the common law rules of evi-
dence into a coherent, and more easily grasped, set of rules that were to
be uniformly applied in the federal courts. 46 As Judge Maris, the Chair-
man of the Judicial Conference's Standing Committee on Rules of Prac-
tice and Procedure, testified: "[T]he basic virtue of the whole task is to
have a Code on the desk of the judge and trial lawyer to which he can
refer immediately when a question comes up . . .47
supra note 33, at 147 (testimony of Arthur J. Goldberg, retired Justice of the United States
Supreme Court).
44. In the early 1940s, the Rules Advisory Committee considered these arguments,
and while recognizing the desirability of such uniform rules, pleaded that it "had not been
feasible ... so far to undertake this important task." FED. R. Civ. P. 43 advisory commit-
tee's supplementary notes.
45. As Mr. Jenner explained to the House Subcommittee which considered the Rules,
the Rules were intended to remedy problems raised by inconsistent evidentiary rules under
the common law that judges who sat by designation in more than one federal district
encountered:
Then there is another problem. It arises from the fact that the Congress has
wisely and generously provided that district judges and circuit judges of this
Nation may be transferred and assigned from district to district and circuit to
circuit to help out those districts and those circuits in which there are tremen-
dously congested calendars, and justice is not being efficiently administered
to the citizenry or litigants in those courts.
Consequently, the district judges themselves must wrestle with rules of evi-
dence that differ from district to district.
Rules of Evidence: House Hearings I, supra note 33, at 33.
46. See Rules of Evidence: House Hearings I, supra note 33, at 90-91 (prepared state-
ment of Mr. Jenner, Chairman, Rules Advisory Committee); id. at 287 (statement of Don-
ald E. Santarelli, Associate Deputy Attorney General, Administration of Criminal Justice);
id. at 354, 357 (testimony of Frank F. Jestrab, National Conference of Commissioners of
Uniform State Laws).
47. Rules of Evidence: House Hearings I, supra note 33, at 24 (testimony of Judge
Albert B. Maris, Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure); see
also id. at 32-33.
[Uniformity] is certainly one of the basic goals that these rules seek to attain,
a very widely applied basis. Many, many lawyers, particularly government
lawyers, who have to go around the United States, and lawyers in other types
of cases, antitrust litigation and others, that go to various districts from time
to time, have this problem and complain about it. And they are welcoming
the possibility of a uniform rule that they can understand and that they know
will be applied in every district court in which they may have occasion to
practice.
Id. at 32-33 (testimony of Judge Maris).
[Tihis is what brought about the demand of the American Bar Association,
its Special Committee on Rules of Evidence that we must have, in order to
administer justice in the Federal courts, uniform rules of evidence that are
applicable to all district courts ....
So that this is, in a very real sense, an absolute, that is, that the rules of
evidence of the Federal courts must be uniform.
[Vol. 48
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In addition to increasing the accessibility of the evidentiary rules for
both judges and practitioners, uniform application of the Rules was an
essential goal of the codification process. As Mr. Albert E. Jenner, Jr.,
the Chairman of the Rules Advisory Committee, explained: "This [uni-
formity] is the sine qua non of these Rules. It is one of the most, if not the
most, compelling reason for promulgation of uniform Federal Rules of
Evidence. ' '48 These comments were cited with approval in the House Re-
port that accompanied enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 49
clearly demonstrating that uniformity in the practice and procedure of
the federal courts was the fundamental purpose behind adopting the evi-
dentiary code.50
C. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Because the Federal Rules of Evidence are a legislative enactment, the
"traditional tools of statutory construction" are applied in construing
them.5 1 Accordingly, the Court begins by examining the plain-meaning
of the Rules, and then analyzes the Advisory Committee's Notes and leg-
islative history to ensure that the plain-meaning given to the Rule is con-
sistent with these other indications of congressional intent.5 2 Finally, in
construing statutes, courts are, of course, not entitled to disregard the
Id. at 33-34 (testimony of Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee on Rules
of Evidence, Judicial Conference of the United States) (emphasis added).
48. Rules of Evidence: House Hearings I, supra note 33, at 89 (emphasis in original).
49. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7075, 7075.
50. But see Adams v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 820 F.2d 271, 273 (8th Cir. 1987) (suggesting
incorrectly that proponent is entitled to "more favorable [state or federal evidentiary]
rule" even after adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
51. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163 (1988) (quoting INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987)) (construing Rule 803(8)(c)); see also Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2793-94 (1993).
52. See, e.g., Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988); Owens v. United
States, 484 U.S. 554 (1988); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987). One commen-
tator has stated that these cases demonstrate that "the plain language of the Rules now
controls outcomes without regard to policy, history, practical operation of the law of evi-
dence, or new conditions," and predicts that "the plain-meaning standard has the potential
to create a new evidence law." Randolph N. Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning,
and the Changed Rules of Evidence, 68 TEX. L. REV. 745,745 (1990). However, these cases
may not support this commentator's conclusions. Although it is true that in each of these
cases the Court applied a plain-meaning interpretation to the rules in question, the Court
considered the legislative history of each rule and the Advisory Committee's Notes in or-
der to determine whether the plain-meaning was in keeping with congressional intent. See
Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 687 (petitioner's interpretation of Rule 404(b) was inconsistent
with the legislative history of this Rule); Owens, 484 U.S. at 562 (Congress's choice regard-
ing Rule 801 was "apparent" from the Advisory Committee's Notes and the Rule's legisla-
tive history); Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 180 n.2 ("The Advisory Committee Notes show that the
Rule was not adopted in a fit of absent-mindedness."). This commentator also failed to
consider Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 163, which clearly undertakes a two-step statu-
tory analysis to determine whether congressional intent was consistent with the Court's
plain-meaning interpretation of the evidentiary rule in question. Thus, interpretation of
the Rules appears to be consistent with general principles of statutory construction: First,
the Court looks at the plain-meaning of the language chosen by Congress; and second, the




intentions of Congress, or ignore Congress's policy choices in favor of
their own.53
Moreover, because Congress has provided a specific procedure for en-
acting and amending the Federal Rules of Evidence (and the other rules
of procedure) in the Rules Enabling Act,54 the general principle that
courts are not free to disregard Congress's policy choices carries special
weight when construing the Federal Rules of Evidence. The procedure
that the Rules Enabling Act 55 establishes contemplates a significant de-
gree of judicial involvement in the amendment process, and appears to
provide the congressionally approved mechanism for channeling judicial
efforts in this area.56 By creating a specific mechanism to amend the
53. See, e.g., Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 514 (1981) ("It is not the func-
tion of the courts to amend statutes under the guise of 'statutory interpretation'."); see also
Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 449
U.S. 268, 280 (1981). In discussing whether the schedule of benefits provided in a workers'
compensation case were exclusive in cases of permanent partial disability, the Court re-
jected the injured worker's arguments that the schedule was not exclusive with the follow-
ing language:
More importantly, a proper understanding of the judicial role in this case
reveals that the recent trend actually supports a literal reading of the federal
statute. Our task is to ascertain the Congressional intent underlying the
scheduled benefit provisions enacted in 1927; we are not free to incorporate
into those provisions subsequent state-law developments that we may con-
sider sound as a matter of policy.
Id.
In the context of the Court's ability to construe statutes so that the statute will not run
afoul of a constitutional provision, the Court in Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985), refused
to construe the statute in a manner inconsistent with its literal language, even if such a
construction were necessary to make the statute constitutional. Justice White, concurring
in the Court's decision, explained:
These limits on our power to avoid constitutional issues through statutory
construction flow from the same principle as does the policy of constitutional
avoidance itself: that is, the principle of deference to the legislature's exer-
cise of its assigned role in our constitutional system. The task of defining the
objectives of public policy and weighing the relative merits of alternative
means of reaching those objectives belongs to the legislature.
Id. at 212-13 (Justices White, Burger, & Rehnquist concurring).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988); see supra note 30. Judicial involvement in the promulga-
tion and amendment of the rules of procedure and evidence has been considered desirable
because commentators believe that it would be difficult to educate Congress concerning
the special needs of the judiciary. Additionally, because the judiciary is more insulated
from the pressures of special interest groups, commentators believe that the judiciary is
able to avoid producing rules that are the product of compromise between competing lob-
byists. Friedenthal, supra note 30, at 673-74.
55. The procedure for amending a rule of evidence is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a),
which provides in pertinent part:
(a) The Supreme Court shall transmit to the Congress not later than May 1
of the year in which a rule prescribed under section 2072 is to become effec-
tive a copy of the proposed rule. Such rule shall take effect no earlier than
December 1 of the year in which such rule is so transmitted unless otherwise
provided by law.
28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1988).
56. See Federal Rules of Evidence: House Hearings I, supra note 33, at 12 (testimony
of Albert B. Maris, Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
Judicial Conference of the United States) ("This is the pattern which has been followed in
later enabling acts, and its purpose, obviously, is to prevent the Court from putting new
rules into effect until after Congress has had an opportunity to consider them and, if it
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Rules, Congress intended the judiciary to follow the procedure detailed
in the Act to implement changes in the Rules57 if such changes should
appear necessary or desirable.5 8 The availability of this specific amend-
ment procedure strongly suggests that reorientation of the Rules through
thinks proper, to legislate their postponement, amendment or appeal."). As Chief Justice
Burger observed in a Message from the Third Branch to the judiciary intended to mollify
the judiciary's frustration over how long it was taking Congress to consider the Federal
Rules of Evidence:
[Rlulemaking is a partnership, a joint enterprise, between Congress and
the Judicial Branch. It was first carried to successful conclusion in 1938, with
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; then came the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Later on Appellate Rules were adopted. All
of these rules are under constant scrutiny of Judicial Conference Advisory
Committees.
The rulemaking enterprise has been one of the most successful and fruitful
of any joint enterprise between branches of government in history. But, we
must always remember that it is a joint enterprise, and while Congress has
rendered us the compliment of general approval in the past, it does not mean
that Congress should accept blindly or on faith whatever we submit.
Rules of Evidence (Supplement): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1973) [hereinafter Rules of Evi-
dence: House Hearings II] (emphasis in original).
57. As Judges King, Reavley, Johnson, and Weiner observed in their dissent in Chris-
tophersen: "If the Federal Rules of Evidence are inadequate in [the context of toxic torts],
then Congress, who enacted them, is the proper branch to amend or repeal them." Chris-
tophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1137 (5th Cir. 1991) (King, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992); see also Rules of Evidence: House Hearings I, supra
note 33, at 525 (testimony of Judge Maris) ("The advantage of a procedure under which
changes in particular rules are proposed when it appears important that they should be, in
this way to write precise rules, is that they can be studied by the committee, the court, and
the Congress, not merely in the context of the facts of a particular case, which is the pres-
ent procedure, but in the context of the whole experience of the country and of all of the
courts."); id. at 525-26 (testimony of Mr. Jenner, Chairman, Rules Advisory Committee)
("The whole premise on which these rules were drafted was that the law of evidence
should grow and develop under these rules as a format. The history of the rulemaking
process under the enabling act has been that the Advisory Committee will, with the input
of the bar, the input of the courts, the input of the Congress, revise the civil rules, revise
the criminal rules, revise the rules of appellate procedure.").
58. In dissenting from the denial of rehearing in Brock, Judge Higgenbotham of the
Fifth Circuit explained his belief that the court needed to revisit the role of experts with the
following words:
I doubt that the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence foresaw the impact
of their changes in the rules for expert witnesses. The changes were seen as
enhancing efficiency and adopting in the courtroom standards of reliance suf-
ficient for the [relevant scientific] community in its daily affairs. The actual
changes have cut more deeply and indeed, in many ways, have materially
changed the dynamics of trial.
Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 884 F.2d 167, 168 n.1 (5th Cir. 1989) (Higgen-
botham, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Judge Higgenbotham's statement
seems a frank expression of the need for, and the Court's authority to draft, revisions in the
Federal Rules of Evidence if circumstances change, or the Rules in application generate
unforeseen results. Yet, even if such "updating" is ordinarily an appropriate part of legiti-
mate statutory interpretation, Congress's decision to provide a specific procedure for revis-
ing the Rules appears to foreclose the availability of such an ad hoc judicial approach. In
other words, if Congress had intended the courts to be free to implement changes in the
Rules through use of judicial precedent, the amendment procedure set forth in the Rules
Enabling Act would be redundant.
19941
SMU LAW REVIEW
statutory construction is particularly inappropriate.59
The section that follows considers the Rules applicable to expert testi-
mony and the specific reasons that they were adopted. This historical
backdrop provides telling evidence that the restrictive courts, including
the Daubert Court, have erred in their interpretation of the Rules per-
taining to expert testimony.
D. THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE RULES: RULES 401 AND 402
Together, Rules 401 and 402 provide the basic structure for the Federal
Rules of Evidence: all relevant evidence is admissible, unless "otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by
these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant
to statutory authority." 60 Under Rule 401, evidence is relevant if it has
"any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence. '61 As the Advisory Committee ex-
plained: "The provisions that all relevant evidence is admissible, with cer-
tain exceptions, and that evidence which is not relevant is not admissible
... constitute the foundation upon which the structure of admission and
exclusion rests." 62
E. EXPERT TESTIMONY: RULES 702 AND 703
To look more specifically at Congress's intent with respect to the ad-
missibility of expert testimony requires consideration of the language and
legislative history of Rules 702 and 703. During the enactment process,
neither of these Rules was debated on the floor of either house of Con-
gress, nor revised in any manner by Congress prior to enactment. 63 Con-
59. The Court has previously been sensitive to its limited role in injecting policy con-
siderations into the Rules of Procedure. For example, in rejecting a proposed interpreta-
tion of the joinder rules, the Court wrote: "Even if we were wholly persuaded by these
arguments as a matter of policy, acceptance of them would require a rewriting rather than
an interpretation of the relevant Rules." Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 767 (1989).
60. FED. R. EVID. 402.
61. FED. R. EVID. 401.
62. FED. R. EVID. 402 advisory committee's notes.
63. While Congress did not debate these rules openly, all of the rules were the "prod-
uct of plenary legislative deliberation, including the careful consideration by this subcom-
mittee in full and open proceedings." Rules of Evidence: House Hearings II, supra note 56,
at 280 (letter from Charles R. Halpern, Center for Law and Social Policy, to William L.
Hungate, Chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice); see also H.R. REP. No. 650, supra
note 49, at 7076 ("H.R. 5463 [the bill containing the Rules of Evidence] constitutes the
Committee's... view as to what should be the content of a uniform code of evidence."). It
should not be interpreted that Congress's failure to revise the expert testimony rules was
merely a rubber stamp of these rules. The legislative history reveals that if a rule, as
drafted, did not comport with Congress's intent, Congress was not reticent about revising
it. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1277, supra note 32, at 7052-53 ("Clearly, the most far-reaching
House change in the rules as promulgated, was the elimination of the Court's proposed
rules on privilege.") (emphasis in original); H.R. REP. No. 650, supra note 49, at 7078 ("In
some instances, the Committee has deleted entire rules or parts of rules proposed by the
Supreme Court; in other instances, rules have been retained but significantly amended.").
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gress did receive several comments and suggestions for revisions to these
Rules from law professors and attorneys, the tone of which, in general,
expressed enthusiasm for the proposed admissibility standards. 64 As will
be discussed below, the enthusiasm was related to the fact that Rules 702
and 703 were designed to remedy specific problems that had developed in
the common law, and to establish more liberal standards for the introduc-
tion of expert testimony. Most importantly, although it was recognized
that enactment of the proposed liberalized standards was not without
risk, the prevailing attitude at the time was that the adversarial process, in
particular, effective cross-examination, would provide an adequate check
on the liberal admissibility standards. 65
1. Rule 702: Scope of the Issues on Which Expert Testimony Will Be
Permitted
In at least some jurisdictions66 prior to enactment of Rule 702, the
common law would permit introduction of expert testimony only if the
testimony addressed an issue that was "not within the common knowl-
edge of the average layman."' 67 Under this standard, sometimes referred
64. See infra notes 81-82, 102-05 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
66. As discussed, before the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a federal
court would either look to the forum state's law to determine the rules governing the ad-
missibility of evidence, or craft its own federal common law of evidence. Compare Wise v.
George C. Rothwell, Inc., 496 F.2d 384, 391 n.11 (3d Cir. 1974) (state law governs the
admissibility of an expert's testimony) and Southern Pac. Co. v. Libbey, 199 F.2d 341, 348-
49 (9th Cir. 1952) (same) with Haddigan v. Harkins, 441 F.2d 844, 851-52 (3d Cir. 1971)
(admitting expert testimony under federal common law of evidence where there was no
state law on point) and Jones v. Goodlove, 334 F.2d 90, 94 & n.5-6 (8th Cir. 1964) (admit-
ting expert testimony under federal common law of evidence even though testimony was
not admissible under applicable state law). As a result, federal courts applied differing
standards to determine the admissibility of expert testimony depending on the applicable
state law, or their interpretation of federal law. See Goldman v. Piedmont Fire Ins. Co.,
198 F.2d 712, 716-17 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1952) (noting "conflict of authority as to whether an
insurance expert may testify to his opinion as to the materiality of a particular representa-
tion or a particular increase of risk"). As examples of these varying state standards, con-
sider the results in the following cases: Compare Missouri P. R.R. v. Fox, 83 N.W. 744
(Neb. 1900) (admitting expert testimony to show improper construction of part of the
coupling device on a railroad car) with Texas & N.O.R.R. v. McCoy, 117 S.W. 446 (Tex.
1909) (such expert testimony not admissible); compare Dardanelle Pontoon Bridge &
Turnpike Co. v. Croom, 129 S.W. 280 (Ark. 1910) (admitting expert testimony to show the
safety of a bridge guardrail) with McDonald v. City of Duluth, 100 N.W. 1102 (Minn. 1904)
(such expert testimony not admissible); compare Indiana Bituminous Coal Co. v. Buffey,
62 N.E. 279 (Ind. 1901) (expert testimony admissible to show that a certain pulley was not
suitable to do certain specified work) with Harley v. Buffalo Car Mfg. Co., 36 N.E. 813
(N.Y. 1894) (such expert testimony not admissible); compare Powers' Adm'r. v. Wiley, 44
S.W.2d 591 (Ky. 1931) (allowing expert testimony to establish the likely cause of auto acci-
dent) with Koenig v. Union Depot Ry., 73 S.W. 637 (Mo. 1903) (such expert testimony not
admissible).
67. Bridger v. Union Ry., 355 F.2d 382, 387 (6th Cir. 1966); see also Steinberg v. In-
demnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 364 F.2d 266, 274 (5th Cir. 1966) ("If the question is one which
the layman is competent to determine for himself, the opinion testimony is excluded; if he
reasonably cannot form his own conclusion without the assistance of the expert, the testi-
mony is admissible."); Duff v. Page, 249 F.2d 137, 140 (9th Cir. 1957); Rules of Evidence:
House Hearings II, supra note 56, at 55 (letter from Frank Martel, President, Defense
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to as the "need" standard, trial judges had considerable discretion 68 to
exclude expert testimony even though the testimony might well have as-
sisted the jury to understand the issues and reach a verdict.
For example, in Schille v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R.,69 the
plaintiff proffered expert testimony on whether "a two-foot-wide steel
batter post with a flange on each side and only rivet heads for footholds,
inclined upward at an angle of 53 degrees, was reasonably safe for work-
men to climb."'70 Applying the "need" standard, the trial court ruled that
this issue was within the jury's common knowledge, and excluded the
proffered testimony. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. 71 Similarly, in Duff v.
Page,72 a party proffered expert testimony from "a witness who had long
experience as an operator of a towing truck in the area where the acci-
dent occurred" on whether "it would have been practicable to remove the
automobile and trailer from the snow bank without placing the wrecker
on the highway."'73 The trial court excluded the evidence as being within
the common knowledge of the jury, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.74
As these two decisions reflect, the common law of certain forum states
limited the admissibility of expert testimony to situations in which the
testimony was essential to resolve or understand a disputed issue.75
Lawyers Association to William H. Hungate, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Criminal
Justice) (commenting that the settled law in Virginia was that expert evidence was inadmis-
sible on matters of common knowledge or those as to which the jury was as competent to
form an intelligent and accurate opinion as the witness); Rules of Evidence: Hearings on
P.L. 93-595 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 247 (1974)
[hereinafter Rules of Evidence: Senate Hearings] (reprint of article by Paul F. Rothstein,
Some Themes in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 FED. B.J. 21 (1974)). The rule
was so common at one time that it was described as "all but unanimous." J.E. Macy,
Annotation, Admissibility of Opinion Evidence as to the Cause of an Accident or Occur-
rence, 38 A.L.R.2d 13, 21 (1954).
68. Generally, the pre-Rules admissibility decisions concerning expert testimony were
principally characterized by the extreme deference given the district court. See, e.g., Engle
v. Stull, 377 F.2d 930, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The district court admitted expert testimony
concerning the cause of a motorboat accident. In affirming the decision, the court of ap-
peals wrote: "We cannot say that the district judge erred in admitting this testimony as the
expert's opinion. By the same token, had the district judge excluded the testimony, we
should undoubtedly not have reversed." Id.; see also Bridger v. Union Ry., 355 F.2d 382,
388 (6th Cir. 1966); Schille v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R., 222 F.2d 810, 814 (8th Cir. 1962). In
affirming the trial court's decision to exclude expert testimony, the Eighth Circuit wrote:
"We would have reached a different conclusion [as to whether the issue was within the
common knowledge of the jury], but the area of discretion on the part of the trial judge is
such that the cause would not be reversed for that reason." Id.
69. 222 F.2d 810, 814 (8th Cir. 1962).
70. Id. at 814.
71. Id.
72. 249 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1957).
73. Id. at 140.
74. Id.; see also Spokane & I. R.R. v. United States, 241 U.S. 344, 347 (1916) (expert
testimony on whether railroad cars had adequate handholds or grab-irons upon the ends of
each car was properly excluded as the issue was within the common knowledge of the
jury).
75. See JONES, BLUE BOOK OF EVIDENCE §§ 372, 374, at 908, 910 (1913).
Expert testimony being an exception to the general rule of law excluding
opinions from evidence, and trenching, as it does, upon the province of the
jury, is not to be extended beyond the necessities of the case. ...
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Under this test, expert testimony was not admissible unless the trier of
fact would be unable to comprehend or resolve a material issue without
the testimony.76
The Rules Advisory Committee drafted, and Congress enacted, Rule
702,77 in part, to overrule the "need" standard of the common law, and to
expand the scope of issues on which expert testimony would be admissi-
ble. Two aspects of Rule 702 define the proper scope of expert testimony
and demonstrate that Congress intended to reject the "need" standard.
First, as a general standard of admissibility, Rule 702 provides that expert
testimony is admissible so long as the specialized knowledge of the expert
will "assist the trier of fact."'78 By using the "assist the trier of fact" lan-
It is the general disposition of the courts to restrict the admission of expert
testimony within the strict bounds of the necessity on which it is founded.
Id.; see also M. C. Dransfield, Annotation, Safety of Condition, Place, or Appliance as
Proper Subject of Expert or Opinion Evidence in Tort Actions, 146 A.L.R. 5, 8 (1943) (stat-
ing "the opinion of witnesses possessing peculiar skill or knowledge may be received when-
ever the facts are such that inexperienced persons are likely to prove incapable of forming
a correct judgment without such assistance, but when the necessity of the case ceases the
operation of the exception also ceases").
76. See People v. Zimmerman, 189 N.W.2d 259 (Mich. 1971) (question was whether a
trial court properly excluded an expert's testimony concerning the speed of a vehicle based
upon skid marks and other evidence of stopping distance; in affirming the trial court's
decision, the court rejected an "assistance" standard that focused on whether the opinion
would assist the trier of fact, in favor of a "need" standard that focused on whether the
opinion "[was] both necessary and unavoidable"); see also Padgett v. Buxton-Smith Mer-
cantile Co., 262 F.2d 39, 41-42 (10th Cir. 1958) (finding abuse of discretion to admit police
officer's testimony concerning the location of a collision based upon skid marks because
such conclusion was equally well within the competence of the lay juror); Grayson v. Wil-
liams, 256 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1958) (expert testimony of police officer as to cause and
location of a traffic accident based upon physical evidence at the scene properly excluded
because the physical facts "were such as are within the experience of ordinary intelligent
persons"); Kenney v. Washington Properties, Inc., 128 F.2d 612, 613-14 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (In
a wrongful death action where the decedent fell out of a hotel window to his death, the
trial court properly excluded expert testimony as to whether the window was properly
designed because the issue "was a matter of observation and common judgment, in which
the man of ordinary experience in looking at the window or hearing it described, was as
capable of forming an opinion as an architect or builder."); Ennis v. R.B. Little & Co., 55
A. 884 (R.I. 1903) (Where an eyebolt had broken, plaintiff sought to introduce expert
testimony that a change in position of the eyebolt had increased the weight acting upon the
eyebolt and caused the eyebolt to break. The trial judge ruled that the testimony was
inadmissible because the jury was fully capable of recognizing that the change in the bolt's
position would increase the leverage, and consequently the stress, acting upon the bolt.).
77. Rule 702 provides as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
FED. R. EvID. 702.
78. The Advisory Committee Notes concerning Rule 702 explain that "[w]hether the
situation is a proper one for the use of expert testimony is to be determined on the basis of
assisting the trier .... When opinions are excluded, it is because they are unhelpful and
therefore superfluous and a waste of time." FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's notes.
This "helpfulness" standard for admissibility had been applied by some courts, and had
been advocated by Professor John Wigmore, since the turn of the twentieth century. See 7
WIGMORE, supra note 41, § 1923. To illustrate the sharp difference between the helpful-
ness standard and the need standard, consider a discussion from 1954 that implicitly com-
pares the two standards:
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guage in Rule 702, Congress rejected the common law rule that expert
testimony was admissible only if the trier of fact would be unable to un-
derstand or resolve a disputed issue without the testimony. With the
adoption of Rule 702, expert testimony became admissible if the issue
was one on which an expert's testimony would help the trier of fact to
understand more appreciably the evidence or resolve more accurately a
disputed issue. Thus, expert testimony is admissible under Rule 702 even
on matters within the common understanding of the ordinary juror or
layman if the expert's testimony would help the trier of fact to under-
stand the issue more appreciably. 79
Second, the common law's focus on whether the issue was beyond the
understanding of the average or common juror often proved to be a
nearly impossible standard for a skilled witness's testimony to satisfy.
When such testimony was proffered, trial judges would often decide, as
they did in Schille and Duff, that the issue was one within the common
experience of the average juror, and exclude the skilled witness's testi-
mony, despite the substantial assistance that the testimony might provide.
To ensure that this sort of limitation did not reappear in the law after the
adoption of Rule 702, Congress broadly defined the sorts of individuals
who would be qualified to offer expert testimony to include anyone with
"scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge." 80
Evidently, there was little disagreement with the generous scope for
permissible expert testimony in the proposed Rule, because there were
virtually no comments addressed to Congress during the enactment pro-
A rule sometimes proposed, reversing nearly all restrictions... on the use of
opinion evidence, would admit any opinion which the trial judge should
deem of assistance to the jury. This has long been the rule in New Hamp-
shire, but it seems to be without other definite support than that of Professor
Wigmore.
Macy, supra note 67, at 21.
79. See, e.g., Morvant v. Construction Aggregates Corp., 570 F.2d 626, 630-34 (6th
Cir.) (holding pursuant to Rule 702, that it was error for the trial court to exclude the
expert testimony of an economist on the impact of inflation on the earning potential of
decedent even though inflation was within the common experience of most jurors), cert.
dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978); see also DAVID W. LouISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUEL-
LER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 382, at 640 (1979). The "appreciable help" or "assist the trier
of fact" standard was adopted by some courts, and recommended by commentators, as an
alternative to the "need" standard before the final adoption of Rule 702. See, e.g., United
States v. Jackson, 425 F.2d 574, 576-77 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (admitting expert testimony on
pick-pocket modus operandi because "the jury could 'receive appreciable help' from such
testimony); 7 WIGMORE, supra note 41, § 1924; Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L.
REV. 414, 418 n.18 (1952).
80. FED. R. EVID. 702; see also FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's notes (noting
that "The rule is broadly phrased. The field of knowledge which may be drawn upon are
not limited merely to the 'scientific' and 'technical' but extend to all 'specialized' knowl-
edge."); Rules of Evidence: House Hearings I, supra note 33, at 96 (statement of Albert E.
Jenner, Jr., Chairman, Rules Advisory Committee) (stating "The category of expert in-
cludes not only the true specialist but also others who can contribute in the area, some-
times called 'skilled witnesses.' (Rule 702)").
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cess, 81 nor any untoward reactions by the commentators at the time.82
2. Rule 703: Permissible Bases for an Expert's Testimony
Prior to enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the common law
limited the permissible bases for an expert's opinion to the expert's first-
hand knowledge, or evidence already in the record at the time the expert
stated his or her opinion.83 If the expert had firsthand knowledge, the
expert generally had to "narrate in detail the perceived facts upon which
his opinion testimony is based."' 84 Alternatively, the necessary facts for
the opinion could be presented to the expert in the form of a hypothetical
question.85 Either approach presented difficulties.
The first led to a detailed, and often repetitive, narration of facts, quib-
bling between the attorneys over whether the facts stated provided a suf-
ficient basis for the opinion or whether more detail was required, and
pointless reversals if an appellate court should later decide that the ex-
pert's factual statement omitted some essential factual predicate. 86 The
hypothetical question, on the other hand, encouraged partisan bias, af-
forded an opportunity for summing up in the middle of the case, and was
often confusing and time consuming.87 In addition, by restricting the ex-
pert to firsthand knowledge or evidence in the record, the common law
excluded much of the information on which experts relied in their day-to-
81. One Senator, speaking generally, noted that "[i]n the main, [Article VII's rules
concerning opinion evidence] ... promise[d] to increase the knowledge that will be avail-
able to the triers of fact. Consequently, it may be expected to enhance the system of jus-
tice." Rules of Evidence: House Hearings II, supra note 56, at 55 (statement of Senator
John L. McClellan).
82. The discussions in the law journals concerning Rule 702 indicate that Congress
intended to liberalize the admissibility of expert testimony, and that a liberal interpretation
was to be applied to this new Rule. See, e.g., Carroll E. Metzner, Article VII Opinions and
Expert Testimony, 23 FED'N INS. COUNS., Spring 1983, at 83, 87-88. The main concern that
the commentators expressed about Rule 702 involved the fact that the new rule allowed
experts to testify in the form of a "dissertation or exposition," rather than being limited to
opinion testimony. Id. at 87.
83. EDWARD CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 14, at 31 (2d ed. 1976); see also
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Penn Cent. Co., 420 F.2d 560, 562-63 & n.4 (1st Cir. 1970).
84. Ladd, supra note 79, at 422.
85. Id. at 425.
86. See United States v. Stephens, 73 F.2d 695, 704 (9th Cir. 1934) (finding hypotheti-
cal question that asked a physician's opinion whether a war veteran was permanently dis-
abled was reversible error because it required an assumption concerning available,
alternative occupations that was not disclosed in the hypothetical); Ladd, supra note 79, at
426; see also Paul D. Rheingold, The Basis of Medical Testimony, 15 VAND. L. REV. 473,
475-77 (1962).
87. FED. R. EVID. 705 advisory committee's notes; see also Ladd, supra note 79, at 425-
27; Edmund M. Morgan, Suggested Remedy for Obstructions to Expert Testimony by Rules
of Evidence, 10 U. CHI. L. REV. 285,294,296 (1943); Hubert W. Smith, Scientific Proof and
Relations of Law and Medicine, 10 U. CHL L. REV. 243, 246 n.6 (1943).
In the Tuckerman will contest, tried before Judge McKim in Suffolk Probate
Court (Mass.), attorney Robert M. Morse put to Dr. Jelley, a psychiatrist,
what is reputed to be the longest hypothetical on record. It concerned the
mental condition of the testator, contained twenty thousand words and re-




Rule 70389 substantially liberalized the common law rule by providing
an additional source of information upon which an expert's opinion could
be founded: the type of facts or data that experts in the particular field
would reasonably rely upon in forming opinions, even if those facts were
not independently admissible into evidence. 90 This Rule was intended to
do away with the cumbersome hypothetical question that both practition-
ers and judges had found so disagreeable, 91 and to recognize that the in-
formational sources that were adequate for the day-to-day work of an
expert were also adequate for the courtroom.92
88. See, e.g., Harris v. Smith, 372 F.2d 806, 811-12 (8th Cir. 1967) (involving hypotheti-
cal question asked and answered on whether treatment that physician provided was appro-
priate given that the patient "seemed to be mentally alert" and that his "pulse and
temperature [and other physical symptoms] ... were ordinary for the type of injury that
the young man had"; on appeal, the court ruled the hypothetical improper because it
"called for expert opinion based upon previously expressed expert opinion rather than
upon the plain facts"; in other words, the question was improper because it described the
patient's symptoms as "ordinary" rather than as, for example, a temperature of 98.6 de-
grees Fahrenheit); see FED. R. EVID. Rule 703 advisory committee's notes; see also Mor-
gan, supra note 87, at 292 (noting that the common law rule prohibiting an expert from
testifying on the basis of hearsay "is particularly annoying to the medical expert, since it
often compels him to disregard data which no physician or surgeon would dream of
neglecting"); Rheingold, supra note 86, at 527. Rheingold notes that:
Even a hurried survey of the various bases [for medical testimony] indicates
that hearsay in one form or another pervades all of medical testimony, just as
it pervades the whole medical routine and practice. And, by the very exclu-
sion of material deemed hearsay, often as the result of rather legalistic, tech-
nical reasoning, much that is of value to the doctor in his practice and to the
court in the determination of the medical facts of the case is lost.
Id.
89. Rule 703, as enacted and as proposed, provides as follows:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opin-
ion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts
or data need not be admissible in evidence.
FED. R. EvID. 703.
90. 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
703[03], at 703-15. As with the "helpfulness" standard, some courts had adopted this Rule
under the "federal equity" provision of FED. R. CIv. P. 43(a). See, e.g., United States v.
Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1290-91 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting that "[t]he rationale for this excep-
tion to the rule against hearsay [permitting an expert to testify based upon inadmissible
records and data] is that the expert, because of his professional knowledge and ability, is
competent to judge for himself the reliability of the records and statements on which he
bases his expert opinion").
91. See supra note 87; see also Twin City Plaza, Inc. v. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp., 409
F.2d 1195, 1201 (8th Cir. 1969) ("The [proposed Federal Rules of Evidence] are obviously
designed to remove stereotyped, long, belabored, and nonsensical hypothetical questions
from the arena of trial.").
92. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's notes:
The third source [of facts or data upon which expert opinions are based]
contemplated by the rule consists of presentation of data to the expert
outside of court and other than by his own perception. In this respect, the
rule is designed to broaden the basis for expert opinions beyond that current
in many jurisdictions and to bring the judicial practice into line with the prac-
tice of the experts themselves when not in court.
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In exchange for allowing an expert to rely on inadmissible evidence,
the Advisory Committee imposed two checks on the underlying basis of
an expert's opinion. First, under Rule 703, if an expert relied on inadmis-
sible evidence in forming his or her opinion, the court was entitled to
consider the underlying basis to determine if it was of a "type" reason-
ably relied upon by experts in the field.93 Second, under Rule 705, if an
expert relied on otherwise inadmissible evidence in forming his or her
opinion, the opposing party could require the expert to disclose on cross-
examination the underlying facts or data upon which the expert based his
or her opinion.94
To explain the proper interpretation of the "of a type reasonably relied
upon" language of Rule 703, the Advisory Committee gave three exam-
ples: (i) a physician who relies on statements by patients and relatives;
reports and opinions from nurses, technicians and other doctors; hospital
records; and X-rays; (ii) a public opinion poll that relies on the answers to
the poll's questions given by selected members of the public; and (iii) a
police officer ("accidentologist") who relies on the statements of bystand-
ers to determine the point of impact in an automobile collision. In evalu-
ating these examples, the Advisory Committee stated that the basis in the
first example would satisfy the Rule because it was the sort of informa-
tion upon which a "physician makes life-and-death decisions. ' 95 The ba-
Id.; see also Rules of Evidence: House Hearings I, supra note 33, at 96 (prepared statement
of Edward W. Cleary, Reporter, Rules Advisory Committee); Rheingold, supra note 86, at
532 ("As has been repeatedly pointed out, the expert is competent to ascertain the reliabil-
ity of statements and reports of others and to use only what is relevant and trustworthy.
The concept, simply put, is that the doctor validates what he uses.") (emphasis in original).
93. See, e.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535 (D.C. Cir.) (observ-
ing that the experts on both sides relied on essentially the same diagnostic methodology,
but arrived at different conclusions from the test results, making the case "a classic battle
of the experts, a battle in which the jury must decide the victor"), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1062 (1984).
94. Rule 705 provides in pertinent part: "The expert may in any event be required to
disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination." FED. R. EViD. 705. For a
discussion of the relation between Rules 703 and 705, see Rules of Evidence: House Hear-
ings I, supra note 33, at 88-89 (statement of Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Chairman, Rules Advi-
sory Committee). After Jenner states that Rule 703 permits an expert to rely upon
inadmissible data, he explains that "the expert may be required, in any event, to disclose
the underlying facts or data on cross-examination" under Rule 705. Rules of Evidence:
Senate Hearings, supra note 67, at 155 (prepared statement of Richard H. Keatinge & John
T. Blanchard). "Rule 703 must also be related to Rule 705. Rule 705 deals with the ques-
tion of 'disclosure of facts or data underlying expert opinion."' (emphasis in original); id. at
247 (reprint of Paul F. Rothstein article). As Paul Rothstein explained:
Rules 703 and 705 do away with the stilted requirement of a hypothetical
question, allowing expert testimony based on a hypothetical set of facts
presented to the expert before trial, as well as on an at-trial hypothetical
question, or on testimony heard, or on personal observations. These rules
dispense with the requirement that the bases of expert opinions be given on
direct; and they allow expert opinions rationally based on otherwise inadmis-
sible evidence, contrary to the ostensible rule in some jurisdictions.
Id.
95. The Advisory Committee also recognized that much of this evidence would be
independently admissible "with the expenditure of substantial time in producing and ex-
amining various authenticating witnesses." FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's notes.
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sis in the second example would also satisfy the Rule, but only if the
opinion survey was properly designed so as to avoid the risks that the
admission of such hearsay would otherwise present. The basis in the third
example would not, however, satisfy the Rule because a reasonable inves-
tigator would determine the point of impact from the physical evidence at
the scene, rather than upon the statements of the parties to the accident
and witnesses at the scene.96
Significantly, in evaluating each of these examples, the Advisory Com-
mittee focused solely on the type of data upon which the expert relied,
and did not examine the reliability of specific data or facts contained in
the medical reports, the public opinion surveys, or the statements of the
bystanders. As these examples demonstrate, Rule 703 did not instruct
courts to evaluate the reliability or validity of the underlying data, only to
determine whether the data was of a type that other experts in the field 97
would reasonably rely upon in forming opinions.98
The Advisory Committee imposed an additional check to safeguard
against evidence that satisfies Rule 703's "of a type reasonably relied
upon" requirement, yet may nevertheless be unreliable. In Rule 705, the
Advisory Committee authorized opposing counsel to force disclosure on
cross-examination of the otherwise inadmissible evidence that formed the
basis for the expert's opinion, ensuring that opposing counsel would have
an adequate opportunity to establish, in the presence of the jury, any
flaws in the underlying data.99 Thus, the combination of the "of a type
96. While the Advisory Committee's Notes are admittedly cryptic on the precise rea-
son why the basis in the third example is insufficient under the Rule, the Notes do cite to
the work of the California Law Review Commission on a similar rule. See FED. R. EVID.
703 advisory committee's notes (citing to the California Law Review Comm'n, Recommen-
dation Proposing an Evidence Code 148-50 (1965)). In its discussion of the point of impact
example, the California Law Review Commission explained: "an expert on automobile
accidents may not rely on extrajudicial statements of others as a partial basis for an opinion
as to the point of impact, whether or not the statements would be admissible evidence."
California Law Review Comm'n, supra, at 148 (citing as authority Hodges v. Severns, 20
Cal. Rptr. 129 (1962); Ribble v. Cook, 245 P.2d 593 (1952)). In both of these cases, the
courts ruled that a police officer's testimony as to the point of impact would be admissible
to the extent it was based upon the officer's personal observations at the scene, but was not
admissible to the extent it was based upon the statements of others. See Hodges, 20 Cal.
Rptr. at 135; Ribble, 245 P.2d at 594-95. The California Law Review Commission goes on
to explain that "a police officer can analyze skid marks, debris, and the condition of vehi-
cles that have been involved in an accident without relying on the statements of bystand-
ers." California Law Review Comm'n, supra, at 149.
97. Thus, Rule 703 does not contemplate an evaluation of the reliability of the facts or
data upon which the expert relied. See, e.g., Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939
F.2d 1106, 1119 (5th Cir. 1991) (Clark, C.J., concurring) (Rule 703 instructs the court to
evaluate only the "type" of data relied upon by an expert in forming his opinion, not the
reliability of the particular facts and data used), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
98. By its express terms, Rule 703's inquiry into whether the expert relied upon a
reasonable type of data applies only if the expert relied upon inadmissible evidence in
forming his or her opinion. Cf. id. at 1118 (Clark, C.J., concurring) (if the facts or data that
form the basis of an expert's opinion are admissible, then the inquiry ends, and Rule 703
does not authorize exclusion of the expert's opinion).
99. See United States v. A & S Council Oil Co., 947 F.2d 1128, 1134 (4th Cir. 1991); see
also Rules of Evidence: House Hearings I, supra note 33, at 437-38 (statement of Alan B.
Morrison, Director of Litigation, Public Citizen, Inc.) ("The basis of [an expert's] opinion
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reasonably relied upon" language of Rule 703, and the cross-examination
provision of Rule 705, ensures that expert testimony whether based on
admissible, or inadmissible, evidence will receive nearly identical treat-
ment. Rule 703 ensures that an opinion is based on either admissible
evidence, or a reliable type of inadmissible, usually hearsay, evidence.
Rule 705 ensures that opposing counsel will have an adequate opportu-
nity to cross-examine an expert concerning the facts or data forming the
basis of the expert's opinion, regardless of whether the facts or data are
independently admissible.
While Rule 703's proposed expansion of the permitted bases for an
expert's testimony raised the possibility that an expert might rely on un-
reliable data, the Advisory Committee intended that cross-examination
would be the check on the potential prejudice that may arise in such
cases.1°° It appears that, in general, this was the assumption of those who
introduced comments at the congressional hearings as well.10 1
Although Congress received few comments concerning Rule 703, one
commentator stated that the changes to the common law rules concerning
expert testimony were a "welcome change" that would "breath fresh air
into courtroom proceedings.' 10 2 In expanding the permissible bases for
an expert's testimony, Congress was not unaware of the possibility that
Rule 703 could create the opportunity for an expert to rely on unreliable
may be stated on direct and will almost certainly be inquired into on cross, thus permitting
a full inquiry into its basis, but in a more sensible manner.").
100. See, e.g., The Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and
Magistrates, 37 INS. COUNS. J. 565, 577 (1970) (statement of Dean Charles Joiner, member
of the Advisory Committee) (discussing Rule 703, Dean Joiner noted that "[p]rior disclo-
sure of the underlying data is not required [under Rule 703], but the testing device here is
cross-examination and cross-examination as to the underlying data is encouraged if some
problem is raised").
101. See id. With respect to Rule 703, Dean Joiner observed:
I have great faith in the American jury and I believe that the American jury
can take evidence and sort it out in their own mind with the help of compe-
tent counsel and that it provides harm to lawsuits and bad results in judicial
administration to have too many reversals for admitting evidence and so my
job on this committee has been as a gadfly to keep the committee reminded
of the fact that the American juror is a fairly responsible guy when guided by
responsible lawyers and with this in mind I think these rules are going to be a
great improvement in the process of trying lawsuits.
Id. at 577.
102. Rules of Evidence: House Hearings I, supra note 33, at 437-38 (statement of Alan
B. Morrison, Director of Litigation, Public Citizen, Inc.). In discussing the expert testi-
mony rules, Mr. Morrison further noted that:
An expert will now be free to testify even as to the ultimate fact at issue, and
the basis of his opinion need not be admissible evidence. Most important is
that under Rule 703 an expert is no longer required to state the factual prem-
ise of his opinion on direct examination, thus eliminating the excruciatingly
long hypothetical question, which served primarily as a pitfall for the attor-
ney posing it and a source of boredom for the trier of fact listening to it. The
basis of the opinion may be stated on direct and will almost certainly be





evidence as the basis for his or her opinion.103 A report prepared by the
Subcommittee on the Use of Hearsay Evidence by Experts of the Com-
mittee on Complex and Multi-District Litigation warned that:
[Rule 703] leaves open the door for reliance by the expert on in-
competent evidence, in forming and expressing an opinion which is
itself inadmissible ...
It is our view that, unless properly qualified and limited, the rule
permitting the expert to rely on incompetent data carries with it the
potential for grave abuse...lo4
This report further warned Congress that the "venality of experts is un-
fortunately a fact more common than one would like to have to
acknowledge." 0 5
Congress did not respond to these comments, or revise Rule 703 to
address these concerns, however. It appears that in adopting a liberalized
standard for the admissibility of expert testimony, Congress, like the Ad-
visory Committee, was relying on the adversarial process, in particular
cross-examination, to ameliorate most of the prejudice that might result
from the admission of expert testimony based on unreliable data.
F. SUMMARY OF THE PURPOSE AND PLAIN-MEANING OF THE RULES
In enacting the evidentiary rules concerning expert testimony, Con-
gress intended to liberalize the admissibility of such evidence by overrul-
ing certain common law limitations on the use of expert testimony, and to
establish a uniform code of evidence to simplify practice in the federal
courts. As Mr. Jenner explained to Congress:
The Advisory Committee is especially proud of the rules dealing
with expert testimony. This area has become encrusted with a heavy
and suffocating layer of technicalities wholly inconsistent with the
simple facts of life and the intelligence of American jurors ....
As practical and experienced trial lawyers, we knew and, in fact,
have long known that intelligent jurors realize that an expert is only
stating his opinion, that his testimony is to be treated as an opinion
and is not binding upon the jurors and is to be judged in the light of all
103. In addition to Learned Hand's warning concerning the misuse and abuse of expert
testimony, a number of other writers addressed the issue decades before the enactment of
the Rules. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 87, at 292-94:
In litigation involving personal injuries, death by accident, and alleged
mental irresponsibility and the like, the medical expert has become a stench
in the nostrils of upright judges. He disgraces his own profession and the
legal profession which uses and tolerates him. Combinations between
crooked doctors and shyster lawyers impose upon honest jurors and defraud
public service companies and insurance corporations. ...
So long as corrupt men are permitted to practice law and venal men are
able to qualify as expert witnesses, this evil cannot be entirely eradicated.
Id.
104. Rules of Evidence: House Hearings II, supra note 56, at 230 (Report to the Com-
mittee on Complex and Multi-District Litigation of the Subcommittee on Use of Hearsay
Evidence by Experts) (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 232.
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the evidence in the case, to be accepted or rejected by a juror as he sees
fit. 106
In liberalizing the admissibility of expert testimony, the drafters con-
templated a jury-oriented system in which effective cross-examination
would remedy most of the prejudice that may result from the admission
of unreliable expert testimony. 107 Rule 702 allowed expert testimony if
the court, in its discretion, found that the testimony would assist the trier
of fact in evaluating a relevant issue, overruling the common law's "need"
standard which would admit expert testimony only in situations beyond
the ordinary understanding of jurors. Rule 703 allowed experts to base
their opinions on inadmissible hearsay evidence, so long as the evidence
was of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field, overruling
the common law limitation that expert testimony could be based only on
firsthand knowledge, or evidence already in the record.
II. THE RESTRICTIVE EVIDENTIARY APPROACH:
PRELUDE TO DAUBERT
In evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony in toxic tort cases,
the fundamental issue is whether a trial judge can evaluate the reliability
of an expert's testimony and choose to bar its admission if the court finds
the expert's methodology or underlying data to be unreliable. The easy
question arises when an expert's opinion is fundamentally unsupported
by the expert's underlying data or methodology.10 8 If the expert's under-
lying data or methodology completely fails to support the expert's opin-
ion, then the expert's opinion would be unlikely to make an issue in
controversy either "more probable or less probable," and therefore,
would be excludable under Rule 401's definition of relevancy.' 0 9
106. Rules of Evidence: House Hearings I, supra note 33, at 88 (prepared statement of
Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Chairman of the Rules Advisory Committee) (emphasis added).
107. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794 (1993)
("'The Rules were designed to depend primarily upon lawyer-adversaries and sensible tri-
ers of fact to evaluate conflicts."') (quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 631 (1991)); Rules of
Evidence: House Hearings I, supra note 33, at 363 (testimony of Frank. F. Jestrab, National
Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws); Rules of Evidence: House Hear-
ings I, supra note 33, at 437-38 (prepared statement of Alan B. Morrison, Director of Liti-
gation, Public Citizen, Inc.).
108. See Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., 919 F.2d 304, 307 (5th Cir. 1990) (affidavit
purporting to establish causal link was based on data that was "replete with so many obvi-
ous errors"); Viterbo v. Dow Chem., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987); Thompson v. South-
ern Pac. Transp. Co., 809 F.2d 1167, 1169 (5th Cir.) (expert who testified that exposure
caused injury had no knowledge of amount or duration of exposure, and had failed to
exclude other causes for the plaintiff's injury), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 819 (1987).
109. Significantly, however, even when the courts properly exclude such evidence, they
often mistakenly rely on Rule 703, rather than Rule 401. See, e.g., Slaughter, 919 F.2d at
306-07 & n.3; Viterbo, 826 F.2d at 422; In re "Agent Orange", 611 F. Supp. at 1243-55.
Alternatively, as will be discussed below, even if fundamentally unsupported evidence sat-
isfies Rule 401's exceedingly low threshold for relevancy, the trial court may properly ex-
clude such evidence under Rule 403.
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The harder question arises when a court evaluates an expert's testi-
mony which, while not fundamentally unsupported, is based on data that
is less than ideal, or a methodology that lies outside the mainstream of
the scientific community. Before the Supreme Court's decision in
Daubert, courts had become increasingly willing to step in to bar the ad-
mission of scientific evidence in toxic tort cases in a determined attempt
to keep questionable scientific evidence from the jury, rather than rely on
the adversarial process to discredit it. Because these cases provide the
context in which the Daubert decision arose and, in some instances, rep-
resent the current thinking of several courts of appeals on some of these
evidentiary issues, this article will examine the pre-Daubert restrictions
on the admissibility of expert testimony.
Before Daubert, the restrictive courts had developed two basic eviden-
tiary approaches that were used to limit the admissibility of relevant ex-
pert testimony. First, the restrictive courts would exclude an expert
witness's testimony because the testimony was based on incomplete or
less than ideal data. Second, the restrictive courts would exclude an ex-
pert witness's testimony because the testimony was based on an unrelia-
ble methodology, either because: (a) the expert's methodology was not
generally accepted in the relevant scientific community; (b) the expert
attempted to establish a causal link without epidemiological11 0 evidence
of causation; or (c) the studies on which the expert's opinions were based
were not subjected to the rigors of peer review. 1'
While some courts tried to tie these two approaches to specific lan-
guage in Rules 702 and 703,112 the restrictive courts disagreed over which
110. Epidemiology is the statistical study of disease in human populations. Michael
Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in Demonstrating Cause-In-
Fact, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 429, 431 (1983). "Epidemiological evidence, like other gen-
eralized evidence, deals with categories of occurrences rather than particular individual
occurrences. Epidemiological studies address questions such as 'Does exposure to this
chemical increase the incidence of cancer in a population?' but not 'Did exposure to this
chemical cause a particular person's cancer?"' Id. at 436.
111. While none of the courts have precisely defined what sort of review process would
satisfy the requirement of "peer review," the American Association for the Advancement
of Science and the National Academy of Sciences, in their joint amicus brief to the
Supreme Court in Daubert, explained that "[p]eer review, in its broadest sense, represents
the scientific community's effort to police itself and to assure a certain minimum level of
quality so that scientists and others can rely on the results of reported scientific research."
Amicus Brief for the American Association for the Advancement of Science & the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2072
(1992) (No. 90-102) (brief filed Jan. 19, 1993). These two groups go further to define "in-
formal peer review" as occurring when the work is discussed among scientists, and "formal
peer review" as occurring when the work is published in a scientific journal. Such formal
peer review involves examination and criticism of a manuscript by an outside team of neu-
tral "referees." Both the review process and the resulting publication of the work are
intended to screen, disseminate, and preserve new research results, and to provide an op-
portunity for clarification and refinement of the new research.
112. See, e.g., DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 954 (3d Cir.
1990) (stating that Rule 702 requires court to evaluate the reliability of the expert's meth-
odology in order to determine whether expert's testimony will "assist the trier of fact");
Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating that
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of these two Rules authorized either of these approaches. 113 The Third
Circuit, for example, interpreted Rule 702 to authorize the trial judge to
examine an expert's underlying data and methodology, while finding that
Rule 703 authorized the trial judge to examine neither.114 Other circuits
arrived at the exact opposite conclusion concerning these two Rules.
These courts interpreted Rule 703 to authorize an examination of the reli-
ability of both methodology and data in determining admissibility, with-
out undertaking any sort of Rule 702 analysis.115 Moreover, in some
cases, the restrictive courts excluded scientific testimony because of per-
ceived weaknesses in underlying data or methodology without specifying
any rule as a basis for the exclusion. 116
Despite disagreements as to the legal bases for excluding questionable
scientific testimony, all of the restrictive courts authorized, and indeed
required, the trial judge to scrutinize an expert's underlying data and
methodology for reliability, and to exclude relevant scientific testimony if
the trial judge determined either that the expert's methodology or data
failed to support adequately the expert's proffered testimony. As a re-
sult, pre-admission screening of both methodology and data for reliabil-
ity, rather than any particular interpretation of the Rules, was the
defining characteristic of the pre-Daubert restrictive evidentiary ap-
proach. Therefore, this article will consider the two restrictive eviden-
tiary approaches themselves, and postpone until Section IV a discussion
of the specific rules the restrictive courts have identified as authority for
these approaches.
Rule 703 requires court to evaluate the adequacy of the "grounds relied on by the expert"),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989).
113. For example, in Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., the Fifth Circuit tried to tie
one of these two approaches to the language of Rule 703, 939 F.2d 1106, 1114 (5th Cir.
1991) (en banc) (noting that Rule 703 authorizes trial judge to examine for reasonableness
the underlying data of an expert's opinion), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992), and when
the court found itself unable to do so, rewrote Rule 703 to include the "assist the trier of
fact" language of Rule 702. See Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1114 (court justifies taking a
hard look at the underlying facts that support an expert's opinion under Rule 703 to satisfy
the "assist the trier of fact" language of Rule 702).
114. See DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 952-57 (noting that the "assist the trier of fact" language
of Rule 702 authorizes a trial judge to screen an expert's underlying facts and methodology
for reliability; Rule 703 authorizes a trial judge to ensure only that an expert relied upon a
reasonable type of data, but does not authorize a trial judge to evaluate the reliability of
the specific data that the expert used).
115. See Lynch v. Merrell-National Labs., 830 F.2d 1190, 1196-97 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating
that Rule 703 incorporates an examination of the reliability of the expert's methodology;
no discussion of Rule 702); Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159, 1161-62 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 950 (1990) (stating that Rule 703 incorporates an examination
of the reliability of an expert's methodology; no discussion of Rule 702). Cf In re "Agent
Orange," 611 F. Supp. at 1243-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that both Rule 703 and Rule 702
authorize a trial judge to examine an expert's underlying data and methodology for
reliability).
116. For example, in Christophersen, the Fifth Circuit held that for expert testimony to
be admitted, aside from any requirements that the Federal Rules of Evidence impose, the
testimony must also be based on a methodology or reasoning that is generally accepted
within the relevant scientific community. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1110, 1115-16.
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A. REASONABLENESS OF UNDERLYING DATA
Certain circuits have authorized trial courts to exclude an expert wit-
ness's testimony in toxic tort cases if the trial court determines that the
testimony is based on what the court perceives to be an inadequate fac-
tual foundation. 117 In Christophersen, for example, the trial court ex-
cluded the testimony of plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. Lawrence Miller,
who was prepared to testify that occupational exposure to nickel and cad-
mium had caused the death of the plaintiff's husband. (The plaintiff's
husband had died from small cell colon cancer.) In forming this opinion,
Dr. Miller obtained the data for his exposure determination primarily
from the affidavit of one of Christophersen's co-workers. 118 The affidavit
stated that over a fourteen year period Christophersen was regularly ex-
posed to "many fumes and gases" which "included heated fume and air-
borne particles of cadmium and nickel alloys." 119 The affidavit contained
factual inaccuracies concerning the amount and length of Christopher-
sen's exposures, and the co-worker admitted in his deposition that he did
not know the chemical composition of the fumes.120 Dr. Miller consid-
ered these deficiencies in rendering his opinion, however. Dr. Miller con-
cluded that while dose and exposure levels were important, his opinion as
to causation remained valid, so long as the exposure occurred in general
as described to him.121
The trial court disagreed with Dr. Miller's confidence in the basis for
his causation opinion, and in excluding the testimony, the trial court ruled
that the exposure data upon which Dr. Miller relied could not reasonably
support his opinion. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, af-
117. See id. at 1114 (excluding expert's testimony that exposure to heavy metals in
fumes caused small-cell colon cancer where such testimony was based upon an uncertain
determination of exposure levels); Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., 919 F.2d 304, 307 (5th
Cir. 1990) (excluding expert's testimony that exposure to asbestos caused pulmonary dis-
ease where such testimony was based upon examination reports that were "replete with 'so
many obvious errors as to be of no value to the trier of fact"'); Washington v. Armstrong
World Indus., Inc., 839 F.2d 1121, 1123-24 (5th Cir. 1988); Viterbo, 826 F.2d at 422 (5th Cir.
1987) (excluding expert's testimony that exposure to chemical herbicide caused high blood
pressure, rash, and mental impairment where such testimony was based upon incomplete
oral medical histories, test results that pointed to some other factor as the cause of plain-
tiff's condition, and animal testing); Thompson v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 809 F.2d 1167,
1168 (5th Cir.) (excluding expert's testimony that exposure to dioxin allegedly caused
porphyria where such testimony was made in the absence of "any knowledge about the
amount or duration of [the plaintiff]'s exposure"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 819 (1987); In re
"Agent Orange," 611 F. Supp. at 1243-45 (excluding experts' testimony that exposure to
Agent Orange had caused plaintiffs' injuries where such testimony was based, in part, upon
unverified checklists prepared by the plaintiffs, rather than physical examination or thor-
ough review of medical records); see also Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 727 F.2d
202 (2d Cir. 1984) (in a wrongful death action, court found expert's assumptions so unreal-
istic and contradictory as to suggest bad faith); Wilder Enters. v. Allied Artists Pictures
Corp., 632 F.2d 1135, 1143-44 (4th Cir. 1980).
118. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1113.
119. Id. at 1123 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 1113.
121. Id. at 1125 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
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firmed.122 After detailing a four-part test that expert witness testimony
must pass before it can be admitted in toxic tort cases,'123 the Fifth Circuit
agreed with the trial court that the expert had relied upon unreliable data
in forming his opinion, and that this unreliable data "tainted" his ultimate
conclusion. As a result, the Fifth Circuit held that the expert's testimony
was properly excluded.124
Significantly, in reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit necessarily con-
cluded that both the reliability of the underlying data, and the validity of
the expert's conclusion based upon that data, went to the admissibility of
the evidence, rather than to its weight. Both questions were therefore for
the trial judge to resolve, rather than the jury. As a result, the fact that
the weaknesses in the expert's basis and resulting conclusion could have
(and would have) been exposed through the adversarial process was not
relevant, in the court's view, to the decision of whether the expert's testi-
mony was sufficiently "good" science to be admissible.
B. REASONABLENESS OF METHODOLOGY: Frye; Epidemiology; and
Peer Review
1. Frye: Exclusion of Evidence Based Upon Theories or Principles
That Are Not Generally Accepted
Despite the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, certain pre-
Daubert courts excluded novel scientific evidence on the basis that the
evidence did not satisfy Frye's requirement that the technique upon
which a proffered opinion is based be generally accepted in the relevant
scientific community. 125 Several courts seized on the Frye requirement to
122. Id.
123. The Fifth Circuit devised a test combining the Federal Rules of Evidence with Frye
to arrive at the following requirements before expert testimony can be admitted:
(1) Whether the witness is qualified to express an expert opinion, FED. R.
EVID. 702;
(2) whether the facts upon which the expert relies are the same type as are
relied upon by other experts in the field, FED. R. EVID. 703;
(3) whether in reaching his conclusion the expert used a well-founded meth-
odology, Frye; and
(4) assuming the expert's testimony has passed Rules 702 and 703, and the
Frye test, whether under FED. R. EVID. 403 the testimony's potential for
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value.
Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1110.
124. Id. at 1114.
125. Prior to the Daubert decision, the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals had
split on the issue of whether Frye survived the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The Third and Fourth Circuits expressly rejected Frye, while six other circuits continued to
apply the Frye test. See Toxic Fumes: U.S. Supreme Court Asked to Clarify Evidentiary
Rule on Expert Witnesses, 6 Toxics L. RPTR. 809 (1991). When first faced with the issue,
the Court refused to grant certiorari to resolve the conflict. See Mustafa v. United States,
479 U.S. 953 (1986) (presenting the issue of whether Frye survived the adoption of the
Military Rules of Evidence, which are worded identically to the Federal Rules). Justices
White and Brennan dissented from the denial of certiorari, stating that the Court should
"grant certiorari to resolve this conflict on an obviously recurring and important issue."
Mustafa, 479 U.S. at 953.
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exclude relevant evidence of causation in toxic tort cases. 126
In Christophersen, for example, the plaintiff's expert, Dr. Miller, con-
cluded that Christophersen's small cell colon cancer was caused by expo-
sure to nickel and cadmium based upon the pathogenesis of small cell
cancer. 127 Dr. Miller noted that small cell cancer was an unusual form of
cancer that had been linked to changes in the genetic material in cells
caused by exposure to toxic substances.128 Dr. Miller indicated that small
cell cancer of the lung had been associated with nickel and cadmium ex-
posure, and suggested that "[biased on what's known about the biochemi-
cal nature of small-cell [cancer] the same sorts of chemicals and
exposures that are associated with small-cell carcinoma of the lung are
likely to be associated with small-cell carcinoma elsewhere in the
body."'1 29 Dr. Miller arrived at this conclusion notwithstanding his own
testimony that causal relationships are most often established through
human epidemiological studies, live animal (or in vivo) testing, and in
vitro (or test-tube) testing.130 The defendant's experts, on the other hand,
stated that proof of causation required one of these three types of stud-
ies.' 3 ' Rather than finding that this discrepancy went to the weight of the
evidence, the court concluded that Dr. Miller's testimony should be ex-
cluded on the basis that his methodology was not generally accepted in
the relevant scientific community.132
2. Epidemiology: Exclusion of Evidence Not Based on Human
Epidemiological Studies
In the context of causation in toxic tort cases, some pre-Daubert courts
went further than simply requiring an approach to causation that was
generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. These courts
held that to be admissible, an opinion must be based on an epidemiologi-
cal study which demonstrated a statistically significant causal link be-
tween the toxic exposure and the resulting injury.133
126. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1130-31 & n.1
(9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993); Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1115 & n.16;
Lynch, 830 F.2d at 1193-96 (holding in vitro and in vivo testing inadmissible because the
relevant scientific community did not generally accept these approaches as a proper
method, on their own, to establish causation).
127. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1115 & n.16.
128. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 902 F.2d 362, 365 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 939
F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
129. Christophersen, 902 F.2d at 366.
130. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1115.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1116.
133. See Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1130; Lynch v. Merrell-National Labs., 830 F.2d 1190,
1194 (1st Cir. 1987); cf Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 830 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (causation opinion based on chemical structural analysis, in vivo tests, and in
vitro tests did not provide a sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find causation in the
face of overwhelming epidemiological evidence suggesting no statistically significant causal
relationship), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 884 F.2d 166, 167 (5th Cir. 1989) (same), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990); In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Lit., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (excluding
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In Lynch v. Merrell-National Laboratories,134 the plaintiff's expert, Dr.
Alan K. Done, based his opinion that Bendectin caused Margo Lynch's
birth defects on: (i) a study of the effects of structurally similar chemicals;
(ii) in vivo animal studies; and (iii) in vitro studies.135 The court ruled
that, even if an expert in the field was willing to testify to a causal rela-
tionship based on these studies, the relevant scientific community did not
generally accept such studies as an adequate method of establishing cau-
sation, in the absence of epidemiological evidence. 136 In fact, the Lynch
court ruled that a causation opinion would be admissible into evidence in
a Bendectin case only if it were based on "a new [epidemiological] study
coming to a different conclusion and challenging the consensus. '137
Therefore, the court excluded Dr. Done's testimony on the causation
issue.
3. Peer Review: Exclusion of Evidence Not Subjected to Peer Review
In response to these courts' requirement that opinions on causation be
based on epidemiological studies, a number of toxic tort plaintiffs offered
the testimony of an expert that was based on a statistical reanalysis 138 of
existing epidemiological studies. 139 The restrictive courts concluded,
however, that these studies, too, provided an inadequate basis for the ex-
pert's causation opinion because the reanalysis itself had not been sub-
jected to adequate peer review.140 While the notion that courts will be
especially skeptical of unreviewed expert opinions surfaced some time
plaintiffs' experts' testimony based, in part, on animal studies and industrial accidents,
where no epidemiological evidence supported plaintiffs' claims that Agent Orange had
caused their injuries), affd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Lombardi v.
Dow Chem. Co., 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
134. 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987).
135. Lynch, 830 F.2d at 1194.
136. Id.
137. Id.; see also Brock, 874 F.2d at 315 (observing that the court's decision would not
serve as a bar to future Bendectin cases "in the event that new and conclusive studies
emerge which would give a jury a firmer basis on which to determine the issue of causa-
tion") (emphasis added). Contra In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 732 F. Supp. 744, 749
(E.D. Mich. 1990) (refusing to grant summary judgment on causation issue in case where
plaintiffs proposed to establish Bendectin's alleged teratogenicity primarily through in vitro
testing, structure activity analysis, sales chart analysis, and animal studies, noting that "di-
vergent views" existed among medical experts over whether epidemiological data was the
only kind of proof which could conclusively link Bendectin exposure to birth defects).
138. A statistical reanalysis re-examines existing data from previously performed epide-
miological studies by combining data from several existing studies or using different con-
trol considerations to create larger sample populations. Such reanalyses use existing
epidemiological data to discover causal relationships not examined in the original studies,
and may detect causal relationships that become statistically significant only with a larger
sample population.
139. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1130 (9th Cir.
1991), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993); Lynch, 830 F.2d at 1194-96.
140. See Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1130-31; Lynch, 830 F.2d at 1195-96; Brock, 874 F.2d at
313; cf Perry v. United States, 755 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1985) ("Despite appellant's
protestations, the examination of a scientific study by a cadre of lawyers is not the same as
its examination by others trained in the field of science or medicine."). On the other hand,
the Third Circuit has ruled that the Federal Rules of Evidence contain no peer review
requirement. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 857-58 (3d Cir. 1990),
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ago,' 4 ' the Ninth Circuit's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. represented the first time a court had upheld the
exclusion of evidence on that basis alone.
C. SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENTIARY HURDLES
Using the above described approaches, the restrictive courts interposed
a trial judge's judgment between the jury and relevant scientific evidence.
If the trial judge did not find an expert's testimony convincing, either
because the trial judge was uncertain whether the underlying data would
reasonably support the expert's opinion, or because the trial judge be-
lieved that the expert's methodology did not reflect "good" science, then
the restrictive construction of the Rules permitted the trial judge to ex-
clude the evidence, and in effect, allowed the trial judge to substitute his
or her own judgment on the merits for that of the jury.
III. THE TWO FACES OF DAUBERT
In 1992, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,142 leading some to hope that the Court would
take the opportunity to clarify the Rules surrounding the admissibility of
expert testimony, and to explain the respective roles of the judge and jury
in evaluating questionable scientific evidence.
A. THE BACKGROUND
In Daubert, the plaintiffs, Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller, two minor
children, sued Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals alleging that their mothers'
ingestion of Bendectin, a prescription anti-nausea drug that Merrell Dow
marketed, had caused their limb reduction birth defects.143 After exten-
sive discovery, Merrell Dow moved for summary judgment, alleging that
the plaintiffs had not presented "any admissible evidence"'"1 that their
exposure to Bendectin had caused the defects. In response to the motion,
the plaintiffs presented the opinion testimony of eight qualified ex-
perts. 45 On the basis of in vitro and in vivo testing, chemical structure
activity analysis, and a statistical reanalysis of previously published epide-
miological studies, these experts were willing to testify that Bendectin can
cause birth defects.
cert. denied sub nom. General Elec. v. Knight, 499 U.S. 99, (1991); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 954 (3d Cir. 1990).
141. See, e.g., Richardson, 857 F.2d at 831 & n.55 (quoting Perry, 755 F.2d at 892, for the
proposition that "examination of a scientific study by a cadre of lawyers is not the same as
its examination by others trained in the field of science or medicine."); Brock, 874 F.2d at
313.
142. 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992).
143. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2791 (1993).
144. Id. at 2791-92.
145. The plaintiffs' experts included well-credentialed experts in the field of statistics
and epidemiology, medicine, veterinary medicine (for evaluation of animal studies), and
chemistry. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791 n.2.
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Relying on the requirement that evidence of causation be based on
human epidemiological studies showing a statistically significant causal
link, the trial court ruled that the testimony of the eight experts based on
in vivo, in vitro, and pharmacological studies lacked "the sufficient foun-
dation under FRE 703."146 With respect to the reanalysis of previously
published studies, the trial court noted that such reanalysis had never
been published or subjected to peer review, and did not, in any event,
establish a statistically significant causal link between Bendectin and birth
defects. 147 Because of these perceived weaknesses in the reanalysis, and
because of the numerous published epidemiological studies which failed
to find a causal link, the trial judge concluded that the opinion evidence
based upon the reanalysis, even if admitted, would not create a genuine
issue of fact on the issue of causation.148 Therefore, the trial judge found
the plaintiffs' evidence to be insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact
on causation, and granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment. 149
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision. 150 In
its decision, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the trial court that the in vivo,
in vitro, and chemical structure studies did not provide an adequate basis
for an opinion as to causation. 151 However, in discussing the plaintiffs'
statistical reanalysis, instead of deciding as the trial court had that the
reanalysis, even if admitted, was insufficient to create a genuine issue of
fact, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the reanalysis was inadmissible per se
because it had not been subjected to the rigors of a scientific peer review
process. 52 According to the Ninth Circuit, peer review was essential
before the evidence would satisfy Frye's general acceptance test.153 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether Frye's general
acceptance test had survived the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
B. FRYE is DEAD
In the first half of its opinion, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth
Circuit's opinion and found the court's exclusive reliance on Frye's gen-
eral acceptance standard to be an improper basis for excluding the plain-
tiffs' statistical reanalysis. The Court ruled that evidence can satisfy the
admissibility standards of the Federal Rules of Evidence even though the
146. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 575 (S.D. Cal.
1989), aff'd, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
147. Id. at 575.
148. Id. at 576.
149. Id. In so ruling, the Daubert trial court used both the procedural approach men-
tioned in the Introduction, see supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text, and the evidentiary
approach discussed in this article, to prevent the liability issue from reaching the jury.
150. 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
151. Id. at 1131.
152. Id. at 1130.
153. Id. The Ninth Circuit panel used only the evidentiary approach to prevent the
liability issue from reaching the jury.
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scientific basis of the expert's testimony was not generally accepted in the
relevant scientific community. 54 According to the Court, by enacting
Rule 702, which details the general standards for the admission of expert
testimony without referring to Frye's general acceptance standard, Con-
gress had intended to displace Frye.'55 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court emphasized that the Rules were intended to liberalize the admissi-
bility of expert testimony, and relied upon "'lawyer-adversaries and sensi-
ble triers of fact"' to evaluate and discredit relevant scientific evidence.' 56
Thus, a failure to obtain peer review on its own was not enough to justify
per se exclusion of the evidence.
C. LONG LIVE FRYE
However, after putting Frye to rest in the first half of its opinion, the
Court, over the dissent of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens,
proceeded in the second half of its opinion to resurrect the trial judge's
authority to examine the reliability and validity of an expert's testimony
in determining the opinion's admissibility. Indeed, while the Daubert
Court rejected Frye's "austere standard" as inconsistent with the "liberal
thrust" of the Rules, 157 the Daubert admissibility analysis may prove, in
practice, to exclude relevant expert testimony under far more circum-
stances than did the Frye standard. In dicta,' 58 the Daubert Court stated
that for scientific expert testimony to be admissible under Rule 702, the
trial judge must first determine by a preponderance of the evidence 159
that the testimony consists of (i) scientific knowledge that will (ii) assist
the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.' 60 In its dis-
cussion of this two part-standard, the Court provided both a brief descrip-
tion of what each of these requirements entails, and a general discussion
of four factors161 that would be relevant in determining whether specific
evidence has satisfied the standard.
154. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
155. Id.
156. Id. (quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound;
It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 631 (1991)).
157. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
158. As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in his separate opinion, the petition for certiorari
presented only two questions: first, whether Frye's general acceptance standard survived
the enactment of the Rules; and second, if it did, whether scientific evidence must be sub-
jected to peer review to satisfy Frye's general acceptance standard. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at
2799 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Because an interpretation of
Rule 702 was not required by the questions presented, nor had it been relied upon as a
basis for excluding the evidence in either the trial court or the Ninth Circuit, see Daubert,
727 F. Supp. 570, 575 (S.D. Cal. 1989) (excluding evidence because it lacked a reasonable
basis under Rule 703), affd, 951 F.2d 1128, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 1991) (excluding evidence
because it was not generally accepted under Frye), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796-98 (1993)
(interpreting Rule 702), the Court's pronouncements concerning Rule 702 are dicta.
159. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796 n.10.
160. Id.
161. In its discussion, the Daubert Court referred to the four variously as "factors,"
"considerations," and "general observations." Id. at 2796-97.
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In describing the type of evidence that will qualify as "scientific knowl-
edge," the Court required the evidence to be "derived by the scientific
method,"'1 62 and ruled that the evidence "must be supported by appropri-
ate validation-i.e., 'good grounds,' based on what is known."'1 63 This
validation, the Court went on to explain, requires that the testimony sat-
isfy a standard of "evidentiary reliability" or "trustworthiness," which the
Court, in a footnote, equated with the evidence being "scientifically
valid." 164
The Court further explained that, for evidence to "assist the trier of
fact," it must be relevant. 165 To be relevant under Rule 702, however, it is
not enough that the evidence satisfy the "liberal" relevancy standard de-
tailed in Rule 401.166 Instead, for expert testimony to be relevant under
Rule 702's "assist the trier of fact" language, there must be a "valid scien-
tific connection to the pertinent inquiry."'1 67 In the toxic tort causation
context, this aspect of the Court's two-part standard would apparently
require the trial judge to find a valid scientific connection between the
basis of the expert's testimony (the expert's principles and methodology,
such as in vivo, in vitro, pharmacological, or epidemiological studies) and
the pertinent issue, causation (the expert's ultimate conclusion). 168 Thus,
the Court has seemingly injected a heightened relevancy standard into
the Rule 702 inquiry.
In addition to its brief description of the two-part standard, the Court
also provided four "general observations"' 69 to guide trial judges in de-
termining whether particular expert testimony will satisfy the Court's
two-part standard.' 70 As its first observation, the Court identified the
question of whether the expert had used the "scientific method," defined
162. Id. at 2795.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2795 n.9.
165. Id. at 2795 ("This condition goes primarily to relevance.").
166. Id. at 2794 ("[Rule 401's] basic standard of relevance thus is a liberal one.").
167. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
168. Cf id. at 2795-96. In explaining its interpretation of relevancy under Rule 702, the
Court gave an example of expert testimony, based upon the phases of the moon, concern-
ing two "pertinent inquir[ies]": (i) darkness at night; and (ii) individual behavior patterns.
Id. at 2796. Testimony with respect to the first would generally be admissible because the
phase of the moon has a valid scientific connection to the pertinent issue, darkness at night.
In contrast, testimony with respect to the second based upon the phase of the moon would
not be admissible, unless "creditable grounds" supported a valid scientific connection be-
tween the two events. Id. If one applies this reasoning directly to the causation issue in
toxic tort cases, causation testimony based upon animal studies, for example, would be
admissible only if the trial judge concludes by a preponderance of the evidence that there
is a valid scientific connection between the incidence of disease in animals and the inci-
dence of disease in humans. Id. at 2706 n.10.
169. The Court suggested that its list was not exhaustive, and that other factors might
be relevant in particular cases. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796 ("Many factors will bear on the
inquiry, and we do not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test. But some general
observations are appropriate.").
170. It is somewhat unclear whether the Court intended the four considerations to illus-
trate both aspects, scientific "validity" and "connection," of its two-part standard, see id. at
2796 (Court identified testing of the methodology as a key consideration in determining
whether the evidence "is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact"), or just
1994]
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as the formation and testing of a hypothesis, as "a key" to determining
whether particular evidence ("theory or technique") satisfied the Court's
standard.171 Additional considerations included whether the "theory or
technique" had been subjected to peer review and publication, whether a
"particular scientific technique" had a significant rate of error, and
whether the methodology was generally accepted in the relevant scientific
community. 172 Through this discussion, the Court incorporated Frye's
general acceptance test 173 as one of four factors that a trial judge should
consider in determining whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable
and relevant under Rule 702 to be admitted.
The Court failed to consider, however, that the Frye test historically
applied only when an expert had relied upon a "novel scientific" device
or technique, but did not otherwise encompass a reliability examination
of the expert's reasoning or analysis. 74 Yet, the Daubert standard autho-
rizes, and indeed requires, a trial judge to examine the reliability, not only
of novel devices or techniques specifically, but of an expert's reasoning
and methodology more generally.175 As with the Daubert standard itself,
this substantial expansion of the general acceptance inquiry is not sup-
validity, see id. at 2797 (in discussing peer review as one of the four considerations, the
Court stated that the consideration was not dispositive of "scientific validity").
171. Id. at 2796-97.
172. Id. at 2797.
173. While the Daubert Court did not mention Frye by name in discussing general ac-
ceptance as one of the four considerations relevant to determining scientific validity and
connection, the Court introduces the general acceptance consideration by referring back to
its discussion of the Frye test in the first half of its opinion. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797
("Finally, 'general acceptance' can yet have a bearing on the inquiry."). Additionally, the
Daubert Court, in discussing general acceptance as one of its considerations, did cite
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985), which expressly adopted
Frye's general acceptance standard as a central part of its "more flexible" Rule 702 reliabil-
ity analysis.
In many cases, however, the acceptance factor may well be decisive, or nearly
so. Thus, we expect that a technique that satisfies the Frye test will usually be
found to be reliable as well [under our interpretation of Rule 702]. On the
other hand, a known technique which has been able to attract only minimal
support within the community is likely to be found unreliable [under our
interpretation of Rule 7021.
Downing, 753 F.2d at 1238.
174. See Christophersen v. Allied Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1133 (5th Cir. 1991)
(Reavley, J., dissenting) ("Until today, we soundly limited the Frye doctrine to particular
techniques, 'novel scientific evidence,' that reflect the factual context of Frye.") (footnote
omitted), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992); United States v. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848, 853
(9th Cir. 1990); see also Gianelli, supra note 26, at 189-90 (noting that Frye test has been
applied to the polygraph test, use of sodium pentothal, the Kell-Cellano blood grouping
test, spectroscopic analysis, the drunkometer, sound spectrometry (voiceprints), neutron
activation analysis, gun-shot residue tests, bite-mark comparisons, scanning electron micro-
scope analysis, ion microprobic analysis, psycholinguistics, trace metal detection, multi-sys-
tem enzyme blood testing, the battered wife syndrome, fingernail comparisons,
astronomical calculations, gas chromatographic/FID/FPD analysis, the rape trauma syn-
drome, psychological profile of rapists and other techniques).
175. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796 n.l; see also Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1115 (ex-
panding Frye's general acceptance standard from historical usage to encompass an exami-
nation of the expert's reasoning for reliability).
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ported by citation to any legal authority.176
In reaching its conclusion that a trial judge should carefully scrutinize
the reliability and relevance of scientific evidence under Rule 702, the
Court seemed to step back sharply in the second half of its opinion from
its earlier emphasis on the "liberalizing thrust" of the Rules and the im-
portance of the adversarial process in discrediting questionable scientific
evidence. Indeed, in the second half of its opinion, the Court attempted
to justify its reading of Rule 702 by suggesting that the liberal admissibil-
ity standards set forth in the Rules were "[p]resumably premised on an
assumption that the expert's opinion will have a reliable basis in the
knowledge and experience of his discipline."' 177
While the Daubert Court ruled that Frye's general acceptance test did
not survive the enactment of the Rules, the Court in the second half of its
opinion read something very much like Frye into the language of Rule
702. Indeed, by the end of its opinion, the Court had not only read into
the language of Rule 702 a standard very much like Frye, but had also
expanded Frye far beyond its historical use, thereby creating a standard
that will give trial judges considerable discretion to keep relevant scien-
tific evidence from the trier of fact. Under this standard, a trial judge
must exclude the evidence unless the trial judge first determines, by the
preponderance of the evidence, 178 that the expert's testimony is both sci-
entifically valid and has a valid scientific connection.
176. In fact, the Court's decision to subject not merely novel scientific devices, but also
expert reasoning, to judge-determined reliability was fobbed off seemingly as an after-
thought in a footnote. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796 n.11. A similar expansion of the Frye
standard in the Fifth Circuit drew a heated dissent. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1132
(Reavley, J., dissenting) ("Now the Fifth Circuit, without precedent, reaches beyond novel
scientific device or technique and subjects expert reasoning to judge-determined
reliability.").
177. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796; see also Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1238-39
(7th Cir. 1993) (citing Daubert for the proposition that "[t]he elimination of formal barriers
to expert testimony has merely shifted to the trial judge the responsibility for keeping 'junk
science' out of the courtroom"), modified, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 318896, cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1844 (1994). While this assumption may seem plausible in the abstract, in actuality,
the legislative record fails to articulate, or even suggest, such a premise. On the contrary,
while the legislative record recognizes the dangers of expanding the scope and bases upon
which experts can testify, the record generally reflects confidence that the adversarial sys-
tem could adequately deal with the potential problems. See supra notes 63-107 and accom-
panying text. Moreover, the Court's logic appears to be fatally flawed. The Court inferred
a substantial gatekeeping role for trial judges from Congress's decision to enact a liberal
admissibility standard for expert testimony. Yet, a substantial gatekeeping role for judges
is inconsistent with a liberal admissibility standard. Whether an admissibility standard is
liberal or restrictive is defined by the degree of gatekeeping assigned to trial judges. The
more substantial the gatekeeping role for trial judges, or in other words, the more discre-
tion that trial judges possess to exclude relevant evidence, the more restricted the flow of
relevant evidence to the jury would be. Thus, if trial judges have a substantial gatekeeping
role, then the resulting admissibility standard would be defined as restrictive. Only if trial
judges have a limited gatekeeping role, such as minimal or structured discretion to exclude
relevant evidence, would the admissibility standard be defined as liberal. Thus, if Congress
adopted a "liberal" admissibility standard, as the Daubert Court has admitted, the stan-
dard, by definition, permits only a limited gatekeeping role for trial judges.
178. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796 n.10.
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D. CHANGES IN THE ADMISSIBILITY OF QUESTIONABLE SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE AFTER DA UBERT
1. Daubert's new admissibility standard: liberal or restrictive?
As discussed, the Daubert opinion, when necessary to bolster its argu-
ment, seemed to approve of both the liberal and restrictive approaches to
the admissibility of scientific evidence. 79 The Court rejected Frye and
overturned the Ninth Circuit's decision excluding the evidence. 180 Yet at
the same time, the decision incorporated Frye's general acceptance stan-
dard into Rule 702 as a consideration relevant to determining the admis-
sibility of questionable scientific evidence.' 8 ' Additionally, in
articulating its own restrictive standard for the admissibility of such evi-
dence, the Court recognized that trial judges have an obligation to scruti-
nize proffered scientific testimony carefully for reliability and
relevancy.' 82
Further evaluation of the decision is complicated because of a noticea-
ble lack in the Court's discussion of how the four Daubert considerations
should be applied to any specific admissibility questions. As the dissent
noted, 183 the Court even failed to explain how it would apply its standard
to the causation testimony proffered in the Daubert case. As a result, a
number of critical aspects of the Court's standard are left unclear. For
example, while the Court explained that the testing of a hypothesis was a
key consideration in determining whether evidence was admissible under
Rule 702, the Court failed to make clear whether, in evaluating the
Daubert evidence, the relevant hypothesis would be: (i) that Bendectin
causes birth defects-a hypothesis directed at the ultimate issue of causa-
tion; or (ii) that a reanalysis of existing epidemiological studies prepared
for litigation can identify causal relationships-a hypothesis directed at
the effectiveness of the methodology upon which the expert's opinion is
based. In other words, should a trial court examine an expert's method-
ology or instead examine an expert's conclusion (of course, couched in
terms of analyzing the "scientific connection" between the methodology
and the conclusion) for consistency with the scientific method?
Despite the Court's caveat that "[t]he focus, of course, must be solely
on [the expert's] principles and methodology, not on the conclusions"
that the expert reaches, 184 the Court, by requiring a "valid scientific con-
nection," seems to come perilously close to inviting the trial judge to de-
cide the ultimate factual issue to which the testimony pertains in
179. See id. at 2798 (Court suggesting that its standard will prove neither so liberal that
it will lead to a "free-for-all" in the judicial process, nor so restrictive that it will stifle the
search for the truth.).
180. Id. at 2794, 2799.
181. Id. at 2797 (stating that a trial court must consider the degree of acceptance within
the scientific community of, not just novel devices or gadgets, but also of an expert's rea-
soning); see also supra note 173.
182. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794-98, 2799.
183. Id. at 2799.
184. Id. at 2797.
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determining whether to admit the testimony. In other words, determin-
ing whether there is a valid scientific connection between the expert's
testimony and the pertinent issue may necessarily entail an examination
of the expert's conclusions concerning the pertinent issue. Even should a
court in good faith attempt to restrict its examination of proffered expert
testimony to the scientific connection between an expert's principles and
methodology and the expert's conclusions, the court will likely find it dif-
ficult to focus solely on the validity of the expert's principles and method-
ology and not the conclusions drawn therefrom, as the two are inevitably
intertwined and the line between the two, as a result, necessarily blurred.
Moreover, the Court failed to provide any guidance on the weight to be
accorded its four "considerations." The Court made clear that Frye's gen-
eral acceptance test did not survive the enactment of the Rules as an
"absolute prerequisite for admissibility." 185 Thus, the failure to obtain
peer review of the Daubert statistical reanalysis, even if such failure
would render the study and the conclusions based thereon not generally
accepted, would not necessarily justify exclusion of the evidence. While
the Court's lack of guidance makes evaluation of its standard difficult, 186
several factors do suggest that the standard will ultimately prove more
restrictive than Congress intended. First, the Court required trial judges
to evaluate the bases of an expert's opinion for scientific validity, and to
examine the opinion itself for a valid scientific connection, under Rule
702. As will be discussed, these requirements do not reflect Congress's
intent in enacting Rule 702.187
Second, while the Court did not identify the weight that a trial court
should accord each of the Daubert considerations, the Court vacated
rather than reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision. This action suggests
that while obtaining peer review might not be a prerequisite for admis-
sion, the failure to obtain such review might be a sufficient basis for ex-
cluding expert testimony so long as the admissibility decision is made
using the four considerations announced in Daubert. If, on remand, the
Ninth Circuit were to decide that a failure to obtain peer review under-
mined the scientific validity of the reanalysis or the scientific connection
between the reanalysis and causation, then the Ninth Circuit would ap-
pear to be free to affirm the exclusion of the reanalysis, so long as it does
so applying the correct legal standard. 188
185. Id. at 2794.
186. In discussing the substantive changes to the evidentiary law that Daubert has
brought about, this article leaves for another time a critique of those changes. Instead, this
article presents these changes and their potential impacts in order to demonstrate the in-
creasingly restrictive view that the Court has adopted on admissibility issues pertaining to
scientific expert testimony.
187. See infra notes 198-242 and accompanying text.
188. Additionally, the Court seemed to approve the insufficiency of the evidence
grounds that the trial court originally relied upon in granting summary judgment. Daubert,
113 S. Ct. at 2798. Thus, even if the Ninth Circuit concludes that the testimony is "scien-
tific knowledge," it could affirm the trial court's decision by holding that the reanalysis
testimony, even if admitted, did not create a genuine issue of fact.
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2. Systemic Changes to the Admissibility Decision
In addition to its specific interpretation of Rule 702, Daubert also ac-
complished two systemic changes in the law concerning the admission of
expert testimony by spelling out a general approach to be used in deter-
mining the appropriate standards for admissibility decisions. First, by rul-
ing that Frye's general acceptance test did not survive independently the
enactment of the Rules, the Daubert Court required that a court establish
some basis in the Rules before excluding expert testimony. After
Daubert, the two evidentiary approaches that the restrictive courts have
used to exclude expert testimony in toxic tort cases, lack of reasonable
underlying data and lack of reasonable methodology, can no longer exist
independently of the Rules. Instead, these approaches will survive only if
the restrictive courts can tie these approaches to the language of the
Rules.
Second, by ruling that Frye's general acceptance standard has survived
as a consideration relevant to determining admissibility under Rule
702,189 the Daubert Court made clear that the courts were free to read the
Rules creatively, and to impose substantial limitations on the admissibil-
ity of questionable scientific evidence as long as each limitation could
plausibly be tied to the language of the Rules. 190 Thus, while Daubert
requires the restrictive approaches to be tied to the Rules, the opinion
also makes it fairly easy for a restrictive court to do so.
As a result, the two basic evidentiary approaches that the restrictive
courts have used in toxic tort cases should survive Daubert largely intact.
With respect to the second evidentiary approach, examining the validity
of the expert's methodology, the Daubert Court expressly held that Rule
702 authorizes trial judges to exclude expert testimony should the trial
judge determine that the expert's methodology lacks scientific validity or
a valid scientific connection. Further, while the Court did not directly
address the first evidentiary approach, examining the reliability of an ex-
pert's underlying data, the Court left open the possibility that either Rule
702 or Rule 703 might authorize pre-admission scrutiny of the adequacy
of such data.191
189. See supra note 173.
190. Thus, while the restrictive courts could no longer exclude expert testimony as to
causation based upon, for example, in vivo, in vitro, or pharmacological studies by deter-
mining that such studies did not satisfy Frye's general acceptance test, the restrictive courts
could continue to exclude such opinion evidence by finding that these methodologies
either are not scientifically valid or do not have a valid scientific connection to the perti-
nent issue, because they are not generally accepted as an adequate basis for determining
causation in the expert's field. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
191. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797-98. The Court noted that Rule 703, by its own terms,
was limited to consideration of expert testimony based upon what would otherwise be
inadmissible hearsay evidence. Id. If the Court follows through on such a reading of Rule
703, it would effectively eliminate the practice of excluding relevant scientific evidence
based upon inadequate data under Rule 703, at least insofar as the proffered testimony had
been based upon data that was otherwise admissible. Cf. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal
Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1114 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (noting that Rule 703, by its own
terms, applied only to testimony based upon otherwise inadmissible data, yet applying
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IV. SPECIFIC RESTRICTIONS ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: JUDICIAL AMENDMENT
VERSUS STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The section that follows considers the specific Rules on which the re-
strictive courts, including Daubert, have relied in limiting the admissibility
of scientific evidence, and demonstrates that the restrictive courts have
misinterpreted the applicable expert testimony rules. Restrictive inter-
pretations of these rules have a disproportionate impact on the toxic tort
plaintiff because this plaintiff will virtually always require expert testi-
mony to establish causation. When the toxic tort plaintiff's expert causa-
tion evidence is excluded under the threshold "good science" approaches
that the restrictive courts have imposed, the plaintiff generally has no
other evidence to prove causation. For this reason, the toxic tort plaintiff
is particularly vulnerable to restrictive interpretations of the expert testi-
mony rules.
Additionally, as the discussion of the pre-Daubert cases will demon-
strate, the restrictive interpretations more heavily impacted toxic tort
plaintiffs because certain courts used a more restrictive evidentiary stan-
dard in toxic tort cases, than was applied in more traditional criminal and
civil cases. The dicta in many of these cases reveals that these courts not
only misinterpreted the Rules, they manipulated the Rules to control
more directly the access of scientific expert testimony to what these
courts perceived as potentially irrational juries. Given this historical bias
against admitting scientific evidence in toxic tort cases, the selectively re-
strictive admissibility standard applied in the toxic tort area before
Daubert92 seems likely to reappear in post-Daubert interpretations of
Rule 702, and to continue in admissibility decisions based on Rule 703.193
Rule 703 to exclude testimony based upon apparently admissible data), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1280 (1992). Significantly, however, even if Rule 703 will not justify excluding prof-
fered scientific testimony based upon questionable, but admissible, data, a trial court might
find that such data does not provide a valid scientific connection to the pertinent issue or
that reliance on such data does not lead to a scientifically valid opinion, and exclude such
evidence under Daubert's Rule 702 standard. Cf Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1114 (While
discussing the standards for admissibility under Rule 703, the court noted that "[d]istrict
judges may reject opinions founded on critical facts that are plainly untrustworthy, princi-
pally because such an opinion cannot be helpful to the jury.").
192. The Daubert decision should restore uniformity to Rule 702's admissibility inquiry,
as its two-part standard appears to apply whenever a trial court is "[flaced with a proffer of
expert scientific testimony .... " See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
193. Compare Tamarin v. Adam Caterers, Inc., 13 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1993) (refusing to
apply Daubert's restrictive admissibility standards to expert testimony in labor law case)
and United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 938-39 (2d Cir. 1993) (refusing to extend
Daubert's restrictive admissibility standard to Rule 703 for prosecution experts in a crimi-
nal case) and Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1175-76 (3d Cir. 1993)
(post-Daubert decision applying liberal admissibility standard to expert testimony in case
involving an alleged breach of contract) and United States v. Markum, 4 F.3d 891, 896
(10th Cir. 1993) (post-Daubert decision applying liberal admissibility standard to expert
testimony presented by prosecutor in criminal case) and Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc.
v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1240-41 (3d Cir. 1993) (post-Daubert decision ap-
plying liberal admissibility standard to expert testimony in case involving alleged antitrust
violation) with Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 569-70 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
1994]
SMU LAW REVIEW
A. PLAIN-MEANING, CONTEXT AND THE RESTRICTIVE
INTERPRETATIONS OF RULES 702 & 703
By ruling that Frye's general acceptance test did not survive indepen-
dently of the Rules, 94 the Daubert opinion effectively required the re-
strictive courts to tie their limitations on the admissibility of expert
testimony specifically to the language of the Rules. Those restrictive
courts, including Daubert, that have relied on the Rules in articulating
restrictive standard have justified the limitations by pointing to specific
language in Rules 702 and 703 that superficially appears to incorporate
such restrictions. To date, these courts have focused on three phrases in
Rules 702 and 703 to justify their limitations of the admissibility of expert
testimony.
First, the Daubert Court pointed to the "scientific... knowledge" lan-
guage of Rule 702 in justifying its "scientific validity" hurdle.' 95 Second,
the Daubert Court, and others, have pointed to the "assist the trier of
fact" language of Rule 702 to justify exclusion of expert witness testimony
when the judge determines that the expert's opinion is questionable,
either because the expert relied on questionable data or a questionable
methodology. The argument apparently is that if the testimony is ques-
tionable, it will not "assist the trier of fact."'1 96 Third, some courts have
read the "if [the evidence is of] a type reasonably relied upon by experts
in the particular field" language of Rule 703 to justify a pre-admissibility
reliability check on the adequacy of the expert's underlying data used in
reaching his or her conclusions. 197
While each of these interpretations may seem superficially plausible, a
closer look at each of these phrases in the context in which they were
adopted reveals that none will support the restrictive interpretations sug-
gested for them.
(post-Daubert decision applying restrictive admissibility standard to plaintiff's expert testi-
mony in product's liability case). See infra note 243 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the varying standards applied in determining the admissibility of expert scientific
testimony under Rule 703. Varying admissibility standards will continue under Rule 703
because the Daubert decision provides no insight into the proper interpretation of this
Rule.
194. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
195. Id. at 2795 ("In short, the requirement that an expert's testimony pertain to 'scien-
tific knowledge' establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.") & n.9 ("In a case involv-
ing scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity.").
196. See, e.g., id. at 2795-96 (tying valid "scientific connection" requirement to Rule
702's "assist the trier of fact" language); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911
F.2d 941, 956-57 (3d Cir. 1990).
197. See, e.g., Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1114-15 (5th Cir.
1991) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992); In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Lit., 611 F. Supp, 1223, 1248-50 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. denied sub nor. Lombardi v. Dow Chem. Co., 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
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1. Rule 702: "Scientific... Knowledge That Will Assist the Trier of
Fact"
"Scientific... knowledge": The Daubert Court, relying on a position
advanced by the United States as amicus curiae, ruled that Rule 702's
introductory phrase "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge," imposed a reliability limitation on the admissibility of relevant sci-
entific testimony. 198 When scientific expert testimony is proffered under
Rule 702, the Court stated that the testimony must constitute "scien-
tific ... knowledge."'199 The Court then proceeded to explain that such
evidence can be considered "scientific . . . knowledge" only if the evi-
dence is sufficiently reliable, which in this context, required that the evi-
dence be "scientifically valid. ' '2°° In giving this interpretation of
"scientific... knowledge," the Court cited to a dictionary and two amicus
briefs,201 but failed to cite any legal authority that might in even an indi-
rect way suggest that Congress intended the "scientific ... knowledge"
language to incorporate such a reliability analysis.
This omission is not surprising given that no court in the eighteen years
since the Rules' adoption has ever read "scientific . . . knowledge" to
incorporate a reliability analysis. Moreover, nothing in the legislative his-
tory or the Advisory Committee's Notes supports such an interpreta-
tion.202 To the contrary, the legislative history establishes that Congress
did not use the word "knowledge" in Rule 702 to establish a reliability
hurdle on the admission of expert testimony. Instead, the legislative his-
tory demonstrates that Congress included the "scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge" language in this Rule to make clear that a
wide variety of educational or experiential backgrounds could provide a
witness with specialized information about an issue that might assist the
trier of fact.
198. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795-97 & n.9 (1993).
199. Id. In its amicus brief in Daubert, the United States stated:
Rule 702's requirement that the expert witness testify to what is "known"
excludes mere unsubstantiated hypotheses or theories, however sincerely the
witness may believe them. The concept of "knowledge" about a subject,
however, does not necessarily encompass only irrefutable certitudes. It
would be sensible in certain contexts to refer more broadly to what is
"known," as that which has been satisfactorily established for a given
purpose.
Amicus Brief for the United States, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 90-
102 (U.S. brief filed Jan. 19, 1993). Indeed, most aspects of the Court's opinion appear to
be adopted in whole or substantial part from the Amicus Brief for the United States, in-
cluding the need to dispense with Frye because it is too rigid, the four considerations that
suggest whether given testimony is scientifically valid, the need for the testimony to be
"helpful" in a heightened relevancy sense, and the supporting roles that Rules 703 and 403
play.
200. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795 n.9.
201. Id. at 2795.
202. Cf State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 535-37 & n.17 (1967)
(rejecting proposed interpretation of interpleader statute because "[tlhere is not a word in
the legislative history suggesting such a purpose").
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By requiring expert testimony to pertain to "knowledge," Congress did
not intend trial courts to examine the reliability of that testimony or its
bases. Congress described the subject matter of expert testimony as
"knowledge" simply to maintain consistency with Rule 602's requirement
that witnesses have "personal knowledge" of the facts to which they tes-
tify in order to be considered competent. 20 3 "Knowledge," as used in
both Rule 602 and Rule 702, does not, and indeed cannot, require a wit-
ness to know the truth of that which he or she testifies. A witness has
actual knowledge of the truth only if what the witness believes that he or
she saw, heard, or understood accurately reflects what actually happened.
Yet, determining the accuracy of the witness's belief is the primary goal of
the adversary process. The American judicial system relies on the cruci-
ble of trial to test witnesses to determine whether their beliefs as to what
they saw, heard, or understood accurately represents what occurred.
Under Daubert's interpretation, if the trial judge must first determine the
truth or accuracy of a witness's knowledge before the witness will be per-
mitted to testify, there is no need to confirm that "truth" through the
farce of a trial. The effect of such a rule is to shift to the trial judge the
authority to decide the merits of a case in determining which expert's or
witness's knowledge was accurate or true enough to admit into evidence.
Therefore, consistency with what actually happened, or substantive valid-
ity, cannot serve as the standard for admissibility, because such a stan-
dard would eliminate the need for an adversarial truth-finding process.20 4
Instead of substantive validity, "knowledge," as an admissibility standard,
requires only that a witness have "some qualification which will make
them worth listening to."205
Historically, the "knowledge" requirement necessitated that the wit-
ness have an "opportunity of observing what was or has happened and
shall have directed his attention or observation to the matter. ' 20 6 For ex-
ample, in Bratt v. Western Air Lines, Inc.,207 a farmer living about five
miles from the scene of an airplane crash testified as follows:
[T]hat during the ten years he had lived in this place, he was in the
habit of listening to the sounds of the motors of the airplanes which
passed over his home daily, and sometimes many times during the
day; that on the evening of the accident in question, and at about the
time it occurred, his attention was attracted by the sound of airplane
motors passing over his home[;] ... that at about the time this air-
plane would in the normal course of its flight pass over his home, he
heard a noise of engines that was different from the usual and ordi-
nary noise he had heard daily over a period of years[; and t]hat in
this particular instance the "motors would come and go off and the
203. FED. R. EVID. 602 ("A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is intro-
duced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the
matter.").
204. See 2 WIGMORE, supra note 41, § 650.
205. Id. (emphasis in original).
206. Id. (emphasis in original).
207. 155 F.2d 850 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 735 (1946).
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noise would come and go."20 8
The trial judge excluded the farmer's testimony "on the grounds that
there was no showing that the motors the witness heard were those of the
plane in question, and for the further reason" that the opinion that the
"motors would come and go off" was a mere "guess" given the altitude of
the plane and the possibility that the sound of the engines was somehow
distorted.209 The court of appeals reversed, however, holding that the
farmer's personal observations were "knowledge" sufficient to be admis-
sible given that he had some reasonable opportunity to observe the facts
and form an opinion concerning an important issue in the litigation.
210
The fact that the farmer's opportunity to observe was neither perfect nor
certain to reflect the truth of the accident did not render his testimony
inadmissible. 211
By requiring expert testimony to reflect "scientific ...knowledge,"
Congress did not intend to create a pre-admission validity or reliability
check on expert testimony. Instead, Congress substituted the adjective
"scientific" for the adjective "personal" to distinguish Rule 702's "scien-
tific ... knowledge" from Rule 602's "personal knowledge," in recogni-
tion of the fact that Rule 702 knowledge will often be founded, in part,
upon expertise in a particular field, rather than upon firsthand observa-
tion of the facts at issue in the proceeding.
"Knowledge" then, as used in Rule 702, refers not to scientifically accu-
rate testimony, but to testimony based upon an opportunity to observe or
determine the truth.212 Upon demonstration that a witness had the op-
portunity to derive relevant insights or observations on a given issue, de-
fects in the witness's knowledge have traditionally been left to the
adversarial system to uncover. 213 Daubert's interpretation of "scien-
tific ... knowledge" as a reliability standard places the judge in the posi-
208. Bratt, 155 F.2d at 854.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.; see also 2 WIGMORE, supra note 41, § 660. As Professor Wigmore explained:
Thus it is that the law may reject testimony which appears to be founded on
data so scanty that the witness' alleged inferences from them may at once be
pronounced absurd or extreme. This principle, however, sound as it is in
theory, can seldom have frequent application. When the source of knowl-
edge is so insufficient, courts will rarely need to pronounce the formal exclu-
sion of the testimony. Its weakness is self-exhibited. The risk of excluding a
useful though small item of testimony is greater than the risk of admitting
testimony capable of exaggeration. Cross-examination will usually furnish
the exposure.
Id.
212. See, e.g., Twin City Plaza, Inc. v. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp., 409 F.2d 1195, 1201-02
(8th Cir. 1969) (expert testimony held admissible even though "[tihere exists the possibility
that one of more of these [several intervening] factors ... had caused the damage").
213. Evaluation of the reliability of expert testimony is generally thought to be a jury
function. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898, 900-01 (1983); Mitchell v. Lone Star
Ammunition, Inc., 913 F.2d 242, 252 (5th Cir. 1990) ("It is the jury's province to determine
whether expert testimony rests upon tenuous evidentiary inferences and weak scientific or
engineering data."); see also DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941,
956 (3d Cir. 1990) (The Rules "embody a strong and undeniable preference for admitting
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tion of weighing the evidence, and therefore, effectively deciding the
merits in many science-based cases, such as toxic torts.
Additionally, by phrasing the Rule to include "scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge," Congress intended to make clear that a
wide variety of educational or experiential backgrounds might provide a
witness with an adequate opportunity to develop insights into a particular
factual issue. As the Advisory Committee's Notes explain:
The rule is broadly phrased. The fields of knowledge which may be
drawn upon are not limited merely to the "scientific" and "technical"
but extend to all "specialized" knowledge. Similarly, the expert is
viewed, not in a narrow sense, but as a person qualified by "knowl-
edge, skill, experience, training or education." Thus, within the
scope of the rule are not only experts in the strictest sense of the
word, e.g. physicians, physicists, and architects, but also the large
group sometimes called "skilled" witnesses, such as bankers or land-
owners testifying to land values. 214
As this discussion suggests, Congress used the "scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge" language in Rule 702 to identify those indi-
viduals who would be competent to offer expert opinions.215 Such broad
language was necessary to make clear that Congress did not intend to
permit courts to continue the common law's practice of excluding a
skilled witness's testimony by finding that the witness's knowledge was
not sufficiently specialized to be beyond the understanding of the average
juror.216 The distinction between "experts in the strictest sense" and
"skilled" experts detailed in the Advisory Committee's Notes confirms
that Congress intended to reject the common law's tendency to apply the
"need" standard to limit the admissibility of expert testimony by skilled
witnesses. Given this context, the adjective "scientific" merely identifies
people who work in science as one group of individuals who, by virtue of
their experience and education, will often have the opportunity to possess
specialized information that can be admitted in the form of opinion testi-
mony if it will assist the trier of fact in understanding or resolving a fact at
issue. Thus, instead of a reliability standard, Rule 702 incorporates an
expansive "identification" criterion that is intended to suggest the myriad
of persons who may be permitted to testify as experts under the Rules.
any evidence having some potential for assisting the trier of fact and for dealing with the
risk of error through the adversarial process.").
214. FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note.
215. See also Rules of Evidence: Senate Hearings, supra note 67, at 154.
It should be noted that, though an expert's opinion is limited to issues within
his area of special expertise, an "expert" is not defined in a narrow sense, but
as a person qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educa-
tion." Therefore, the term "expert" encompasses not only physicians, physi-
cists, architects, etc., but also the group of witnesses sometimes termed
"skilled."
Id.
216. See 7 WIGMORE, supra note 41, § 1923; see also supra notes 157-58 and accompa-
nying text.
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Further support for finding that Rule 702's scientific knowledge lan-
guage represents an identification, rather than a reliability, criterion can
be found by returning the phrase "scientific ... knowledge" to the con-
text of the Rule. Rule 702 reads: "If scientific, technical, or other spe-
cialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue .... "217 By tying the adjective "scientific"
to the adjectives "technical, or other specialized," the language of the
Rule confirms that the phrase "scientific... knowledge" simply describes
one category of individuals who, by virtue of their experience and educa-
tion, will often possess insights into relevant issues such that they should
be allowed to testify in opinion form, if such testimony will assist the trier
of fact to understand and resolve the case. To suggest that Congress in-
tended the adjective "scientific" to incorporate a substantive requirement
of "scientific validity" would necessarily imply that the parallel use of the
adjectives "technical" and "other specialized knowledge" was also in-
tended to incorporate similar reliability checks, an argument bordering
on the frivolous. 218
Additionally, in discussing "scientific... knowledge" more specifically,
the Advisory Committee referred generally to physicians and physicists.
By referring to "physicians" and "physicists" generally, rather than to
"physicians who hold scientifically valid opinions" or "physicists who
practice 'good science,"' the Committee seems to emphasize the use of
the adjective "scientific" in the Rule as simply descriptive of a type of
knowledge, and appears to reject the Daubert Court's argument that the
phrase "scientific... knowledge" necessarily incorporates the substantive
requirement that the expert's opinion satisfy a standard of "scientific
validity."
Thus, in context, the phrase "scientific... knowledge" represents one
aspect of Rule 702's identification criterion, in that it was intended to
describe one type of educational or experiential background that would
likely provide a witness with an opportunity to know something that
could help the trier of fact to understand more appreciably an issue in
dispute. Under Rule 702, the opinion of such an expert can be admitted
if it will assist the jury. Clearly, Daubert's restrictive interpretation of this
phrase is inconsistent with the intentions of Congress.
"Assist the trier of fact": Certain courts, including the Daubert Court,
have read Rule 702's requirement that proffered expert testimony "assist
the trier of fact" to justify pre-admission scrutiny of an expert's underly-
ing data or methodology, and to exclude such expert testimony if the trial
judge concludes that the testimony is based upon questionable data or
methodology.219 While exclusion of fundamentally unsupported evi-
217. FED. R. EVID. 702.
218. Cf. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2800 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Does all of this dicta
apply to an expert seeking to testify on the basis of 'technical or other specialized knowl-
edge' . . ?").
219. See, e.g., Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795-96 (reading the "assist the trier of fact" lan-
guage to require "a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry"); DeLuca v. Mer-
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dence may be appropriate under Rule 401,220 Congress did not intend
this language to authorize exclusion of expert testimony simply because
the trial judge concludes that the testimony is questionable, or on the
scientific fringe.
The mistake that the restrictive courts have made is to extract the
phrase, "assist the trier of fact," from the context of Rule 702 and to use it
in undertaking what amounts to a free-form inquiry into the type of ex-
pert testimony that might provide the most assistance to a jury.221 Di-
vorced from its context, it becomes obvious to argue that valid, or
substantively correct, expert testimony would provide more assistance to
the trier of fact than would invalid expert testimony. 222 Additionally, the
restrictive reading of the "assist the trier of fact" language would appear
to be facially consistent with the Advisory Committee's explanation that
opinions may be excluded if "they are unhelpful, and therefore superflu-
ous and a waste of time. '223 Again, taken out of context, a valid opinion
would seem to be more "helpful" ' 224 than an invalid, or questionable, one.
Yet, if the language is returned to its proper context, several considera-
tions establish that Congress did not intend the phrase, "assist the trier of
rell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 954-55 (3d Cir. 1990); Viterbo v. Dow Chem.
Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing Rule 702's "assist the trier of fact" require-
ment, and then explaining that "[i]f an expert opinion is fundamentally unsupported, then
it offers no expert assistance to the jury."); see also Jonakait, supra note 52, at 767 (inter-
preting "assist the trier of fact" literally to require pre-admissibility screening of the basis
of an expert's opinion for reliability); cf Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d
1106, 1114 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (per curiam) (court combines Rules 702 and 703 in
holding that careful scrutiny of an expert's underlying data and methodology is appropriate
under Rule 703 because an unsupported opinion "cannot be helpful to the jury"), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
220. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
221. This sort of acontextual interpretation of code language has been a recurring prob-
lem. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 518 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring) (In discuss-
ing whether trial preparation material was discoverable under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Justice Jackson wrote: "It is true that the literal language of the Rules would
admit of an interpretation that might sustain the district court's order .... But all such
procedural measures have a background of custom and practice which was assumed by
those who wrote and should be by those who apply them."); Rules of Evidence: House
Hearings I, supra note 33, at 209 (testimony of Robert L. Clare, Jr., New York Trial Law-
yers Committee) ("[The new judges] are the ones who get in trouble [with a uniform code
of evidence] because they look at the black letters and they have tried to apply it without
knowing why they got there or why that rule was in.").
222. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796 ("Rule 702's 'helpfulness' standard requires a valid
scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.").
223. The Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 702 provide in pertinent part: "Whether
the situation is a proper one for the use of expert testimony is to be determined on the
basis of assisting the trier.... When opinions are excluded, it is because they are unhelpful
and therefore superfluous and a waste of time." FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's
notes.
224. Although the Advisory Committee defined the standard for exclusion in terms of
"unhelpful[ness]," courts, including the Daubert Court, have instead imposed a "helpful-
ness" requirement in analyzing the meaning of Rule 702's "assist the trier of fact" lan-
guage. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796; see also DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 954 ("Rule 702's
helpfulness requirement implicitly contains the proposition that expert testimony that is
based on unreliable methodology is unhelpful and therefore excludable."); In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Lit., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1242 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d
Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Lombardi v. Dow Chem. Co., 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
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fact," to authorize a pre-admissibility screening of expert testimony for
validity or reliability. As a threshold matter, Congress intended this lan-
guage to address the very specific issue of whether expert testimony
would continue to be governed by the strict "need" standard of the com-
mon law, or the more liberal "assistance" standard that Professor Wig-
more advocated. In context, the "assist the trier of fact" language reflects
Congress's decision to reject the "need" standard in favor of the more
liberal "assistance" standard. By choosing the more liberal standard,
Congress intended to shift from a standard that admitted expert testi-
mony only when the jury would be incapable of understanding or resolv-
ing an issue without the aid of an expert, to a standard that permitted
such testimony on any issue where the jury would be somewhat more
capable with the aid of an expert.225
. Congress's intentions for the "assist the trier of fact" standard become
evident when one considers the authorities cited in the Advisory Com-
mittee's Notes for Rule 702. These cited authorities are entirely inconsis-
tent with Daubert's interpretation of this phrase.226 The Advisory
Committee's Notes cite the work of Professors Ladd and Wigmore as
guides in distinguishing helpful from unhelpful expert testimony under
Rule 702.227 Significantly, in the cited portions,228 neither Ladd nor Wig-
more define helpfulness in terms of the validity or reliability of the ex-
pert's opinion. Instead, both discuss and reject the early common law's
position that expert testimony was admissible only to the extent neces-
sary for the trier of fact to understand an issue, or in other words, only to
the extent the testimony satisfied the common law's "need" standard.229
These commentators endorsed an admissibility analysis which would ad-
mit the expert testimony, even when it was not essential, if the testimony
would assist the trier of fact to understand or resolve an issue.2 30
225. See supra notes 66-82 and accompanying text.
226. Because the Daubert Court apparently found the "assist the trier of fact" language
unambiguous, it did not bother to check its literalist interpretation of this language against
the interpretations given in these sources. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795-96 (interpreting
the language out of context, without any reference to the sources that the Advisory Com-
mittee actually cited).
227. The Advisory Committee used the phrase "unhelpful" to describe the sort of ex-
pert testimony that may be excluded under the "assist the trier of fact" standard. See FED.
R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's notes ("When opinions are excluded, it is because they
are unhelpful and therefore superfluous and a waste of time."). The Rule's "helpfulness"
or "assistance" standard is specifically meant to suggest that expert testimony will be ad-
missible upon a lesser showing of need for the testimony than the "need" standard im-
posed under the common law. See supra notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
228. In discussing the requirement that testimony reflect "knowledge," Wigmore re-
quired that the testimony "involve rational inferences from adequate data." 2 WIGMORE,
supra note 41, § 659. Wigmore warned, however, that with respect to expert scientific testi-
mony, trial judges should generally admit such evidence to permit "whatever light can be
thrown upon the issue by competent persons and then leaving their credit to the jury." Id.
§ 662. Wigmore advocated this approach even when "the subject is one in which certain
and accurate results are difficult to reach and upon which most persons' opinions will be
merely notational and conjectural .... Id.
229. See supra notes 66-82 and accompanying text.
230. WIGMORE, supra note 41, § 1918; Ladd, supra note 79, at 418 n.18.
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Additionally, these commentators provide crucial insight into the Advi-
sory Committee's intentions in defining the "assist the trier of fact" stan-
dard in terms of "[ ]helpful[ness]." As Professor Ladd's quoted article
explains, helpfulness focused not on the substantive validity or accuracy
of the expert's opinion, but on whether "'the untrained layman would be
qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the par-
ticular issue without enlightenment from those having a specialized un-
derstanding of the subject involved in the dispute.' 231 Similarly,
Wigmore, in his discussion of the issue, defined the "helpfulness" issue by
examining whether the expert testimony would be "superfluous. '232 As
did Ladd, Wigmore made clear, however, that whether testimony should
be considered "superfluous," and therefore unhelpful, turned not on the
validity or accuracy of the proffered testimony, but instead on whether
the trier of fact might better understand an issue with the aid of an ex-
pert's testimony:
It is not that there is any fault to find with the witness himself or the
sufficiency of his sources of knowledge or the positiveness of his im-
pression; but simply that his testimony, otherwise unobjectionable, is
not needed, is superfluous.
Thus the principle of exclusion is in no sense one of testimonial
qualifications, but one of auxiliary policy .. 233
In Wigmore's view, this evidentiary principle provides for exclusion of
expert testimony as superfluous where the court or trier of fact possesses
knowledge and information such that the testimony of an expert would
add no further insight into, or understanding of, the issue. 234 As an ex-
ample of this principle, Wigmore explained that if the deceased's clothes
have been admitted into evidence, expert testimony on the issue of
whether the clothes "were what is commonly described as black" can be
excluded as superfluous.2 35 Testimony on such an issue would not give
the trier of fact "real help" in resolving or understanding the issue be-
cause the average lay juror would be equally capable of determining for
himself or herself whether clothing could be described as black. There-
fore, expert testimony on such an issue could be properly excluded as
231. See FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's notes (quoting Ladd, supra note 79, at
418) (emphasis added).
232. 7 WIGMORE, supra note 41, § 1918 (section cited with approval FED. R. EVID. 702
advisory committee's notes).
233. 7 WIGMORE, supra note 41, § 1918 (section cited in FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory
committee's notes) (emphasis added); see also 2 WIGMORE, supra note 41, § 679 ("But by
the opinion rule ... the tribunal will not listen to conclusions or opinions from persons who
possess no more skill than the tribunal itself in drawing inferences from the premises .... ).
234. Id. ("We are dealing merely with a broad principle that, whenever the point is
reached at which the tribunal is being told that which it is itself entirely equipped to deter-
mine without the witness' aid on this point, his testimony is superfluous and is to be dis-
pensed with."); see also 2 WIGMORE, supra note 41, § 679 ("But by the opinion rule (§ 1918
infra) the tribunal will not listen to conclusions or opinions from persons who possess no
more skill than the tribunal itself in drawing inferences from the premises.").
235. Id. § 1918.
[Vol. 48
EXPERT TESTIMONY & TOXIC TORTS
"unhelpful., 236
Thus, Wigmore's discussion would exclude as "superfluous," and there-
fore unhelpful, expert testimony that concerned an issue on which an ex-
pert's insights would not add to the trier of fact's own knowledge or
understanding of the issue.2 37 Significantly, Wigmore emphasized that
this principle of exclusion should not focus on, or find "fault" with, the
expert or the expert's "sources of knowledge," but instead on whether
the issue is one on which expert testimony could add something to the
trier of fact's own thoughts on the issue. 238
By basing its interpretation of the "assist the trier of fact" standard on
an improper, acontextual definition of "unhelpful[ness]," the Daubert
Court has inappropriately injected a reliability analysis into the admissi-
bility standard. The Advisory Committee's Notes plainly demonstrate
that the drafters intended the "assist the trier of fact" language of Rule
702 to permit admission of expert testimony so long as the subject was
one on which the jury could expect to receive some insight from the spe-
cialized knowledge of an expert. The Advisory Committee intended "as-
sist the trier of fact" to authorize exclusion of expert testimony under
Rule 702 only when the testimony would substantially duplicate informa-
tion already available to, or concern an issue readily understood by, the
average trier of fact.
Additional support for rejecting Daubert's analysis can be found in
Congress's decision to tie the "assist the trier of fact" language of Rule
702 to Rule 702's introductory phrase concerning the "scientific, techni-
cal, or other specialized knowledge" of an expert, rather than to any
given expert's testimony.239 If Congress had intended Rule 702 to en-
compass a pre-admissibility screening of particular opinions for validity, it
would have provided that an expert's opinion is admissible if "the ex-
pert's opinion will assist the trier of fact to resolve an issue correctly."
Instead, by tying the "assist the trier of fact" language to "scientific, tech-
nical or other specialized knowledge," Congress directed courts to ex-
amine the matter at issue, and to determine whether that matter is one
which the trier of fact might better understand or resolve with the aid of
the specialized knowledge of an expert.2 40
236. Id.
237. See also 2 WIGMORE, supra note 41, § 557 ("Thus, it will often depend on the
special qualifications of the witness whether he can add anything valuable which the jury
have not already for themselves."). As Wigmore explained, without such a safeguard, the
courts could be inundated with repetitive expert testimony that could inappropriately in-
fluence a jury by virtue of its sheer volume, rather than by its additional insights.
238. See also 2 WIGMORE, supra note 41, §§ 557, 679.
239. FED. R. EVID. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact .... ).
240. See Christophersen, 939 F.2d 1106, 1116-17 (5th Cir. 1991) (Clark, C.J., concurring)
("The advisory committee's notes make it clear that this rule focuses any question of assist-
ance on the nature of the jury's factual inquiry rather than on the substance of the expert's
testimony."), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
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Thus, Daubert's incorporation of a reliability check into the "assist the
trier of fact" standard is without support. By using the "assist the trier of
fact" language and citing to Ladd's and Wigmore's discussions, Congress
intended to reject the "need" standard of the early common law, and re-
place it with a broader standard for the issues on which an expert would
be permitted to testify. Under this broader "assistance" standard, Con-
gress intended expert testimony to be admissible so long as it would help
the trier of fact to understand more appreciably a matter at issue, even if
the testimony was not essential to understanding or resolving the is-
sues. 241 By ignoring the applicable legislative history and historical con-
text of the Rules' drafting and adoption,242 Daubert and the other
restrictive courts have substantially reoriented this Rule and increased
the burden of proof for plaintiffs who must rely on scientific evidence to
prove causation.
As an alternative to the language of Rule 702, some courts have relied
upon the language of Rule 703 to justify restricting the admissibility of
questionable scientific testimony.
2. Rule 703: "Of a Type Reasonably Relied Upon"
Although there is considerable controversy on the issue of whether
Rule 703 may be used to restrict the admissibility of questionable scien-
tific testimony, several courts have interpreted Rule 703 to authorize a
trial court to exclude expert testimony which the court finds to be based
upon questionable underlying data, regardless of whether such underly-
ing data is independently admissible into evidence. 243 In justifying this
241. See Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1116-17 (Clark, C.J., concurring) ("The advisory
committee's notes make it clear that this rule focuses any questions of assistance on the
nature of the jury's factual inquiry rather than on the substance of the expert's testi-
mony."); Hagen v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 334, 337 (N.D. I11. 1988); In re
Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., 533 F. Supp. 567, 579 (D. Colo. 1980).
242. In contrast, the Daubert Court considered the Rules' legislative history in deter-
mining whether Frye had survived enactment of the Rules. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
See also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 518 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring) (In discuss-
ing whether trial preparation material was discoverable under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Justice Jackson wrote: "It is true that the literal language of the Rules would
admit of an interpretation that might sustain the district court's order .... But all such
procedural measures have a background of custom and practice which was assumed by
those who wrote and should be by those who apply them."); Rules of Evidence: House
Hearings I, supra note 33, at 209 (testimony of Robert L. Clare, Jr., New York Trial Law-
yers Committee) ("[The new judges] are the ones who get in trouble [with a uniform code
of evidence] because they look at the black letters and they have tried to apply it without
knowing why they got there or why that rule was in.").
243. Compare Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 830 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (Rule 703 requires a sufficient foundation for expert's opinion; "chemical, in vitro,
and in vivo [studies] cannot furnish a sufficient foundation for a conclusion that Bendectin
caused the birth defects at issue in this case"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989) and Viterbo
v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 423-24 (5th Cir. 1987) (expert opinion based upon labora-
tory tests and oral history "lacks the foundation and reliability necessary" to be admissible)
and In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Lit., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1246 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (dis-
cussing whether Rule 703 should require trial court to determine whether expert relied
upon reliable data, or a reliable type of data, and adopting former view), affd, 818 F.2d 187
(2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Lombardi v. Dow Chem. Co., 487 U.S. 1234 (1988)
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interpretation, the Christophersen court explained that restricting Rule
703's analysis to expert testimony based solely on inadmissible data
would "render Rule 703 impotent as a tool for testing the trustworthiness
of the facts and data underlying the expert's opinion in a given trial."'244
Significantly however, Rule 703 was never intended as a means of test-
ing the trustworthiness of the underlying data, either admissible or inad-
missible, upon which an expert relied. As previously discussed,
Congress's purpose in enacting Rule 703 was to eliminate the common
law rule that an expert's opinion could not be based on hearsay. By elim-
inating the common law rule, Congress intended to eliminate the "excru-
ciatingly long hypothetical question, 2 45 and to provide an additional
source of information upon which an expert's opinion could be founded:
the type of facts or data reasonably relied upon by experts in the field,
even if that information would otherwise constitute hearsay.246 In ex-
change for allowing experts to rely upon this additional source of infor-
mation, Congress imposed the requirement that the inadmissible hearsay
evidence be "of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particu-
lar field," and permitted, under Rule 705, opposing counsel to force dis-
closure of the underlying hearsay evidence through cross-examination.
As a corollary principle, if the facts or data upon which an expert bases
his or her opinion are independently admissible, a judge may not consider
whether the facts or data upon which the expert relied "are of the type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field. '2 47 In this situa-
tion, Congress depended on the adversarial process to identify and bring
to the jury's attention the unreliable nature of the facts upon which an
expert relied. For this reason, the "of the type reasonably relied upon"
language of Rule 703 only becomes an issue if the facts or data upon
which an expert has relied are inadmissible.
Even when proffered expert testimony is based upon inadmissible facts
or data, two considerations suggest that the proper role of the trial court
with DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 953 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Rule
703 is satisfied once there is a showing that an expert's testimony is based on the type of
data a reasonable expert in the field would use in rendering an opinion on the subject at
issue .... ) and In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 732 F. Supp. 744, 748 (E.D. Mich.
1990) (in evaluating proffered testimony on Bendectin causation, court noted that when
examining expert testimony under Rule 703 the court "must determine whether the data
underlying [the causation opinion] is of the type reasonable relied upon by experts in the
field without separately evaluating the trustworthiness of the particular data") and In re
Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., 533 F. Supp. 567, 578 (D. Colo. 1980) (held
admissible expert testimony based upon laboratory testing of plaintiff's blood even though
the medical community had not accepted the expert's conclusions drawn from the testing).
244. See, e.g., Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1114.
245. See supra note 91.
246. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text, concerning the historical develop-
ment and purpose of Rule 703.
247. See Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1110 n.4. The Christophersen majority recognized
that the "of the type reasonably relied upon" language of Rule 703 applied only to inad-
missible evidence, yet, without explanation, proceeded to evaluate the trustworthiness of




under Rule 703 is to determine whether the expert has used a reasonable
"type" of data in forming his or her opinion, not whether the data itself
reasonably supports the opinion. First, if Congress intended Rule 703 to
incorporate a reliability analysis focusing on the specific data an expert
uses, rather than the type of data, it could certainly have said so. 248 In-
stead, Congress chose to focus Rule 703's language on the "type" of data,
making it clear that the drafters intended for courts to evaluate the relia-
bility of the category or kind of data, rather than the integrity of the data
itself. Moreover, Congress retained language focusing on the "type" of
data despite specific warnings that the language would permit experts to
rely upon incompetent data.249
The Advisory Committee's Notes also reflect that the drafters intended
courts to evaluate the type of data relied upon, rather than the data it-
self.250 Specifically, the examples in the Notes focus on the types of data
on which experts rely, such as a physician's reliance on statements from
the patient and the patient's relatives, reports and opinions of other med-
ical personnel, hospital records, and laboratory reports, rather than the
specific facts or data that these sources contain in a particular case.251
Thus as an initial matter, the language of the Rule and the Advisory
Committee's Notes which explain the application of the Rule both direct
the trial court to examine whether the information upon which the expert
has relied is the type upon which experts in the field reasonably rely, not
whether a reasonable expert would rely upon the particular facts or data
available in a specific case.252
Second, the restrictive reading of Rule 703 leads to disparate treatment
of an expert's opinion depending on whether the opinion is based upon
admissible or inadmissible data,253 and also renders Rule 705 largely ir-
relevant. If an expert's opinion is based on admissible data, Rule 703
does not apply by its own terms254 and any weaknesses in the underlying
248. For example, Congress could have drafted the second sentence of Rule 703 to
read: "If the facts or data would be reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field
in forming opinions or inferences, such facts or data need not be admissible in evidence."
249. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
251. FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee's notes.
252. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1118 (Clark, C.J., concurring). See also DeLuca v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 953 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Rule 703 is satisfied
once there is a showing that an expert's testimony is based on the type of data a reasonable
expert in the field would use in rendering an opinion on the subject at issue; it does not
address the reliability or general acceptance of an expert's methodology.").
253. Rule 703 intends to treat opinions based upon admissible data differently from
opinions based upon inadmissible data in one respect. If data is independently admissible,
then it is not hearsay (or is admissible hearsay), and as a result, does not raise hearsay
reliability questions. To ensure that the hearsay reliability problems potentially associated
with inadmissible data are not excessive, Rule 703 requires that the inadmissible data be
"of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field." FED. R. EVID. 703.
Such a requirement addresses the hearsay reliability problems that the introduction of tes-
timony based upon such inadmissible evidence might otherwise present.
254. FED. R. EvID. 703 ("If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence.").
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data must be demonstrated to the trier of fact through effective cross-
examination. Alternatively, if the expert has relied upon inadmissible
data in forming his or her opinion, then Rule 703 would apply. If a court
reads Rule 703 restrictively, to authorize the trial judge to examine the
underlying data for reasonableness, then the opponent of the evidence
could keep the evidence from the trier of fact altogether if he or she can
convince the trial judge that the data does not provide a valid basis for
the expert's opinion. Such an option is not available to the opponent of
expert testimony based upon admissible data.
Moreover, the restrictive interpretation of Rule 703 would render Rule
705's cross-examination provision unnecessary. If the trial judge deter-
mines that proffered expert testimony has a reasonable basis and admits
it, an attorney would have little interest in bringing to light the admittedly
reasonable underlying factual basis through cross-examination under
Rule 705. On the other hand, if the testimony lacks a reasonable basis,
then it would be excluded, and an attorney would have no need to cross-
examine the expert under Rule 705 concerning the factual basis of the
excluded testimony. Therefore, in addition to creating unintended dis-
parities in the treatment of opinions depending on whether they are
based upon admissible or inadmissible data, the restrictive interpretation
of Rule 703 would also render Rule 705 redundant.
In contrast, a reading of Rule 703 that authorizes the trial judge to
examine the type of data upon which the expert has relied would place
expert opinion based upon inadmissible data on essentially the same foot-
ing as an opinion based upon admissible data. As a threshold matter, the
court would ensure that the inadmissible data on which an expert relied
was of a reasonable type, thereby addressing possible hearsay reliability
problems associated with the inadmissible data. While such a check is not
directly required for opinions based upon admissible data, the fact that
the underlying data is independently admissible ensures that the data will
not suffer from any hearsay reliability problems. Having addressed po-
tential hearsay reliability problems, both opinions would be admitted,
and any weaknesses in the underlying data could be brought to the trier
of fact's attention through cross-examination, either directly if the under-
lying data is independently admissible, or under Rule 705's cross-exami-
nation provision.
Thus, of the two possible interpretations of Rule 703, only a reading
that directs trial courts to focus on the type of data, rather than the data
itself, will ensure parallel treatment of expert opinions based on either
inadmissible or admissible data. Furthermore, only the "type of data"
reading of Rule 703 will ensure that Rule 705 plays the role plainly in-
tended for it.255 This parallel treatment concern, and the Rule's provision
for cross-examination under Rule 705, confirm that Congress intended
for the proper check on the use of unreliable data, as opposed to an unre-
255. On the interrelation between Rules 703 and 705, see supra note 94.
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liable type of data, to be cross-examination. 256
3. Inconsistency with Rule 403
In addition to the language and history of Rules 702 and 703, and the
interaction between Rules 703 and 705, the restrictive interpretations of
Rules 702 and 703 are also inconsistent with the general framework of the
Rules which favors admissibility.257 While the restrictive courts have re-
ferred to Rule 403 as an additional basis to exclude expert testimony,
their restrictive interpretations of Rules 702 and 703 are likely, as a prac-
tical matter, to displace almost entirely Rule 403's balancing test in deter-
mining the admissibility of scientific evidence. 258 If the result of the
restrictive interpretations of Rules 702 and 703 is to render another ap-
parently applicable Rule 259 irrelevant, 260 this violence to the basic struc-
ture of the Rules tends to confirm the conclusion drawn from the plain-
256. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text; see also Ladd, supra note 79, at 422
(In dispensing with the common law's requirement that the facts upon which an expert's
opinion is based be first admitted into evidence, either directly or through the use of a
hypothetical question, "[t]he opportunity of the opponent to cross-examine is looked upon
as a sufficient safeguard to faulty testimony.").
257. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (generous standard of relevancy), 402 (all relevant evidence
is admissible unless otherwise specifically provided), 403 (relevant evidence may be ex-
cluded only if the dangers associated with admitting the evidence substantially outweigh its
probative value); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786,
2793-94 (1993).
258. See DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 957 (3d Cir. 1990)
("Moreover, if [an expert's] testimony survives the rigors of Rule 702 and 703 on remand,
Rule 403 is an unlikely basis for exclusion."); see also Christophersen v. Allied-Signal
Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1116 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (per curiam) (casually dismissing Rule
403 as unnecessary to the court's decision because the court had already concluded that
exclusion was proper under Rule 703 or Frye), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
259. By its terms, Rule 403 applies to all relevant evidence. FED. R. EVID. 403
("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice .... "). In a few circumstances, Congress pre-
balanced the dangers and probative value of specific evidence and displaced Rule 403's
general danger versus probative value balance by a more specific Rule. See FED. R. EVID.
404 (defining circumstances where character evidence is admissible), 406 (habit), 407 (sub-
sequent remedial measures), 408 (compromise and offers to compromise), 409 (payment of
medical and similar expenses), 410 (plea bargains), 411 (liability insurance), 412 (past be-
havior of victim in sex offense cases), 609 (impeachment by past conviction). Congress has
not done so for admissibility decisions concerning questionable expert testimony. See also
supra notes 66-105 and accompanying text.
260. While the Daubert Court did not interpret Rule 702 to require trial judges to bal-
ance the reliability and validity of the expert testimony against its dangers, the Court cites
with approval the Third Circuit's interpretation of the Rule in United States v. Downing,
753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985). See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797. In Downing, the Third
Circuit interpreted Rule 702 to require consideration both of the reliability of the proffered
testimony, and the dangers resulting from its admission. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1239. The
Downing court expressly recognized that its restrictive reading of Rule 702 "incorporates
to some extent a consideration of the dangers.., enumerated in FED. R. EVID. 403," but
failed to consider that the overlap that its reading of Rule 702 created would tend to sug-
gest that it had erred in interpreting Rule 702. Id. at 1242. Even when a later Third Circuit
decision read Downing's Rule 702 standard to displace almost entirely the applicability of
Rule 403 to questionable expert testimony, see DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 957 (3d Cir. 1990), the Third Circuit failed to recognize that this abroga-
tion of Rule 403 might suggest that it had impermissibly reoriented the basic framework of
the Rules.
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meaning and legislative history of Rules 702 and 703: the restrictive
courts have misread them.261
The discussion that follows considers the more rigorous admissibility
standards that the pre-Daubert courts applied in toxic tort cases, as con-
trasted with more traditional tort and criminal cases. The restrictive
courts' heightened admissibility inquiry in toxic tort cases, as well as the
courts' dicta expressing tremendous skepticism concerning scientific ex-
pert testimony in such cases, demonstrate that these courts will likely ap-
ply even Daubert's apparently even-handed approach in a selectively
restrictive manner.
B. VARYING ADMISSIBILITY STANDARDS: CRIMINAL, TRADITIONAL
TORT, AND Toxic TORT CASES
In enacting the Rules, Congress expressly provided in Rule 1101(b)
that the Rules were to be applied generally in all federal proceedings
(except bankruptcy and summary contempt proceedings). 262 Therefore,
if the evidentiary hurdles that the pre-Daubert restrictive courts imposed
represented a reasonable interpretation of the plain-meaning of the
Rules, one would expect that these courts would have applied the same
interpretations to both civil and criminal proceedings. 263 Yet, these
courts have not done so. In both the criminal context and in more tradi-
261. See Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1120 (5th Cir. 1991)
(Clark, C.J., concurring) (expressing confusion at both the majority's and dissent's refusal
to weigh expert testimony under Rule 403, noting "Rule 403 is as much a part of the Rules
of Evidence that govern this case as Rules 702 and 703"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280
(1992). Rule 403 has been described as the "cornerstone" on which the Federal Rules of
Evidence were built. 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5212, at 250 n.1 (1978) (citing Peterfreund, Relevancy
and its Limits in the Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts: Arti-
cle IV, 25 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 80, 81 (1970)). As such, careful consideration must be
given to the relationship that Rule 403 has to other Rules, or courts may expand or limit
their discretion in ways not intended by the drafters of the Rules. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
supra, § 5213 ("The scope of Rule 403 is of some importance. Other rules confer discretion
on particular issues; unless careful consideration is given to the relationship of those rules
to Rule 403, courts may expand or limit discretion in ways not intended by the drafters of
the Evidence Rules.").
262. Federal Rule of Evidence 1101(b) provides as follows:
(b) PROCEEDINGS GENERALLY. These rules apply generally to civil actions
and proceedings, including admiralty and maritime cases, to criminal cases
and proceedings, to contempt proceedings except those in which the court
may act summarily, and to proceedings and cases under title 11, United
States Code.
FED. R. EVID. 1101(b). See also supra notes 34-50 and accompanying text.
263. When a criminal defendant offers expert testimony as part of his or her defense,
the defendant's right under the United States Constitution to establish a defense may jus-
tify greater leeway in admitting questionable scientific testimony. See 22 WRIGHT & GRA-
HAM, supra note 261, § 5166, at 75; see also United States v. Whitetail, 956 F.2d 857, 859-60,
862 (8th Cir. 1992) (admit expert testimony and permit cross-examination with respect to
the underlying facts upon which the experts based their opinions). Therefore, this article
will limit its consideration to the differences between application of the Rules to scientific




tional contract and tort cases, the courts refused to apply the restrictive
interpretations given the Rules in toxic tort cases.
For example, the difference in the treatment of expert testimony be-
tween criminal and toxic tort cases is illustrated by contrasting the admis-
sibility decisions in United States v. Smith2 64 and in Christophersen.2 65
Both cases considered whether an expert should be permitted to testify as
to a central issue based upon a questionable methodology. In the crimi-
nal case, Smith, the prosecution's expert, Dr. Hirotaka Nakasone, used a
technique known as spectrographic voice identification to identify which
of two twin sisters had telephoned various banks and authorized wire
transfers of nonexistent funds.266 While Dr. Nakasone admitted that the
technique was "controversial and that some studies had found high error
rates,"12 67 the court held that the evidence was sufficiently reliable to be
admitted even if "the entire scientific community does not support it. ''268
In reaching its decision, the court noted that Dr. Nakasone was candid
about the limitations of the technique and was subject to "rigorous cross-
examination. '269
Thus, in this criminal case the court admitted expert testimony based
upon questionable methodology, so long as the expert admitted the limits
of the methodology, and the opposing counsel had the opportunity to
cross-examine the witness concerning the reliability of the analysis. In
contrast, the Christophersen court refused to admit expert testimony as to
causation on behalf of a toxic tort plaintiff under similar circumstances.
As in Smith, the expert in Christophersen admitted the limits of his meth-
odology,2 70 and the opposing counsel would have had an adequate oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the expert concerning the reliability of his
analysis, yet the Christophersen court refused to permit the jury to hear
the expert's testimony.
The Fifth Circuit was similarly willing to admit questionable scientific
evidence adverse to a criminal defendant in United States v. Johnson.271
In Johnson, the Fifth Circuit permitted an "expert 2 72 to testify, over the
defendant's objection, that he could identify the origin of marijuana
based upon the plant's appearance, its smell, and the effects of smoking
264. 869 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1989).
265. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
266. Smith, 869 F.2d at 350.
267. Id. at 353.
268. Id. at 354.
269. Id.
270. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text. Dr. Miller testified that although
the information on which he relied in making his exposure determination contained factual
inaccuracies, so long as the exposure occurred in general as described to him, his opinion
as to causation remained unchanged. Christophersen v. Allied Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106,
1125 (5th Cir. 1991) (Reavley, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
271. 575 F.2d 1347, 1361-62 (5th Cir. 1978).
272. As his qualifications for identifying the source of the marijuana at issue, the wit-
ness referred to his extensive history of using and dealing in the drug. Id. at 1360.
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it.273 The only evidence suggesting that the expert could accurately iden-
tify the source of the marijuana was the witness's bald assertion that he
could do so. 274 In justifying its ruling, the court explained that it could
not "say that the claim of an ability to identify Columbian marijuana is so
inherently implausible that, as a matter of law, a jury should not be per-
mitted to hear testimony on the identification. '275 The court reached this
conclusion despite testimony from'a defense expert that such identifica-
tion was not possible.276 As was the case in Smith, the court was willing
to leave the credibility of the expert's testimony to the adversarial pro-
cess, so long as the jury was made aware of the limitations of the expert's
methodology, and the opposing counsel had an opportunity to illustrate
the weaknesses of the expert's testimony through cross-examination. The
willingness of the courts to trust the adversarial process to deal appropri-
ately with expert testimony in criminal litigation,277 circumstances under
which a defendant runs the risk of forfeiting life or liberty, stands in sharp
contrast to the pre-Daubert restrictive courts' treatment of such evidence
in toxic tort cases. 278
In addition to the different standard applied in the criminal area, cer-
tain courts applied a more restrictive standard to the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony in toxic tort litigation than the standard applied in more
traditional contract and tort cases.279 For example, in a product's liability
case, the defendant asked a panel of the Fifth Circuit to follow the evi-
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1362.
276. On the issue of whether the expert's testimony would "assist the trier of fact," the
court did not examine the questionable basis for the testimony, nor the helpfulness of this
specific expert's testimony. Instead, the court, as Congress intended, examined whether
the issue, the origin of the marijuana, was one on which the jury might be helped by the
specialized knowledge of an expert. Id. at 1361 ("[T]estimony which would identify the
source of the marijuana would be of obvious assistance to the jury.").
277. See also United States v. Hickey, 596 F.2d 1082, 1089 (1st Cir.) (Expert testimony
on whether hair samples taken from a ski mask and sweater found in the getaway car
implicated the defendant properly admitted where the "jury was made well aware of the
limitations of the evidence" and "the link between the sweater and mask and the robbery
was strong, and the similarity of hairs, while not affirmatively implicating [the defendant],
,enhanced the probability of guilt' and was therefore probative."), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
853 (1979); United States v. Hollman, 541 F.2d 196, 200-01 (8th Cir. 1976) (court held
admissible expert testimony that the drug seized was heroin based upon comparison with a
substance that a government official had told the prosecution's expert was heroin, even
though there was no proof that the substance to which the seized heroin was compared
actually was heroin).
278. In one quite cynical sense, the varying treatment of questionable scientific evi-
dence can be understood. If one assumes that conservative judges desire defendants to be
exonerated in toxic tort cases, and defendants to go to jail in criminal cases, and if one
further assumes that questionable evidence will more often be of benefit to the plaintiff in
toxic tort cases and to the district attorney in criminal cases, then to achieve the desired
outcomes, such evidence would not be admitted in toxic tort cases, but would be admitted
in criminal cases.
279. See Mitchell v. Lone Star Ammunition, Inc., 913 F.2d 242, 252 n.17 (5th Cir.
1990); Breidor v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1134, 1138-39 (3d Cir. 1983) (expert




dentiary standards that that Circuit announced in Brock v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,280 a toxic tort case. Specifically, the defendant as-
serted that the underlying data on which an expert had based his opinion
was "egregiously skimpy. '281 Drawing on the reasoning and holding of
the court in Brock, the defendant asked the court to examine the ade-
quacy of the underlying data, find the data insufficient to support the
expert's testimony, and reverse a jury's award of damages against the de-
fendant that had been based on the expert's testimony.282 The Mitchell
panel responded to this request in the following manner:
[The defendant] argues that Brock permits appellate courts to look
behind the conclusions of expert witnesses in determining the suffi-
ciency of the evidence. By its express language, the holding in Brock
at least arguably applies only to "mass toxic tort" cases, because of the
"growing realization among academics, lawyers, and judges that
cases such as this present special problems and challenges to tradi-
tional ideas regarding the role of the jury as a decisionmaker. ' 283
Significantly, the Fifth Circuit's seeming proposal to create a special
body of evidentiary law for toxic tort cases did not go unnoticed by the
judiciary. As the Third Circuit explained:
We understand and sympathize with the concerns expressed in
Brock over the costs and inequities that flow from inconsistent out-
comes in Bendectin cases, the potential effect erroneous verdicts
have on the availability of useful medicines, and the wastefulness of
continued reconsideration of an identical scientific issue in the courts
However, our concern over these issues is tempered by our recog-
nition that we do not have the authority to create special rules to ad-
dress the problems posed by continued Bendectin litigation ...
Moreover, we may not manipulate our interpretation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence to exclude expert testimony that on the record
before us may satisfy the normal standards of admissibility. Nor are
we at liberty, especially in a case to be decided under our diversity
jurisdiction, to impose different burdens of proof on Bendectin plain-
280. 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1046 (1990). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 288-95 and accompanying
text.
281. See Mitchell, 913 F.2d at 252. In Mitchell, injured servicemen and survivors of
other servicemen killed in an explosion of a mortar shell brought a products liability action
against the manufacturers of the shell. Id. at 243-44. The plaintiffs' experts had investi-
gated and discovered cracks in four shell casings from the same lot as the exploding shell,
as well as a number of shells with voids in the explosive filler. Id. at 244, 250. Based upon
this evidence and the fact that the shell had exploded, the plaintiffs' experts concluded that
either a crack in the shell casing, a void in the explosive filler, or some combination thereof
was the most likely cause of the explosion. Id. at 250-52. Based upon this evidence, the
jury held both the manufacturer of the shell casing and the manufacturer of the explosive
filler liable.
282. Id. at 252 n.17.
283. Id. (emphasis added); see also In re "Agent Orange," 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1260
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) ("[s]uch careful scrutiny of proposed [scientific] evidence is especially ap-
propriate in the toxic tort area"), affd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom.
Lombardi v. Dow Chem. Co., 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
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tiffs than those that would apply in analogous products liability
suits. 284
The differences in the pre-Daubert standards for admission of expert
testimony suggest that the restrictive courts were not simply engaging in
legitimate statutory interpretation, but were instead attempting to imple-
ment tort reform by manipulating the Federal Rules of Evidence. In ad-
dition, the restrictive courts' special evidentiary rules in the toxic tort
area seemed to create a distinct body of evidentiary law applicable to this
area, an express violation of Rule 1101(b).
C. THE RESTRICTIVE COURTS & TORT REFORM
While it is generally difficult to catch red-handed a court engaging in
judicial lawmaking (since it can so easily be cloaked as mere statutory
construction, if a court is motivated enough to do so),285 the pre-Daubert
restrictive courts in the area of toxic torts supported their interpretations
of the Rules with what amount to declarations of public policy. These
public policy declarations are especially telling, in view of the fact that
these statements were generally accompanied by "notice provisions"
(which bordered on warnings) 286 that seemed intended to send a message
284. DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1990)
(emphasis added).
285. Thus, accusations of "judicial lawmaking" usually come from the dissent as a vain
attempt to remind fellow justices of their proper role. See, e.g., County of Washington v.
Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 183-84 (1981) (Justices Rehnquist, Berger, Stewart and Powell, in
dissent, accuse the majority of following its own policy choice instead of the will of Con-
gress: "The Court is obviously more interested in the consequences of its decision than in
discerning the intention of Congress. In reaching its desired result, the Court conveniently
and persistently ignores relevant legislative history and instead relies on what it believes
Congress should have enacted.") (emphasis in original).
286. The Fifth Circuit has stated:
In sum, we adhere to the deferential standard for review of decisions regard-
ing the admission of testimony by experts. Nevertheless, we take this occa-
sion to caution that the standard leaves appellate judges with a considerable
task. We will turn to that task with a sharp eye, particularly in those in-
stances, hopefully few, where the record makes it evident that the decision to
receive expert testimony was simply tossed off to the jury under a "let it all
in" philosophy. Our message to our able colleagues: It is time to take hold of
expert testimony in federal trials.
In re Air Crash Disaster, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added). This warn-
ing was repeated in Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., 919 F.2d 304, 307 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990).
In response to the philosophical shift in the Fifth Circuit's position, Chief Judge Clark
observed:
The majority opinion distorts or ignores the letter and spirit of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Today's case ought to be decided based on the plain
language of the three applicable rules. By overlaying these rules with its own
agenda for exclusion the majority disserves our trial judges in this difficult
area of their work.
Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1122 (5th Cir. 1991) (Clark, C.J.,
concurring) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992). Judges King, Reavley,
Johnson and Weiner, in dissent, noted the following: "Lest anyone misunderstand, at the
root this is not a case about the Federal Rules of Evidence, albeit that two of them may
have been mangled in the process. It is instead about the outcomes in toxic tort cases." Id.
at 1136 (emphasis added). See also Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d
1349, 1352 (6th Cir. 1992) (court justifies taking "hard look" at "scientific cases based pri-
1994]
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to the lower courts that the rules with respect to toxic tort litigation had
changed.2 87
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,2 88 for example, provides an express declaration of the restrictive
courts' toxic tort reform agenda. In Brock, the Fifth Circuit upheld the
trial court's decision to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict in a
case where the jury awarded the minor plaintiff $550,000 for her congeni-
tal limb reduction defect which the jury attributed to her mother's inges-
tion of the prescription anti-nausea drug, Bendectin. In upholding the
j.n.o.v., the court explained that the plaintiff had presented insufficient
evidence on the issue of whether Bendectin had caused her limb reduc-
tion defect to enable a reasonable jury to conclude that causation existed.
The court found the plaintiff's evidence insufficient because she failed to
introduce statistically significant epidemiological proof as to the cause of
her injury.289 While the court did not require epidemiological evidence in
all cases, the court described such evidence as "certainly a very important
element." 290
In reaching its decision, the Brock court appears to have tipped its
hand that it was manipulating the Rules in order to achieve toxic tort
reform when the court admitted that under the "traditional approach" of
evaluating such evidence, "courts would not peer beneath the reasoning
of medical experts to question their reasoning. 2 91 The Brock court ex-
plained the basis for its rejection of the "traditional approach" by observ-
ing that in the area of "mass toxic torts," there was a "growing realization
among academics, lawyers, and judges that cases such as this present spe-
cial problems and challenges to traditional ideas regarding the role of the
jury as decisionmaker. ''2 92
The Brock panel went on to explain that confronted as it was with "dif-
ficult medical questions, courts must critically evaluate the reasoning pro-
cess by which experts connect data to their conclusions in order for courts
to consistently and rationally resolve the disputes before them. ' 293 The
marily on expert testimony" because of the potential for "juror misunderstanding" and
because expert witnesses "are not necessarily always unbiased scientists"); In re "Agent
Orange," 611 F. Supp. at 1260 (noting that "[t]he uncertainty of the evidence in [toxic tort]
cases, dependent as it is upon speculative scientific hypothesis and epidemiological studies,
creates a special need for robust screening of experts and gatekeeping under Rules 403 and
703") (emphasis added).
287. See, e.g., Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1122 (Reavley, J., dissenting) ("The judges of
this court have in recent years been sending warning signals about their displeasure with
expert testimony. Today the court 'takes hold' of expert testimony by taking over.").
288. 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1046 (1990).
289. Brock, 874 F.2d at 313. The plaintiffs' experts had based their causation opinions
upon statistical reanalysis of existing epidemiological data and upon in vitro testing. While
the statistical reanalysis did demonstrate some possibility that Bendectin causes birth de-
fects, the causal relationship was not statistically significant. Id. at 312-13.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 309.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 310.
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court based the need for this judicial intrusion on public policy considera-
tions implicated by the tort system. As the court explained:
[I]n mass torts the same issue is often presented over and over to
juries in different cases, and the juries often split both ways on the
issue. The effect of this is to create a state of uncertainty among
manufacturers contemplating the research and development of new,
and potentially life-saving drugs. Appellate courts, if they take the
lead in resolving those questions upon which juries will go both ways,
can reduce some of the uncertainty which can tend to produce a sub-
optimal amount of new drug development. 294
Other restrictive courts also justified their interpretations of the Rules on
the basis that drug companies would not otherwise be able to maintain
their research and development activities unless the courts provided some
level of certainty as to the outcomes in toxic tort cases. 295
As an alternative to the Brock justification, 296 some courts restricted
the admissibility of expert testimony in toxic tort cases because of their
fear that a jury would not consider the evidence in a rational or fair man-
ner given the usually serious nature of the alleged injury, and the possibil-
ity of holding somebody (anybody?) liable.297 As the Lynch court, for
example, observed, "[tihe sight of a helpless mutilated youngster may
evoke emotion along with the corresponding wish to make somebody pay
for his or her plight ... [creating the] very real possibility of runaway
emotion overcoming judgment. '298 To avoid that possibility, the restric-
tive courts authorized trial judges to step in and substitute their, appar-
294. Id. (footnotes omitted). Other courts have rejected the Brock panel's reasoning:
"We understand and sympathize with the concerns expressed in Brock over the costs and
inequities that flow from inconsistent outcomes in Bendectin cases, [but] ... we do not
have the authority to create special rules to address the problems posed by continued
Bendectin litigation." DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 951-52
(3d Cir. 1990).
295. Cf Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1349 (6th Cir.)
("For a judicial system founded on the premise that justice and consistency are related
ideas, the inconsistent results reached by courts and juries nationwide on the question of
causation in Bendectin birth defect cases are of serious concern."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
84 (1992).
296. Actually, both justifications that the restrictive courts give in describing the need
for toxic tort reform are grounded upon a perception that corporate defendants need to be
protected from American juries.
297. DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 952 (3d Cir. 1990)
(stating that the need for scrutiny of expert testimony "is naturally heightened when an
expert is testifying on behalf of a plaintiff as sympathetic as a child crippled by serious birth
defects"); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 832-33 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
("The circumstances of the case are tragic and Carita Richardson's plight evokes the ut-
most sympathy. It would be foolhardy to expect members of the jury to be without com-
passion for the catastrophe that befell this family. That is a natural response of the human
spirit, and is without legal consequence so long as it is properly controlled. But in a case
such as this it not only is appropriate but indeed imperative that the court remain vigilant
to ensure that neither emotion nor confusion has supplanted reason. . . . The scientific
issues are complex, the trial was lengthy, and the evidence and testimony were often diffi-
cult to understand. There was an emotional factor at play, a circumstance we are not at
liberty to ignore."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989); Lynch v. Merrell-National Labs., 830
F.2d 1190, 1196 (1st Cir. 1987).
298. Lynch, 830 F.2d at 1196.
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ently more rational, judgment concerning the credibility and reliability of
an expert's testimony, for that of the jury. These policy justifications,
when considered in conjunction with the strained reading of the Rules
necessary to justify such a shift and the failure to adopt consistently re-
strictive admissibility standards in non-toxic tort cases, demonstrate that
"tak[ing] hold" of expert testimony was one of the methods the restrictive
courts chose to accomplish their agenda of tort reform. 299
D. JUDICIAL AMENDMENT OF THE RULES IN THE Toxic TORT AREA
In authorizing a substantial gatekeeping role for the trial judge, the
restrictive courts have taken specific language of Rules 702 and 703 out of
context and given it a meaning that Congress never intended. In doing
so, these courts have ignored the historical common law limitations on
the admissibility of expert testimony that the Rules were intended to
remedy,3°° and distorted the relationship between Rules 702 and 703 and
the remaining Rules.301 Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the
restrictive courts have fundamentally reoriented the testing of expert tes-
timony away from a system that relies on the adversarial system and the
good sense of jurors towards a system that relies primarily on the judge to
test the reliability and validity of expert testimony.
It goes almost without saying that such "reinterpretation" of Rules 702
and 703 is impermissible, both as a general matter of statutory interpreta-
tion302 and more particularly because of the special nature of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. The availability of the specific amendment procedure
in the Rules Enabling Act 30 3 suggests that reorientation of the Rules' ba-
sic philosophy3°4 without benefit of amendment is particularly
299. As discussed in the Introduction, courts can accomplish their goal of toxic tort
reform in one of two ways: First, through the evidentiary approach discussed in this article,
or second, by admitting the evidence at trial, but finding the evidence insufficient to estab-
lish causation as a matter of law. Although Brock turned on the sufficiency of the plain-
tiff's evidence at trial, rather than the exclusion of the plaintiff's evidence under the Rules,
the court's opinion foreshadows the court's future restrictive interpretation of the Rules in
Christophersen, discussed supra. Further, while the Brock panel used the procedural ap-
proach to prevent the plaintiff's case from reaching the jury, the Brock panel also approved
of the evidentiary approach: "[C]ourts must critically evaluate the reasoning process by
which the experts connect data to their conclusions in order for courts to consistently and
rationally resolve the disputes before them." Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
874 F.2d 307, 310 (5th Cir.), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1046 (1990).
300. See supra notes 66-105 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 257-61 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
304. Even in a criminal case in which the defendant's life was at stake, the Supreme
Court observed:
The rules of evidence generally extant at the federal and state levels antici-
pate that relevant, unprivileged evidence should be admitted and its weight
left to the fact finder, who would have the benefit of cross-examination and
contrary evidence by the opposing party.
If [those psychiatrists who are willing to testify as to the probability of
future dangerousness of a criminal defendant] are so obviously wrong and
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inappropriate.
Moreover, this reorientation is unnecessary given that Congress au-
thorized trial judges to evaluate relevant, but questionable, scientific evi-
dence under the structured balancing test of Rule 403. The following
Section explores the application of this Rule to the admissibility of scien-
tific expert testimony.
V. RULE 403: BALANCING PREJUDICE AND PROBATIVE
VALUE FOR QUESTIONABLE SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE
While the restrictive courts have exaggerated to some extent the dan-
gers associated with expert testimony, there is little reason to doubt that
certain risks attend a decision to admit questionable scientific testimony.
As the legislative record reflects, Congress was aware of the risks that
expert testimony may present, and provided two limitations on the admis-
sion of unreliable or invalid expert testimony. These reliability checks
are found not in the language of Rules 702 and 703, but in two more
general provisions: Rule 401 and Rule 403.
Under Rule 401, Congress provided that only relevant evidence may be
admitted.30 5 While Rule 401's relevancy standard is exceedingly gener-
ous, 3 0 6 expert testimony that "is 'almost entirely unreliable,' [relies] upon
'assumptions devoid of any basis in the real world,'... '[abuses] known
facts' or '[contradicts] proven facts,' or [is] so manifestly wrong as to of-
fend common sense" could appropriately be excluded under even Rule
401's broad relevancy standard. 30 7
Furthermore, even when questionable expert testimony satisfies Rule
401's relevancy standard, 30 8 Rule 403 gives the trial judge discretion to
should be discredited, there should be no insuperable problem in doing so by
calling members of the [American Psychiatric] Association who are of that
view and who confidently assert that opinion in their amicus brief.
WVe are unconvinced, however, at least as of now, that the adversarial pro-
cess cannot be trusted to sort out the reliable from the unreliable evidence
and opinion about future dangerousness, particularly when the convicted
felon has the opportunity to present his own side of the case.
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898, 900-01 (1983); see also DeLuca v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 956 & n.18 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[The Federal Rules of
Evidence] embody a strong and undeniable preference for admitting any evidence having
some potential for assisting the trier of fact and for dealing with the risk of error through
the adversary process."); cf Edward W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of
Evidence, 57 Neb. L. Rev. 908, 910 (1978) ("A further underlying assumption is that the
Rules will operate within the framework of an adversary system, with professional lawyer
representation of the parties as the norm.").
305. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
306. See, e.g., 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 261, § 5165.
307. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1127 (5th Cir. 1991)
(Reavley, J., dissenting) (citations to previous Fifth Circuit cases upholding exclusion of
expert testimony) (footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
308. See Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1119 (Clark, C.J., concurring) (discussing "funda-
mentally unsupported but relevant expert opinions"). More generally, expert testimony
that is "merely controversial, debatable, questionable, unsettled, or suspicious," if ad-
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exclude relevant evidence if the trial judge first determines that the dan-
gers of admitting the evidence substantially outweigh its probative value.
This article proposes Rule 403's structured balancing test as the appropri-
ate guide for determining the admissibility of questionable scientific
evidence.
A. RULE 403: A Toxic TORT STEP-CHILD TO RULES 702 & 703
As a starting point, it seems odd that the restrictive courts have
strained to examine questionable scientific evidence under Rules 702 and
703, when Rule 403 would seem to provide an ideal vehicle by which
courts could determine the admissibility of such evidence. By its own
terms, Rule 403 grants the trial judge discretion to exclude evidence
"[a]lthough relevant.., if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger[s]" associated with admitting it.3°9 Given that the drafters
defined the scope of the Rule to include all "relevant evidence," this Rule
appears to encompass admissibility decisions concerning expert testi-
mony.310 Additionally, Rule 403's focus on whether the probative value
of testimony is substantially outweighed by the potential dangers associ-
ated with admitting it seems, on its face, to address directly the sorts of
concerns that the admission of questionable scientific evidence may raise.
dressed to a material issue, should satisfy Rule 401's relevancy standard. See Christopher-
sen, 939 F.2d at 1127 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
309. Rule 403 provides as follows: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
310. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798 (1993); see
also 1 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 90, 403[01]; MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE §§ 6641, 6644, at 244-45, 273 (interim ed. 1992);
see also FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's notes ("The rules which follow in this
Article are concrete applications evolved for particular situations. However, they reflect
the policies underlying the present rule [(Rule 403)], which is designed as a guide for the
handling of situations for which no specific rules have been formulated."); Rules of Evi-
dence: Senate Hearings, supra note 67, at 139 (statement of Richard H. Keatinge & John T.
Blanchard) ("Rule 403 is one of the broadest provisions qualifying Rule 401 and providing
for the exclusion of relevant evidence.") (emphasis in original). An argument might be
made that Rule 702's "assist the trier of fact" requirement is intended to displace Rule
403's balancing test in the context of expert testimony. Cf. 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra
note 90, 1 702[02]-702[031, at 702-18 to 702-22, 702-36 to 702-41 (referring to the "rele-
vance and prejudice analyses implicated in Rule 702's helpfulness standard"). However, as
discussed, Congress did not intend Rule 702's "assist the trier of fact" to encompass an
inquiry into whether the expert's opinion is helpful in some abstract sense, a standard that
might well encompass such a reliability and prejudice analysis, but to overturn the limita-
tion sometimes expressed in the common law that the expert testimony had to concern an
issue beyond the understanding of the average juror. See supra notes 66-82 and accompa-
nying text. Moreover, when Congress intended to displace Rule 403's balancing test, it
specifically said so. See FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee's notes (recognizing that
Rules 404-412, "[t]he rules which follow in this Article ...are concrete applications
evolved for particular situations"); FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1) (expressly providing for appli-
cation of Rule 403's balancing to certain types of impeachment evidence, but not others).
Congress added the Rule 403 language in Rule 609(a)(1) to address the interrelation be-
tween the two Rules after Judge Friendly raised the issue. See Rules of Evidence: House
Hearings I, supra note 33, at 252 (testimony of Henry J. Friendly, Chief Judge, United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit).
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Yet despite the seeming fit between the standard and scope of Rule
403, Rule 403 has not played a central role in determining the admissibil-
ity of expert testimony in the toxic tort area. To the contrary, the restric-
tive courts have chosen to rely almost entirely upon their restrictive
interpretations of Rules 702 and 703 to bar the admission of questionable
scientific testimony, and have thereby largely eliminated any role for
Rule 403.311 As a result, in most cases the restrictive courts have assigned
Rule 403 what can, at best, be described as a background role. These
courts have relied principally on Rule 702 or 703, while mentioning Rule
403 only in passing if at all.312 In some cases, the restrictive courts have
gone further and expressly stated that if testimony is admissible under the
restrictive interpretations of Rules 702 and 703, then "Rule 403 is an un-
likely basis for exclusion. '313
Of those courts that have directly addressed the applicability of Rule
403 to expert testimony, two basic positions have emerged. The differing
views of the concurring and dissenting judges in Christophersen v. Allied-
Signal Corp.314 well illustrate these two positions. While both the concur-
ring and dissenting judges in Christophersen agreed that neither Rule 702
nor Rule 703 authorized a trial court to exclude an expert's opinion be-
cause it was based upon questionable data,315 the concurrence read Rule
403 to permit the trial judge to consider the adequacy of the expert's un-
derlying data in determining whether to exclude the expert's testi-
mony.3 16 The dissenters would not. 317
At the heart of this disagreement lies two questions over the proper
application of Rule 403 to questionable expert testimony: (i) whether a
311. See supra notes 257-61 and accompanying text.
312. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798 (1993)
(mentions in passing the possibility that Rule 403 might also bar the admission of question-
able scientific testimony); Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1116 (5th
Cir. 1991) (en banc) (per curiam) ("Because we find that Dr. Miller's testimony failed to
clear either the Rule 703 or the Frye hurdle, we need not consider the district court's
application of Rule 403."), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992); Lynch v. Merrell-National
Lab., 830 F.2d 1190, 1196-97 (1st Cir. 1987) (a causation opinion that is not based upon
epidemiological data is inadmissible under Rules 703 and 403 because of the "very real
possibility of runaway emotion overcoming judgment").
313. DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 957 (3d Cir. 1990); see
also In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 859 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub
nom. General Elec. v. Knight, 499 U.S. 99 (1991).
314. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1120-22 (Clark, C.J., concurring), at 1134-35 (Reavley,
J., dissenting).
315. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1116-20 (Clark, C.J., concurring), at 1126-34 (Reavley,
J., dissenting). Both Chief Judge Clark and the dissenters also agreed that Frye's general
acceptance test did not bar the admission of the expert's testimony, either because Frye did
not survive enactment of the Rules, id. at 1120 (Clark, C.J., concurring), or because the
Frye standard did not reach "beyond novel device[s] or technique[s] [to subject] expert
reasoning to judge-determined reliability." Id. at 1132 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
316. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1120-22 (Clark, C.J., concurring); see also In re "Agent
Orange," 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1241-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (Rule 403 permits trial judge to con-
sider the adequacy of underlying data in determining whether to admit the expert's testi-
mony under Rule 403's probative value versus dangers standard), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d
Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Lombardi v. Dow Chem. Co., 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
317. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1134-35 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
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trial court can consider the weaknesses in an expert's underlying method-
ology and data in determining the "probative value" of the testimony;
and (ii) whether the testimony of an expert creates any danger of "unfair
prejudice. '318 The concurring judge, Chief Judge Clark, answered both
of these questions affirmatively, 319 while Judge Reavley, writing for the
dissent, answered both negatively.320
In considering the probative value aspect of Rule 403's balancing test,
Chief Judge Clark suggested that an expert's opinion "based on such er-
roneous facts or data, such proven unsound methodology, or such inter-
nally inconsistent reasoning" will have "minimal" probative value under
Rule 403.321 On the issue of unfair prejudice, Chief Judge Clark ex-
plained that the combination of an "arcane and speculative" subject mat-
ter and the "expert" qualifications of the witness may lead the jury to
base its decision on the fact that a particular witness has been labelled an
"expert. '322 Chief Judge Clark considered that the jury's reliance on the
label "expert," rather than the evidence presented, would be an improper
basis for decision. 323 As a result, Chief Judge Clark found the admission
of questionable scientific testimony to create a distinct risk of unfair prej-
udice within the meaning of Rule 403. Together with the minimal proba-
tive value of an opinion based upon questionable data or methodology,
this risk of unfair prejudice could justify excluding questionable scientific
testimony under Rule 403.324
Judge Reavley, on the other hand, expressed concern that permitting
the trial court to evaluate an expert's underlying data or methodology for
weaknesses in determining the probative value component of Rule 403's
balancing test would inevitably lead the trial judge to "weigh contradic-
tory testimony," and substitute his or her "opinion about the contested
evidence" for that of the jury.325 Judge Reavley also disagreed with Chief
Judge Clark's view that expert testimony presents any special risk of un-
318. Chief Judge Clark discusses the basic danger that questionable scientific testimony
presents in terms of "unfair prejudice." Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1120 (Clark, C.J., con-
curring). As will be discussed, see infra notes 344-53 and accompanying text, questionable
scientific testimony may present other dangers recognized in Rule 403 as well.
319. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1120 (Clark, C.J., concurring).
320. Id. at 1134-35 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
321. Id. at 1120 (Clark, C.J., concurring).
322. Id.; see also United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522, 1526-27 (9th Cir. 1985) (aura
of scientific reliability creates risk of undue prejudice that justifies excluding testimony of
questionable reliability); United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979) (the
"aura of special reliability and trustworthiness" associated with expert testimony creates
risk of undue prejudice that justifies excluding testimony of questionable reliability);
United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (expert testimony may "as-
sume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen" that justifies excluding
testimony of questionable reliability).
323. FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee's notes ("'Unfair prejudice' within its con-
text means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though
not necessarily, an emotional one.").
324. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1121-22 (Clark, C.J., concurring) (given that Dr. Miller
"relied on erroneous factual assumptions," district court could properly exclude Dr.
Miller's opinion testimony under Rule 403).
325. Id. at 1135 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
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fair prejudice. Without specifically addressing Chief Judge Clark's con-
cern that the "expert" label might become a substitute for evaluating the
substance of the expert's testimony, Judge Reavley expressed the view
that the only possible risk of unfair prejudice that questionable scientific
testimony presents is the danger that the expert's opinion might be sub-
stantively incorrect. 326 Because the risk that evidence is untrue or inaccu-
rate is not the sort of risk that the danger of unfair prejudice
encompasses, Judge Reavley rejected the proposition that Rule 403 au-
thorizes a trial judge to scrutinize more carefully the substantive correct-
ness of an expert's testimony and to exclude the testimony if the trial
court determines that the testimony is based on potentially inaccurate
data or methodology. 327
By suggesting opposing definitions of "probative value" and "unfair
prejudice," these two opinions delineate the boundaries of the dispute
over the proper application of Rule 403 to questionable scientific evi-
dence. Once it is acknowledged that Congress did not intend either Rule
702 or 703 to encompass a pre-admission reliability check on an expert's
underlying data and methodology, the dispute over the proper applica-
tion of Rule 403 becomes paramount to determining the admissibility of
questionable scientific evidence. The following section attempts to re-
solve this dispute by examining the legislative record and other indica-
tions of congressional intent to determine, first, whether a trial court may
consider the reliability or validity of an expert's underlying data and
methodology in determining the probative value of the expert's testimony
under Rule 403, and second, whether there are any special risks associ-
ated with expert testimony that create a danger of unfair prejudice within
the meaning of Rule 403.
B. RULE 403: "PROBATIVE VALUE" AND "UNFAIR PREJUDICE"
Before enactment of the Rules, a trial judge had authority under the
common law to exclude evidence on collateral issues that, while relevant,
tended to mislead, distract, or confuse the jury, or unduly prolong the
litigation.328 In addition to the specific risk of confusion or distraction,
the evidence might also be unexpected, and its admission would therefore
find "the opponent unprepared to answer. '329 When Congress enacted
Rule 403, it recognized some of these concerns and granted the trial court
discretion to exclude relevant evidence under certain circumstances if the
evidence had the potential to interfere with the just resolution of the
issues.
For that reason, Rule 403 was thought, by some, to be a codification of
326. Id.
327. Id.




the common law.330 Yet, the discretion granted the trial judge under
Rule 403 differs from that of the common law in several important ways.
Most obviously, though not of substantial importance here, Rule 403 does
not recognize unfair surprise as an adequate basis for excluding evi-
dence.331 Of more significance here, Rule 403 established: (i) a test that
balanced the probative value of relevant evidence against the potential
dangers of admitting it in a far more structured manner than did the com-
mon law 332 and (ii) a presumption in favor of admitting relevant evidence
by requiring that the probative value of relevant evidence be "substan-
tially outweighed by" the dangers associated with admitting it before the
trial judge had discretion to exclude the evidence. 333
While there is no legislative history that directly discusses Rule 403 in
330. See Rules of Evidence: House Hearings II, supra note 56, at 48 (letter from Sena-
tor McClellan to Judge Maris) ("Rule 403 codifies the familiar principle that evidence,
even though relevant may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
such dangers as unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, delay, etc.").
331. As initially drafted, Rule 403 provided for mandatory exclusion of relevant evi-
dence if its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, and discretionary exclusion if the probative
value was outweighed by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presen-
tation of cumulative evidence. FED. R. EVID. 403, 46 F.R.D. 161, 225 (Proposed Draft
1969), reprinted in 2 BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note 38, at 53. The distinction between
mandatory and discretionary exclusion was criticized, however. See Rules of Evidence:
House Hearings II, supra note 56, at 48 (letter from Senator John L. McClellan to Judge
Albert B. Maris) ("Rule 403 also draws a distinction between those situations thought to
require mandatory rather than discretionary exclusion. In my judgment, this distinction is
without foundation either in prior case law or in reason .... I see no reason to purport to
draw a hard and fast line that no one will be able to trace in practice. The adoption of the
present draft would only provide criminal defendants with another standard ground for
appeal and lead to more needless reversals and retrials in criminal cases."). The Rules
Advisory Committee rewrote the proposed Rule to make exclusion discretionary under
each of the listed circumstances.
At the congressional level, Rule 403 was labelled "controversial." See Rules of Evidence:
House Hearings I, supra note 33, at 191 (letter from the Washington Council of Lawyers to
the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice). The rule was considered controversial be-
cause it failed to include "unfair surprise" as a basis for exclusion and because certain
critics wanted to reintroduce the mandatory-discretionary distinction to the Rule. See
Rules of Evidence: House Hearings II, supra note 56, at 310 (letter from Bar Association
of the City of New York to the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice); Rules of Evi-
dence: Senate Hearings, supra note 67, at 312 (supplemental memorandum of the Washing-
ton Council of Lawyers). These comments and suggestions for revisions, however, appear
to have generated little or no interest at the congressional level, and Congress ultimately
enacted the Rule without further revision.
332. See 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 261, § 5212.
333. See Rules of Evidence: Senate Hearings, supra note 67, at 206 ("[The philosophy of
the Advisory Committee was] that all relevant evidence should be admitted, subject of
course, to the restraints of the Constitution and of the statutes of the Congress of the
United States combined with the public policy considerations. However, the burden
should be on him who seeks to exclude evidence to demonstrate that relevant evidence
should not be admitted."). By requiring that the potential dangers substantially outweigh
the probative value of the evidence, Rule 403 adopts that philosophy. Id. at 246 (reprint of
Paul F. Rothstein article) ("Perhaps the predominant theme is a 'bias' in favor of admissi-
bility.... Rule 403 provides for exclusion on an ad hoc balancing, but in order for there to
be such exclusion, probative value must be 'substantially' outweighed by certain dangers,
including unfair prejudice."); see also 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 261, § 5221.
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connection with expert testimony, 334 the history does provide some indi-
cation of the meaning that Congress intended for the phrases "probative
value" and "unfair prejudice." This history suggests that a trial judge can
consider the reliability or validity of questionable expert testimony in de-
termining the "probative value" of such evidence and can consider as a
type of "unfair prejudice" the risk that the label, "expert," may become a
substitute for evaluating the substance of the expert's testimony.
As a starting point, while Rule 403 does not itself define the phrase
"probative value," Rule 401 implicitly defines "probative value" as the
tendency of an item of evidence to prove or disprove a matter at issue.335
Under Rule 401, an item of evidence has sufficient probative value to be
considered relevant if it is has "any tendency to make the existence of any
[material] 336 fact .. .more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence. ' 337 Thus, probative value reflects the relationship
between the existence of one fact, which the proponent attempts to estab-
lish by introducing an item of evidence, and the existence of a legally
material issue, such as causation. The probative value of proffered evi-
dence will vary depending on the tendency of the proffered evidence to
establish the matter at issue.338
Based on the plain language of the Rules, the phrase "probative value"
would appear to encompass an evaluation of every facet of the evidence
that affects the tendency of the evidence to prove or disprove the exist-
334. As discussed, see supra note 331, most of the discussion before Congress related to
the mandatory-discretionary distinction and whether unfair surprise should be one of the
factors that would justify exclusion.
335. To derive this definition of probative value from Rule 401, one begins with the
language of Rule 401 that defines as relevant "evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more prob-
able or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EvID. 401. Then,
one combines this definition of relevance with the Advisory Committee's Notes that ex-
plain that relevance determines "whether an item of evidence, when tested by the
processes of legal reasoning, possesses sufficient probative value to justify receiving it in
evidence." FED. R. EvID. 401 advisory committee's notes. By equating the two definitions
of relevance, "probative value" becomes the tendency of an item of evidence to "make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence ... more probable or less probable." See also
M. C. Slough, Relevancy Unraveled, 5 KAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1956) (equating probative value
with relevancy and the logical tendency of "Fact A" to prove "Fact B").
336. "Material" is defined in this context as a fact "that is of consequence to the deter-
mination of the action." FED. R. EviD. 401.
337. FED. R. EVID. 401.
338. See FED. R. EvI. 401 advisory committee's notes; see also George F. James, Rele-
vancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CAL. L. REV. 689, 699-700 (1941). Specifically, the
Advisory Committee recognized that some evidence will have more probative value than
other evidence, but to be admissible under Rule 401, an item of evidence is judged not by
whether it establishes on its own the matter at issue, but on whether it tends to suggest the
existence of the matter at issue. Id. ("The standard of probability under the rule is 'more
... probable than it would be without the evidence.' ... As McCormick says, 'A brick is
not a wall,' or as Falknor quotes Professor McBlaine, '. . . [Ilt is not to be supposed that
every witness can make a home run."') (citations omitted); see also Herman L. Trautman,
Logical or Legal Relevancy - A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REV. 385, 388-89 (1952)
("Thus Fact A will be said to be relevant to Fact B when, according to human experience, it
is so related to Fact B that Fact A, considered either by itself or in connection with other
facts[,] renders probable the past, present or future existence or nonexistence of Fact B.").
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ence of a matter at issue. If this definition is applied to determine the
probative value of an expert's opinion in a toxic tort case, it seems plain
that an expert's opinion based on questionable data or methodology will
generally have less tendency to establish the issue to which the expert's
opinion is addressed than an expert's opinion based on flawless data and
methodology. In toxic tort cases, even the plaintiff's experts often recog-
nize that more accurate data on length and extent of exposure,339 for ex-
ample, or that epidemiological data rather than in vivo, in vitro, or
chemical structure analysis,340 would provide a more certain basis for the
expert's opinion on causation. Given that an opinion is usually only as
reliable as its underlying basis, it would seem quite extraordinary to say
that the adequacy of the opinion's basis has no bearing on the degree to
which the resulting opinion would tend to make the existence of a matter
in issue either more probable or less probable. Thus, in terms of the plain
language of Rule 403, a determination of "probative value" would seem
to require the trial judge to consider the adequacy of an expert's underly-
ing basis.
Judge Reavley does not directly dispute the relationship between the
adequacy of the underlying basis and the tendency of the resulting opin-
ion to establish the existence of the matter at issue.341 Instead, he argues
that permitting trial judges to evaluate the adequacy of an expert's under-
lying basis under Rule 403 would authorize trial judges to "weigh contra-
dictory evidence and exclude any proffered evidence considered
unreliable. ' 342 Yet, evidence cannot be excluded under Rule 403 solely
because it is unreliable. If evidence is unreliable, but still relevant, it may
be excluded only if the trial judge first identifies one of the dangers iden-
tified in Rule 403 associated with admitting it and determines that the
danger of admitting the evidence substantially outweighs its probative
value.343 The second question in a Rule 403 admissibility analysis is
whether the admission of scientific evidence raises any of the dangers
recognized under this Rule.
Without question, the admission of expert testimony can, at some
point, cause such "undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence" that the district court will have discretion under
339. See Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1113 (5th Cir. 1991) (en
banc) ("Dr. Miller testified at his deposition that the level and duration of the patient's
exposure are important considerations when evaluating the effect of exposure to a toxic
substance."), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992). While Dr. Miller did agree that the level
and duration of exposure played an important role in identifying causal relationships, he
felt sufficiently comfortable with the data available to express a causation opinion to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty. Id. at 1125 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
340. See Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 314 (5th Cir.), mod-
ified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990); Richardson v. Rich-
ardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989).
341. Judge Reavley appears more willing than either the majority or Chief Judge Clark
to accept the expert's own determination that he or she has an adequate basis for render-
ing an opinion. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1131-32 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
342. Id. at 1135 (Reavley, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
343. FED. R. EVID. 403.
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Rule 403 to exclude the additional testimony. 344 Aside from this time
management concern, which is present with any sort of repetitive or cu-
mulative evidence, the principal dangers identified in Rule 403 that may
be associated with the admission of questionable expert testimony are the
dangers of: (i) misleading the jury or confusion of the issues and (ii) un-
fair prejudice.
While sometimes mentioned as a basis for excluding questionable sci-
entific testimony,345 the dangers of misleading the jury or confusion of
the issues will seldom provide an appropriate basis for exclusion. As with
the "assist the trier of fact" language of Rule 702, the courts misinterpret
the phrase "mislead the jury" by taking it out of historical context and
interpreting it in the abstract. When divorced from its historical context,
an argument can easily be made that a substantively incorrect expert's
opinion will mislead the trier of fact by leading it to the wrong substantive
outcome. While this may appear in the abstract to be a plausible inter-
pretation of the plain-language of this Rule, the legislative history sug-
gests that Congress used the words "misleading the jury" to address the
danger that certain evidence, if admitted, "may create a side-issue that
will unduly distract the jury from the main issue." 346
Both Professors McCormick and Trautman 347 discussed the scope of
the trial judge's authority to exclude evidence that would confuse the is-
sues or mislead the trier of fact in terms of the danger of distraction that
the evidence would create if it were to be admitted.348 In discussing this
344. As Justice Holmes explained, "so far as the introduction of collateral issues goes,
that objection is a purely practical one, a concession to the shortness of life." Reeve v.
Dennett, 11 N.E. 938, 943 (Mass. 1887); see also Rules of Evidence: Senate Hearings, supra
note 67, at 139 (statement of Richard H. Keating & John T. Blanchard) ("Rule 403 .* *
merely codifies traditional concessions to the human limitations of jurors and recognizes
that mortal time is finite.").
345. Cf United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1239 (3d Cir. 1985) (in crafting a
balancing test under Rule 702, court identifies need to prevent scientific testimony from
confusing or misleading the jury as the central justification for excluding unreliable
testimony).
346. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 83, at 319 (cited with approval by
Rules Advisory Committee, FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's notes); see also 1
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 90, 1 403[041, at 403-68 to 403-692; WIGMORE, supra
note 41, § 443, at 529; 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 261, § 5217, at 295.
347. The Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 403 cite these two commentators with
approval. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's notes.
348. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 83, at 319; Trautman, supra note 338, at
392-93 ("Thus, where Fact A is offered for the purpose of proving Fact B, and the existence
of Fact A is itself disputed, an additional issue is raised. If the probative value of Fact A
and its importance to the proponent for the purpose of establishing Fact B is slight, and the
time required to hear the evidence for and against the existence of Fact A would be so
much as to be out of proportion to the probative value of Fact A, the courts have always
considered it proper to exclude such evidence, not only because of the undue consumption
of time, but also because of the tendency to confuse the issues.") (citation omitted). The
cases that these two commentators cite reveal a similar focus on the degree to which the
evidence concerns a material issue as compared to the evidence's relationship with an im-
material collateral issue. See Reeve v. Dennett, 11 N.E. 938, 943-44 (Mass. 1887) (Holmes,
J.) (cited by Trautman as a leading case) (issue was whether the defendant's compound was
effective at mitigating pain caused by filling teeth; the defendant sought to introduce the
testimony of a number of his patients who testified that after administration of the com-
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issue, neither McCormick nor Trautman endorsed the exclusion of evi-
dence simply because the trial judge believed it might be substantively
incorrect. Instead, they focused on the possibility that evidence of slight
probative value to a material issue might be of substantial probative value
to an immaterial one.349 If such evidence were admitted, it would create
the risk that the substantial relationship between the admitted evidence
and an immaterial issue could lead the jury to decide the case on the
immaterial issue rather than the material one. For this reason, such evi-
dence presents a danger of confusing the issues or misleading the jury and
may therefore be excluded. 350
It appears, then, that Congress intended the "confusion of the issues"
and "misleading the jury" language of Rule 403 to address the risk that
admission of certain evidence will distract the jury from the legally mate-
rial issues in a case. In most toxic tort cases, the admission of questiona-
ble expert testimony will seldom present these dangers because, whatever
else may be said about the expert's opinion, it is usually directed towards
establishing a central element of the plaintiff's case. 351 As a result, while
pound, the defendant's operations on their teeth were "practically painless"; over the
plaintiff's objection, the testimony was admitted; the evidence related directly to the issue
at hand, and while the evidence might introduce collateral issues, it was admissible); Jones
v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 242 S.W.2d 473, 477-78 (Mo. 1951) (cited by Trautman) (issue was
what caused the plaintiff's injury while riding a freight elevator; plaintiff claimed that it was
due to a defect in the elevator or the negligence of a fellow employee that caused the
elevator to jerk; the defendant proffered the testimony of two witnesses who stated that
they, on separate occasions, had seen the plaintiff "monkey" around on the elevator and
had warned him that the elevator was dangerous; over the plaintiff's objection the testi-
mony was admitted because it went directly to a material issue in the case); Kurn v.
Radencic, 141 P.2d 580, 581-82 (Okla. 1943) (cited by Trautman) (issue was whether puni-
tive damages should be awarded against company for an intentional assault by one of its
employees; in determining the appropriate award of punitive damages from the company,
the court ruled that the company's knowledge of the likelihood that their employee would
commit such an assault was material; plaintiff sought to introduce testimony that the same
employee had previously committed similar assaults; over the defendant's objection, the
testimony was admitted because it suggested in a fairly direct fashion the likelihood that
the company was aware of its employee's violent propensity).
349. See also James, supra note 338, at 701.
350. See Veer v. Hagemann, 165 N.E. 175, 177 (I11. 1929) (cited by McCormick on con-
fusing the jury issue) (issue was whether testator was sound of mind; plaintiffs sought to
introduce testimony that testator had purchased a farm for his son-in-law, that son-in-law
still owed testator $4000 on this farm, and yet testator had devised the farm to another in
his will; court excluded the testimony finding that the evidence was of marginal relevance
to the testator's soundness of mind, but would strongly tend to establish the "equities of
the [son-in-law], if any, in this land").
351. For example, in essentially all of the toxic tort cases discussed herein, the expert's
testimony was addressed to the issue of causation, a prima facie element of the plaintiff's
case. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (ex-
pert's opinion addressed whether exposure to an allegedly toxic substance caused the
plaintiff's medical condition); Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1126
(5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (per curiam) (same), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992); Slaugh-
ter v. Southern Talc Co., 919 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1990) (same); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990) (same); Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 950 (1990); Richardson v. Richard-
son-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (same), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989);
Lynch v. Merrell-National Lab., 830 F.2d 1190, 1196-97 (1st Cir. 1987) (same); Viterbo v.
Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1987) (same); Thompson v. Southern Pac. Transp.
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an expert's opinion on an issue such as causation may, and often will, lead
to a side issue over the validity and reliability of the opinion's bases,352
this side issue will seldom mislead the jury within the meaning of Rule
403 because it does not distract the jury from the material issues. Instead,
resolution of this side issue bears directly on the validity of the expert's
resulting conclusion, and thereby, implicates a central element of the
plaintiff's cause of action.353
In view of the foregoing, if questionable expert testimony is to present
a danger that may justify its exclusion under Rule 403, the danger must
arise from a risk of "unfair prejudice." The Advisory Committee's Notes
explain that "'unfair prejudice' within its context means an undue ten-
dency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not
necessarily an emotional one. '354 The words "improper basis" appear to
be intentionally broad and would seem to encompass both of the princi-
pal risks commonly associated with expert testimony: (i) authority and
(ii) venality. 355
As others have recognized, 356 expert testimony may carry an undue
"aura of mystic infallibility." If a jury were to decide a case based solely
on this "aura," such a basis would seem to be improper.357 While the fact
that a witness is qualified as an expert may provide some basis to believe
that the expert's conclusions are correct, labelling a witness as an "ex-
pert" is based not upon the substantive correctness of the expert's opin-
Co., 809 F.2d 1167 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 819 (1987); In re "Agent Or-
ange" Prod. Liab. Lit., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (same), affd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d
Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Lombardi v. Dow Chem. Co., 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
352. See, e.g., Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1134 (Reavley, J., dissenting) ("True, defense
attorneys confronted Dr. Miller with all varieties of skepticism about Christophersen's
exposure.").
353. For similar reasons, the difficulties the jury may encounter in understanding the
"ins and outs" of epidemiology and other forms of scientific evidence sufficiently to resolve
the question of causation intelligibly and the confusion that will no doubt be engendered
by requiring the jury to understand and resolve complex scientific issues on which experts
often disagree also do not implicate any danger recognized under Rule 403. Indeed, such
confusion is an inevitable result of the states' decisions to resolve these liability questions
through a litigative rather than an administrative system. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1126
(Reavley, J., dissenting) (reminding the majority that "[wie properly entrust determina-
tions of evidentiary weight and credibility to the jury-even in 'scientific' cases-because
of our faith in the adversarial process").
354. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's notes. "Unfair prejudice" as used in Rule
403, however, should not be equated with testimony that is simply adverse to an opposing
party since virtually all evidence is prejudicial in that sense, or it would not be material to a
case. 1 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 90, 403[03], at 403-29. The issue is thought to
turn on whether the proponent has adopted an "illegitimate method of persuasion" either
because it appeals to "inappropriate logic" or "undesirable emotion." 22 WRIGHT & GRA-
HAM, supra note 261, § 5215. Thus, courts have excluded evidence under Rule 403 where it
appealed to the jury's sympathies, aroused its sense of horror, provoked an instinct to
punish, or triggered other "mainsprings of human action" that might cause a jury to base
its decisions on something other than the established propositions in the case. 1 WEIN-
STEIN & BERGER, supra note 90, 1 403[03].
355. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
356. See supra note 2.
357. See, e.g., Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1120 (5th Cir. 1991)
(Clark, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
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ion but on the expert's qualifications. 358 Because there may be a
substantial gap between qualifications and substantive correctness, the la-
bel, "expert," would seem to be too indirectly related to the matter at
issue to serve as a proper basis for deciding a case.
This potential gap between qualification and correctness is exacerbated
by the fact that an expert is not generally a neutral party.359 Because an
expert witness will generally be retained by one side of the dispute or the
other, the witness may have substantial incentive to emphasize a particu-
lar point of view at the expense, perhaps, of accurate science. 360 Again, if
the jury were to rely on an expert's opinion that was in turn motivated or
influenced substantially by the payment of an expert witness fee, such a
basis would also be improper and, therefore represent a danger of unfair
prejudice.
Questionable expert testimony can present a risk of "unfair prejudice"
that may justify its exclusion if that risk of unfair prejudice substantially
outweighs the probative value of the testimony. This interpretation need
not stand on its own, however, as there are two sources that demonstrate
that the drafters intended questionable scientific evidence to be evaluated
under Rule 403. Edward W. Cleary, the Reporter for the Rules, ex-
pressly stated in an article published just after the Rules' enactment that
the drafters intended the "common law experience [with] ... purportedly
scientific evidence in an insufficiently established field" to be applied
through the "relevancy/prejudice" balance of Rule 403.361 In addition,
Professor Trautman, whose discussion of the probative value-unfair prej-
udice balance under the common law is cited in the Rules Advisory Com-
mittee's Notes to Rule 403, uses the admissibility of lie detector testing as
his first example of proper application of the balance.362
358. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1120 (Clark, C.J., concurring).
359. But see FED. R. EvID. 706 (authorizes trial court to appoint independent expert).
360. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986) ("First, many
experts are members of the academic community who supplement their teaching salaries
with consulting work. We know from our judicial experience that many such able persons
present studies and express opinions that they might not be willing to express in an article
submitted to a refereed journal of their discipline or in other contexts subject to peer re-
view. . . . Second, the professional expert is now commonplace. That a person spends
substantially all of his time consulting with attorneys and testifying is not a disqualification.
But experts whose opinions are available to the highest bidder have no place testifying in a
court of law, before a jury, and with the imprimatur of the trial judge's decision that he is
an 'expert."').
361. Cleary, supra note 304, at 915-16.
362. Trautman, supra note 338, at 395-96. In his discussion of the lie detector test,
Trautman identifies the "unfair prejudice" as "resulting from a lack of proper administra-
tive standards for controlling the competency of the operator, the type of machine used
and the circumstances under which it is used." Id. at 396. While flawed application of
scientific principles might be considered an improper basis for resolving an issue, courts
should not recognize an expert's questionable basis as a type of "unfair prejudice" within
the meaning of Rule 403. If a court were to consider substantive weaknesses in the testi-
mony to establish both unfair prejudice and minimal probative value, then courts would
exclude such evidence solely because of the questionable nature of its underlying basis.
Such an approach would lead, as Judge Reavley feared, to the trial judge substituting his or
her opinion on an issue for that of the jury.
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These two sources confirm that Congress intended the probative value-
unfair prejudice balance that Rule 403 establishes to apply to determining
the admissibility of questionable scientific evidence. Together with the
plain language of the Rules, these sources suggest that a trial judge may
evaluate the underlying bases of an expert's opinion for adequacy and
exclude the evidence if the resulting probative value of the opinion is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice that such ex-
pert testimony may present. The fact that such testimony may be evalu-
ated under Rule 403 does not suggest, however, that the restrictive courts
have simply used the wrong Rules as authority for excluding questionable
scientific evidence. The proper approach to questions of admissibility
under Rule 403 differs fundamentally from the threshold "good science"
approach that the restrictive courts have adopted under Rules 702 and
703 as the next two sections demonstrate.
C. APPLYING THE RULE 403 ANALYSIS TO Toxic TORT ISSUES
In determining the admissibility of questionable scientific evidence
under Rule 403, a trial judge must determine (i) the probative value of
the proffered testimony; (ii) the danger of unfair prejudice that admitting
the testimony would present; and (iii) whether the danger of admitting
the testimony substantially outweighs its probative value. If, and only if,
a trial judge determines that the dangers substantially outweigh the pro-
bative value of the evidence, does the trial judge then have the discretion
to exclude the proffered evidence. Rule 403 requires the trial judge to go
through a "conscious process of balancing the cost of the evidence against
its benefits. '363 Unless the trial judge concludes that the probative value
is "substantially outweighed" by one of the countervailing dangers listed
in the Rule, the judge has no discretion to exclude relevant evidence, and
the evidence must therefore be admitted.364 If, however, the balance is in
favor of one of the countervailing dangers, the judge may, but need not,
exclude the evidence. 365
In approaching this "conscious process of balancing," the trial judge
must first determine the probative value of proffered scientific testimony.
As discussed, a determination of probative value will require an examina-
tion into the tendency of the testimony to establish a matter in issue.
Such an examination might entail consideration of the four Daubert fac-
tors and would likely be somewhat broader and certainly more flexible
than Frye's general acceptance standard. 366
After determining the testimony's probative value, the trial judge must
then consider the danger of unfair prejudice that the admission of a paid
363. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 261, § 5214.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Thus, even when Professor Cleary discussed the consideration of questionable sci-
entific evidence under Rule 403, he did not refer to Frye's general acceptance standard
specifically but to "purportedly scientific evidence in an insufficiently established field"
more generally. Cleary, supra note 304, at 916.
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expert's testimony may create. While the admission of questionable sci-
entific testimony does create some danger of unfair prejudice, Congress
premised the Rules on an underlying belief in the effectiveness of the
adversarial process. 367 Therefore, the trial judge should evaluate the po-
tential for unfair prejudice within the context of the adversarial process as
well as the entire lawsuit. 368 The Advisory Committee, for example, sug-
gested that in determining the danger of unfair prejudice, a trial judge
must consider whether a limiting instruction would mitigate the potential
dangers associated with admission of the evidence and whether the prof-
fered testimony is the only available means of proof.369
More generally, the adversarial process will often reveal the weak-
nesses of questionable scientific evidence and thereby mitigate or elimi-
nate the potential danger of unfair prejudice. As a result, dangers that
may seem substantial in the dark night of abstract possibilities may be
revealed as insubstantial when exposed to the bright light of the adver-
sarial process. The danger that a jury will resolve a case based solely on
the label expert, while plausible in the abstract, appears much less so
when placed in the context of litigation where both parties are presenting
witnesses bearing the expert label. Similarly, the use of effective cross-
examination to reveal the venality of an expert can go far towards dis-
crediting an expert before the jury.
In view of Rule 403's underlying assumptions, the trial court must not
determine the unfair prejudice of proffered testimony in a vacuum. In
determining unfair prejudice, the trial judge must consider the effects of
aggressive and able cross-examination, 370 the introduction of testimony
from opposing experts, and other aspects of the litigation process that will
limit or reduce the unfair prejudice that might appear substantial in the
367. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898-99 (1983) ("[T]he rules of evidence gen-
erally extant at the federal and state levels anticipate that relevant, unprivileged evidence
should be admitted and its weight left to the factfinder, who would have the benefit of
cross examination and contrary evidence by the opposing party. Psychiatric testimony pre-
dicting dangerousness may be countered not only as erroneous in a particular case but as
generally so unreliable that it should be ignored."); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 956 (3d Cir. 1990) (The Rules "embody a strong and undeniable
preference for admitting any evidence having some potential for assisting the trier of fact
and for dealing with the risk of error through the adversarial process.").
368. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard-PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 859-60 (3d Cir. 1990) ("How-
ever, a court cannot fairly ascertain the potential relevance of evidence for Rule 403 pur-
poses until it has a full record relevant to the putatively objectionable evidence. We
believe that Rule 403 is a trial-oriented rule .... [W]e hold that in order to exclude evi-
dence under Rule 403 at the pretrial stage, a court must have a record complete enough on
the point at issue to be considered a virtual surrogate for a trial record."), cert. denied sub
nom. General Elec. v. Knight, 499 U.S. 99 (1991); 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 261,
§ 5214.
369. FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee's notes ("In reaching a decision whether to
exclude on the grounds of unfair prejudice, consideration should be given to the probable
effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a limiting instruction .... The availability of other
means of proof may also be an appropriate factor.").
370. As Professor Cleary explained: "A further underlying assumption is that the Rules
will operate within the framework of an adversary system, with professional lawyer repre-
sentation of the parties as the norm." Cleary, supra note 304, at 910; see also Rock v.
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987).
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abstract. Often, the litigation process itself will adequately address the
potential for unfair prejudice that the admission of questionable scientific
evidence would create.
If the adversary process is unlikely to mitigate significantly the danger
of unfair prejudice, then the trial court must determine whether the pro-
bative value of the proffered testimony is substantially outweighed by the
danger of admitting it. Only if the probative value of the evidence is
substantially outweighed by its dangers will the trial court have the dis-
cretion under Rule 403 to exclude the evidence.
D. RULE 403's BALANCING APPROACH: A WORLD OF DIFFERENCE
Application of the proposed Rule 403 analysis to questionable scien-
tific evidence would introduce three critical differences in the admissibil-
ity inquiry as compared to the approaches the restrictive courts have used
under Rules 702 and 703. First, the Rule 403 analysis calls for a balancing
rather than a threshold approach. As a result, the fact that the proffered
evidence is the best, and perhaps only, evidence available weighs strongly
in favor of its admission under the Rule 403 approach, 371 but it plays no
role at all under the Rule 702 and 703 threshold analyses. Further, under
the proposed Rule 403 analysis, a court must consider both the value and
the potential harm of the questionable scientific evidence, whereas under
the restrictive Rule 702 and 703 approaches, the evidence is evaluated
against a threshold "valid science" standard.
Second, the Rule 403 analysis re-focuses the trial court's attention on
the evidence within the concrete context of the litigation and the adver-
sarial process rather than the abstract world of science. Instead of asking
the trial judge to determine whether scientific evidence is valid, Rule 403
asks the trial judge to evaluate the evidence's role within an adversary
context and consider the evidence's likely effect on the jury's resolution
of the issues. Such an inquiry requires the judge to determine, for exam-
ple: (i) whether the evidence is a type that well-trained lawyers in the
area can adequately discredit through effective cross-examination, (ii)
whether the presence of opposing experts will adequately convey to the
jury the disputed nature of the issue on which the opposing experts have
testified, and (iii) whether a limiting instruction, or the trial judge's ability
to comment on the evidence, will adequately remind the jury to make its
own evaluation of the evidence, guided perhaps, but not controlled by the
experts' opinions. Even assuming a generous degree of scientific savvy
on the part of trial judges,372 the trial-oriented inquiries on which Rule
371. See 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 261, § 5214 (observing that "the judge
cannot focus exclusively on the challenged evidence, but must look at the other evidence
already introduced or available to the proponent").
372. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796 (1993)("We are confident that federal judges possess the capacity to undertake [a review of the
proffered testimony to ensure that the testimony is scientifically valid and has a valid scien-
tific connection].").
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403 focuses are far more likely to be within a trial judge's expertise than
would an analysis based entirely on scientific validity.
Moreover, the threshold good science approach essentially asks the
trial judge to determine whether he or she finds the proffered testimony
convincing and therefore encourages trial courts to usurp the jury's tradi-
tional role of deciding what weight to assign various pieces of evidence.373
By keeping relevant causation evidence from the jury if the trial judge is
not convinced of its validity, the threshold approach inevitably leads the
judge to substitute improperly his or her judgment on the issue of causa-
tion for that of the jury. On the other hand, Rule 403's balancing of pro-
bative value against unfair prejudice reminds the trial judge to focus on
the evidence's role within the context of the litigation and the adversarial
process rather than on the evidence's substantive correctness.
Third, while application of Rule 403's structured balancing test may
sometimes lead a trial judge to the same conclusion that he or she would
otherwise have reached under the restrictive Rule 702 and 703 threshold
approaches, 374 Rule 403 will lead to the admission of questionable scien-
tific evidence in far more cases. Given Congress's undisputed intent to
rely principally on the adversarial process rather than gatekeeper judges
to resolve disputed issues of fact, applying Rule 403 to the admissibility
373. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2797 (1993);
Osburn v. Anchor Labs., Inc., 825 F.2d 908, 915-16 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Garnac Grain
Co. v. Blackley, 932 F.2d 1563, 1567 (8th Cir. 1991); Wilson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc., 893 F.2d 1149, 1154 (10th Cir. 1990); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 780 F.2d 147, 156
(1st Cir. 1985).
374. For example, in Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1987), the plain-
tiff claimed that his symptoms of depression, high blood pressure, allergies, nervousness,
and "itching on his arms and legs" were caused by his occupational exposure to a pesticide,
Tordon 10K. Id. at 421. The plaintiff's expert, Dr. Alfred Johnson, eventually hospitalized
the plaintiff, and performed multiple tests on the plaintiff, including allergy testing. Id.
None of the tests implicated Tordon 10K as the basis for the plaintiffs depression and
hypertension. Id. at 423. On the basis of the plaintiff's oral history alone, Dr. Johnson
concluded that the plaintiff suffered from a toxic reaction to Tordon 10K. Significantly,
however, Dr. Johnson failed to ascertain whether the plaintiff had a family history of de-
pression and hypertension (which the plaintiff did), notwithstanding Dr. Johnson's own
testimony that these conditions had a hereditary component. Id. Dr. Johnson also admit-
ted that the plaintiff's condition could have been caused by a number of other causes. Id.
Thus, on the basis of negative test results and an incomplete oral history, Dr. Johnson
made a finding of causation. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's exclusion of Dr.
Johnson's testimony under Rule 703 because the opinion lacked the requisite foundation
and reliability. Id. at 424.
For the reasons previously discussed, see supra notes 89-105 and accompanying text, the
court should not have relied on Rule 703 as a basis for excluding Dr. Johnson's fundamen-
tally unsupported testimony. Once the court established that physicians typically rely on
oral histories and laboratory results in making diagnoses, Rule 703 has been satisfied. In
this case, even though Dr. Johnson's testimony was fundamentally unsupported, Rule 401's
general relevancy requirement may also have been satisfied. If it was, the weakness of the
underlying bases suggests that Dr. Johnson's testimony has little probative value because
the flaws in his bases substantially reduce the tendency of his opinion to establish the cause
of the plaintiffs symptoms. Given the minimal probative value of Dr. Johnson's testimony,
the risk that the jury may give undue credence to Dr. Johnson's opinion because of his
"expert" label might suggest a danger of unfair prejudice sufficient to justify excluding the
testimony under Rule 403.
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issue would return to the Rules the "liberal thrust" that Congress in-
tended when it enacted them. 375
VI. CONCLUSION
In enacting the evidentiary rules concerning expert testimony Congress
intended to liberalize the admissibility of such evidence by overruling cer-
tain common law limitations on the use of expert testimony, and to estab-
lish a uniform code of evidence to simplify practice in the federal courts.
Certain federal courts have expressed concern, however, that the liberal
admissibility of expert testimony often leads to inconsistent and inaccu-
rate results in toxic tort cases. These courts have chosen to restrict the
admissibility of expert testimony in a manner that is inconsistent with the
plain-meaning and legislative history of the Rules in question.
In a determined attempt to restrict the flow of relevant, but questiona-
ble, scientific evidence to toxic tort juries, the restrictive courts have gen-
erally ignored Rule 403 as a basis for evaluating scientific evidence, in
favor of reliability tests that have been improperly injected into Rules 702
and 703. By doing so, the courts have crafted an admissibility standard
much more restrictive than the structured balancing of Rule 403 that
Congress intended to govern the issue, and have thereby substituted a
trial judge's admissibility decision for the rigors of the adversary process
as the appropriate testing mechanism for determining the accuracy and
substantive correctness of questionable scientific evidence.
375. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
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